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Philosophical Anthropology in Contemporary Times. (1992) Directed by Dr. R. Fritz 
Mengert. 337 pp. 
This philosophical and historical investigation into the nature of radical evil 
includes a discussion of the history of radical evil that culminates in a twentieth century 
perspective on radical evil based on Martin Buber's philosophical anthropology and his 
biblical/Kabbalistic interpretation of the sources of evil and the ultimate redeemability 
of the individual human person. An historical-philosophical portrayal of the concept of 
radical goodness concludes with an interpretation of Buber's / and Thou in light of the 
post-Holocuast modern world's ethical struggles. The central thesis is that post-modern 
society accepts varying occasions and degrees of radical evil because, in part, it has 
experienced the radical evil of the Holocaust and consequently evaluates the acceptability 
of evil in comparison to the ultimate evil known by people within this century. 
Accepting some evil, not striving toward goodness, has become the route by which 
humankind considers behavior, government, rules, deviance, and social policy. 
Concomitant to this thesis of societal acceptance of evil in comparison to the radical evil 
of the Holocaust is the critical importance of the individual person as the source of both 
radical goodness and radical evil. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
If a piece of my life remains with every student I have taught and with every 
teacher from whom I have truly learned, then it seems probable that my spirit has been 
enriched by the task of writing this dissertation. The ever-renewing spirit of Martin 
Buber's Judaism has brought me here, now. Without his voice that spoke directly into 
my heart, I could not be here, now. It has been my father's presence and spirit that has 
shown me that even though he could fight in France and liberate concentration camps in 
Poland, I must--I have ro—know that here and now within every human being there is a 
redeemable spirit of goodness that may, from time to time, resemble evil. Fritz 
Mengert, the embodiment of the spirit of love and caring in this and every moment, has 
shown me that it is O.K. to be smart, to talk philosophy, and to enjoy myself. My 
mother and my sisters have joined to provide assurance that no matter what I may do, 
they will always be there for me, whether that involves proof-reading yet another chapter 
or picking up the take-out to feed my family while I sat glued to the computer. Danny 
and Lauren have put up with my need to monopolize the family computer and willingly 
gave up their time with me as well as their need for me so that I could finish just "one 
more section," and showed that they loved me anyway through it all. My "brother," 
Steve, understood and believed in me. He was there to talk and with open arms for one 
hug, and another one, and yet another when I really needed them. And David, my 
lawyer/partner/friend/lover/WP51 expert waded mercilessly through the manuals and 
solved every problem while he ordered pizza for the kids and gave me back, without too 
iii 
much complaining but always with a calmness that overwhelmed and saw through my 
stress and pressure, the opportunity of three years that I once gave him for law school. 
The men, women, and children without names but with numbers on their forearms 
marched steadily through my mind as I struggled with their journey. I believe I have 
walked along with them and their spirit has been permanently imprinted within me. I 
am the better for it. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
APPROVAL PAGE ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii 
CHAPTER 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF RADICAL EVIL 1 
The Duality of Good and Evil: Ancient Religions 1 
Evil: The Christian View 6 
Evil in the Ages of Science and Enlightenment 8 
Evil in the Age of Psychology 12 
Buber's Philosophical Anthropology: Good, Evil, Radical Evil ... 23 
Classical Kabbalistic View of Good and Evil 35 
Buber's Biblical Foundation of Evil 39 
Two Stages of Evil 41 
Radical Evil 49 
The Eclipse of God 57 
II. HASIDIC AND KABBALISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF 
RADICAL EVIL 60 
The Ba'al Shem Tov 60 
Isaac Luria and Kabbalism 62 
Buber's Interpretation of Hasidic and Kabbalistic Thought 68 
Buber's Recounting of Hasidic Parable 75 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF RADICAL GOODNESS 77 
Martin Buber's Unity of Good and Evil 77 
Early Civilizations' Conceptions of Radical Goodness 97 
Hedonism 97 
Buber's Perspective on Hedonism 103 
Stoicism and Cynicism 106 
Buber's Perspective on Stocism and Cynicism Ill 
Self-Realization: The Good Life 113 
v 
Buber's Perspective on Self-Realization 126 
Scholasticism 130 
Buber's Perspective on Scholasticism 136 
Utilitarianism Through Rationalism 140 
Utilitarianism 140 
Rationalism 146 
Buber's Perspective on the Utilitarians and Rationalists . . . 152 
Eastern Thought 155 
Bhagavad-Gita 155 
Buddhism 156 
Buber's Perspective: The Teaching of the Tao 157 
Reformation Through Intuitionalism 160 
Reformation of Aroused Conscience 160 
Buber's Perspective on the Protestant Reformation 168 
Deontological Intuitionalism 171 
Buber's Perspective on Deontological Intuitionalism 183 
Buber's Perspective on Ethical Naturalism 191 
Ethical Evolutionism 197 
Buber's Perspective on Ethical Evolutionism 201 
Ethical Pessimism 204 
Buber's Perspective on Ethical Pessimism 213 
Modern Philosophy 218 
Pragmatism 218 
Buber's Perspective on Pragmatism 224 
IV. MODERN RADICAL PHILOSOPHY: THE I AND THOU 229 
The I and Thou 229 
The Threshold of Meeting and Dialogue 229 
Buber and Dialogue 235 
Meeting 237 
The Sphere of It 239 
The Eternal Thou 242 
Dimensions of Evil 249 
What Is Man? 249 
Distance and Relation 251 
The Nature of Evil 256 
Conscience and Guilt 259 
Mythology and the First Stage of Evil 261 
Mythology of the Second Stage of Evil 269 
The Second Stage of Evil 272 
vi 
Coming to Radical Evil 274 
Background 274 
Radical Evil 276 
The Eclipse of God 280 
Modern Responses to Radical Evil 287 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 293 
APPENDIX A: EPILOGUE 311 
APPENDIX B: THE VOICE OF THE CRICKET 317 
APPENDIX C: COMMENTARY 336 
vii 
1 
CHAPTER I 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF RADICAL EVIL 
This study will investigate the way in which we have come to know evil as the 
opposite of good and offer an alternative paradigm based on the thinking of Martin Buber 
for coming to know evil. Using the metaphor of the Holocaust and style of Hasidic 
parable, my goal is to engender a new understanding for recognizing radical evil by 
investigating the radical goodness that emerged in epochs of philosophizing human 
society throughout history. The following material is descriptive of the dissertation and 
of the literature search and narrative that I will undertake. 
The Duality of Good and Evil: Ancient Religions 
The question of good and evil has generated a paradigm of duality throughout 
history. A considerable number of authors from the realms of philosophy, psychology, 
literature, history, and religion have imagined the notions of good and evil as opposites, 
locked in an eternal struggle for domination of one by the other or the calling for the 
emergence of good to triumph over its demonically-inspired counterpart (Russell, 1988). 
Evil, the less philosophically desirable but nonetheless the more forceful of the two 
forces, can be described as existing in three types: moral, natural, and metaphysical. 
A moral evil is one in which an intelligent being knowingly and deliberately inflicts 
suffering upon another sentient being. Natural evil is comprised of suffering resulting 
from processes of nature such as cancer or a tornado. Metaphysical evil is the necessary 
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lack of perfection that exists in any created cosmos, since no cosmos can be expected to 
be perfect as God is perfect (Russell, 1988). In addition, evil may be regarded as 
personal, exemplified when a person murders a child; transpersonal, evidenced by mob 
lynchings or governmental bombing of a city; transgeneric, which has potential if 
intelligent yet morally flawed beings exist on other planets, perhaps, which extends evil 
beyond humanity; and cosmic evil which is played out by human willingness to menace 
our entire planet with destruction to oppose a nation or group currently defined as the 
enemy. 
We have come to know evil through three general schools of thought: the Judaeo-
Christian religious morality, traditional scientific or materialist world view which had at 
its core 18th century scientific realism, or through New Age thought which was hostile 
to both the Judaeo-Christian morality and scientific realism, and which strived to 
entertain a wide diversity of angles and vision through its desire to explore reality beyond 
conventional lines. Its goal was to answer the question: Could the devil, the 
personification of evil, exist outside the human mind? 
Throughout history, diverse social, cultural, and religious groups have envisioned 
evil both as personified by a being and as a conglomeration of existence that defied 
anthropomorphic representation. The Greco-Roman civilization and religions had their 
share of gods and goddesses who represented, inspired, and wrought destruction, but they 
did not achieve a single personification of evil in their religious philosophy. Greek views 
on demonology were represented by Plutarch, who wrote soon after the New Testament's 
codification that demons were equivalent to god or the divine; that souls of the dead had 
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the capacity for changing into other levels of being; and that intermediary spiritual beings 
could become good or bad. He also insisted that some men retained personal guardian 
spirits (Plutarch, 1932). Homer wrote that demons existed in a midway position between 
gods and men. Hesiod classified four levels of beings: gods, demons, heroes, and men. 
Xenocrates, in agreement with Plato, defined demons as those with human emotions but 
godlike powers. Socrates often talked of daimonion, a kind of negative voice that kept 
him from certain actions and Plato posited divine intermediaries as lesser than divine 
beings who acted as intermediaries between the gods and humans, (Symposium 202E-
203A). This view made it easier to attribute to the attendant demon things which if 
ascribed to the deity might seem unworthy or philosophically difficult to accept 
(Ferguson, 1984). Accordingly, it was the natural tendency of the Greeks and other 
cultures increasingly to attribute bad things to these intermediary beings (Ferguson, 
1984). The Greek roots of evil were derived from a dual-sexed being who sired the 
father of Kronos, the father of Zeus. Thus evil can be seen as pre-dating the celebrated 
gods and goddesses of Greek religion. Even Greek rationalists like Plato wavered 
between dualism and monism when ascribing a basis to the existence of good and evil 
in our world. The Hermetic literature of the second and third centuries C.E. blended 
Platonic and Stoic thought regarding evil. Evil demons were the cause of evil in the 
world (Hermes, 1954). 
Although the early Hindus and Buddhists considered demonology central to their 
philosophies, they too had no single figure that embodied what western twentieth century 
culture has come to know as a devil-figure. The Hindu stories of the Tandava Dance of 
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Shiva illustrated both sorrow and joy and attempted to annihilate the illusory world yet 
integrate the world with Brahma. This rite attempted to re-create chaos of creation to 
regain and release creative forces in man. Japanese Buddhists recognized over twenty-
four thousand demon servants, seen as executioners of divine justice who tormented 
damned souls. The demon who can be seen as closest to a devil figure was Mara, the 
demon of death and thirst. His purpose was to attempt to obstruct the divine Guatama's 
progress toward enlightenment, but Buddha, who knew the only way to true good lay in 
transcending the world, drove him away. Mazdaism or Zoroastrianism became one of 
the first cultures to typify a single demonic figure but retained a certain ambiguity which 
was never resolved over the origins of evil. 
Egyptian culture viewed God and gods as ambivalent who both helped and 
hindered humanity. Metaphysically, the ancient Egyptian cosmos was a stable 
coincidence of opposites which promoted worldly stasis. In such a divine cosmos, the 
Egyptian theology held, absolute evil could not exist and therefore no one figure 
represented such evil. In neighboring Sumaria and Mesopatamia, such cosmic harmony 
was almost non-existent, a state of chaos which they attributed to a world that was 
fundamentally alienated from its divine plan. The Mesopatamian world was one filled 
with hostile demons and the gods representing goodness were not expected to interfere 
in man's plight; in fact, they could help, abandon, or ignore the world's situation. The 
closest representation to a metaphysical evil spirit was Lilitu, the prototype of Lilith 
(Cantor-Zuckoff, 1976), a barren female, who inflicted evil on the world by draining 
men of their life energy. This notion of a feminine demon whose evil work was directed 
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mainly against men has been carried over into ancient Hebrew mythology as well as has 
been inculcated into the Christian concept of original sin. 
The Canaanite and Phoenician theology directly influenced the early Hebraic 
concept of evil and centered around the god, El, a bull who dwelt in earth as well as 
heaven. As his son, Baal, became the god of fertility and vegetation with the power to 
grant or deny success, the evil lord and Baal's direct counterpart, Mot, defeated him and 
sent him to the underworld which locked the two antithetical forces into eternal combat. 
Our medieval caricatures and artwork of evil as physically horrible are derived from the 
Etruscan concept of Charun, the god of death, which relied heavily on the Greek Charon, 
the boatman of the dead. 
This struggle of a doublet of life and death which were both God has 
characterized Western religious philosophy as we have come to know it. The ethical 
ambivalence within a single personality has been translated into the cosmos in which 
good and evil were forever intertwined. Attributing good to be the opposite of evil can 
be understood through the metaphor of a spectrum rather than through the opposition of 
a simple duality. The first thoroughly dualist religion, Zoroastrianism, dated from 1200 
B.C.E. and the Iranian prophet Zarathustra who decreed that evil was not an aspect of 
the good God but a completely separate principle. The first monist religions, Rabbinic 
Judaism and Islam, existed at the opposite end of the spectrum regarding the duality of 
good and evil, but the monist polytheisms of Egypt, Greece, and India were near the 
same pole as Zoroastrianism. Christian theology existed between these two extremes 
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with Lutheranism and Calvinism at one pole, and Augustine, Aquinas, the Manicheans 
and Process Theology residing closer to the other. 
Evil: The Christian View 
The classical Christian view was represented by St. Augustine's of Hippo 
diabology of the fathers. Augustine's influence on Western thought was considerable and 
his positive theology and use of reason to construct a detailed, logically organized and 
structured view of the world has become the basis of conservative Christianity in our 
time. The Syrian monk, Dionysius the Areopagite, was Augustine's counterpart, and he 
espoused a negative theology affirming that the greatness of God was far beyond the 
powers of human reason. Dionysius wrote that rational systems have limited value and 
truth should be pursued less through logic than through prayer and contemplation. Taken 
together, these two approaches were more complementary than competing and they have 
provided the basic structure of Christian theology for more than a millennium. 
Christian theology began with God as eternal, timeless, and without cause, whose 
nature was to create the universe. Because God was creative and dynamic, the universe 
could not be regarded as static; rather, it was seething with power. Had the cosmos been 
formed only with love, it would be unformed; had it been formed singularly with reason, 
it would resemble a machine. God created man with free will after the creation of angels 
with free will because an absence of free will would disallow a moral choice of good. 
Traditionalists held that the first thing the angels did was make a moral choice: most 
chose to love God, but some, led by Satan, chose to put their own wills in place of 
God's and were therefore cast out of heaven. The first choice made by people was evil 
and away from God. Augustine's belief in reconciliation impelled him to write that 
nothing limited God's omnipotence except God and when He chose to suspend it, people 
were able to exercise free will. There was genuine moral choice because free will was 
genuine. God supported humanity and the angels' search for the good with a special 
energy termed "grace." 
Dionysius argued that man must reconcile with God not through reason, but 
through contemplation, prayer, and an understanding beyond reason. He warned that no 
qualities could be assigned to God because such categories were inventions of the limited 
human mind and must become limitations of God. Dionysius' was a panentheistic 
theology in which the cosmos was God in the sense of God's being a manifestation of 
Himself, but that the cosmos was infinitely transcended by God-in-Himself. A useful 
analogy is that of the cosmos being in God like a sponge is "in" a vast sea (Russell, 
1988, pp. 107-108). 
The universe was a dynamic hierarchy to traditional Christian thought and was 
represented by a moving scale or ladder. Dionysius' was the first detailed description 
of a celestial hierarchy, but was not accompanied by an evil hierarchy. His explanation 
was that although God was love, He was neither meek nor mild and He was not what we 
preferred Him to be. Through the theory of privation, Dionysius explained evil simply 
as the lack of good, with no substantial being. Evil was 
. . . [a] lack, a deficiency, a weakness, a disproportion, an 
error,purposeless, unlovely, lifeless, unwise, unreasonable, imperfect, 
unreal, causeless, indeterminate, sterile, inert, powerless, disordered, 
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incongruous, indefinite, dark, unsubstantial, and never is itself possessed 
of any existence whatever (Russell, 1988, p. 109). 
Thus all things were God, but evil was not God, since evil was not anything only a lack 
of being, evil was a lack of Godness. 
The Catholic Church in the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 established that evil 
was created by Satan's choice through his free will away from God. Since evil had no 
essence, it was declared, it could not be the source of anything. Evil might diminish 
good but not consume it, and since evil had no being, it could not cause anything except 
accidentally. The principles of incoherence and disorder likewise cannot have existed, 
since these were mere negations of coherence and order. Had God created evil, these 
two eternal principles would have to be absolutely balanced, and the cosmos would be 
in stasis between them. But if they were not absolutely balanced, one would eternally 
exclude the other. Therefore, an absolutely evil being cannot exist, because absolute evil 
was absolute nothing and such a being would be self-contradictory in that it would hate 
and cancel out its own essence and if it loved and cherished anything in itself, it would 
not be entirely evil. 
Evil in the Ages of Science and Enlightenment 
This theological perspective dominated conservative Christian theology until the 
eighteenth century when the Christian world view weakened and ancient questions 
resurfaced. In the Middle Ages prior to the age of scientific realism, the dualism again 
arose regarding rule of the universe by a just and intelligent mind or by chance and mere 
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mechanics. The Catholic and Protestant world became more secular, and focused on the 
tangential aspects of religion, such as social action and other good works. Enlightenment 
thinkers were opposed to the churches and were aligned with social betterment achieved 
without miracles, independent of tradition, and obedient to philosophies of reason. The 
French Revolution of 1789 was hostile to Christianity, and Christian symbols lost their 
effectiveness. Whereas in 1700, nature was believed to illustrate the splendor of God, 
in 1800 nature was personified to describe the divine in terms of philosophical 
phenomena. Concepts such as evil were seen as "philosophical baggage" (Russell, 1988, 
p. 137). 
Fideism, similar to medieval nominalism and democratic mysticism, developed 
and asserted that God's truths were forever beyond human reason and Christianity could 
not be proved rationally. Voltaire rejected theological certainty, a view which paralleled 
pietism and Methodism dominant by the late 1800s, and wrote that optimism must be 
dismissed when it maintained that all was right when in fact all was wrong. True 
religion, Voltaire implied, must ignore dogma and rest on purely natural morality. His 
logical conclusion was that Christianity was false because it tried to make doctrine about 
the unknowable and was socially destructive. David Hume proposed a rational basis for 
religious skepticism around five points: (1) the transcendent (the only valid knowledge 
was empirical); (2) the psychological (the origin of all religion was the projection of 
human hopes and fears on external objects); (3) the historical (religion was a human 
invention and has developed in a natural, historical fashion); (4) that spiritual intervention 
cannot occur in the universe; and (5) that monotheistic religion was incorrect because of 
the existence of evil. Hume's arguments carried to the extreme espouse atheism. 
Donatien Alphonse Francois, Marquis de Sade, took up Hume's atheistic 
relativism and defined the dilemma: either there was evil or not; either there were 
grounds of ultimate concern to judge actions or not; either the cosmos had meaning or 
not. In the General History and Theory of the Heavens, Kant showed the evolution of 
the cosmos and lent support to arguments for atheism. When Christian history regarding 
creation became suspect, its semeiotics were also questioned. Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
a liberal theologian, tried to eliminate the idea of radical evil by writing that Christ and 
the apostles did not believe in such evil but were only using a metaphor that represented 
the superstitions of their time in order to communicate with a relatively unsophisticated 
people. Therefore, scholars' misinterpretation of Christ's use of metaphor had resulted 
in an unnecessary, unfortunate, and misguided determination of the existence of radical 
evil. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau personified the change from the Enlightenment to 
Romanticism and the concomitant shift in the Western Christian view of evil. Rousseau 
was contemptuous of organized religion and rejected the church. His belief was that evil 
was understood better as social rather than metaphysical, and admonished, "Man, look 
no farther for the author of evil: you are he." Although Rousseau believed that human 
nature was basically good, he held that society had corrupted it and called for social 
reform, education, and even revolution to erase repressive institutions. 
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By the 1800s, evil, as personified by the figure of a devil, could be found more 
in literature than in theology, a shift that encouraged psychological introspection in a 
society desiring emotional stimulation with a thirst for the miraculous, supernatural, 
weird, and grotesque. Romantics used Christian symbols without theological content and 
their outlook was one of detachment from basic religious meanings. The Romantic hero 
was a rebellious individual who opposed the church, now seen as a political evil. The 
hero's goal was liberation of humanity from that which blocked progress toward the goals 
of liberty, beauty, and love. Writers of this period characterized evil in terms of 
goodness within the construct of literary excess. 
William Blake symbolized the extremes of good and evil in his work and typified 
self-righteousness as evil and rebellion against tyrannical authority as good. For Blake, 
no evils and no goods were absolute. George Gordon, Lord Byron, opposed the 
traditional Christian view of evil and the degree of evil present in the world convinced 
him that the Christian Creator could not be defined as "good." Percy Bysshe Shelly 
rejected organized religion and defined evil as that which blocked progress toward the 
spirit of love moving humanity toward a better, freer, and more loving future. His 
writing reflected Manichean philosophy in which two spirits of balanced power and 
opposite dispositions existed and reflected the divided state of the human soul. In Mary 
Shelly's writing, there could be no reconciliation between the halves of this divided soul 
and both halves must ultimately perish. Victor Hugo opposed the doctrines of original 
sin, salvation through crucifixion, and hell. Although humanity and God were 
intrinsically good and benevolent, Hugo portrayed a tension between Jesus and 
Christianity and sought the "real" Jesus behind Christian doctrine. For Hugo, evil was 
the lack of equilibrium, peace, and balance in the cosmos and was reflected in the 
alienation of humanity from love and liberty. By mid-century, Romanticism had split 
into two directions: (1) toward naturalism which favored realistic descriptions of 
everyday life, and (2) toward decadence which explored the depths of human corruptions, 
especially sexual depravity. 
American Romantic writers such as Edgar Allan Poe and Mark Twain considered 
evil as detached from any one personification and wrote in the bleak spirit of nihilism. 
Evil often appeared in writing at the outset as profoundly horrible and was then revealed 
through irony as good. The 20th century message through such writing could be known 
as a reproach to God because the world's evil was really God's cruelty to the world of 
real people. 
Evil in the Age of Psychology 
By the late nineteenth century through the early twentieth century, materialist 
assumptions outweighed religious traditions, including a serious belief in radical evil. 
The most influential thinkers in this shift were Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. The intellectual consensus was that the ideas of both 
God and radical evil were illusions. William James, a psychologist in sympathy with 
religion, faced radical evil by intuitive experiences and wrote that the "world is all the 
richer for having a devil in it, so long as we keep our foot upon his neck" (Russell, 
1988, p. 242). Whereas the bases of Christianity, scripture, tradition, and reason had 
been undermined by philosophy, history, and bible criticism, James added a new 
dimension to the discussion of good and evil, that of personal experience. 
James believed that philosophy and the study of good and evil should be personal 
and was not best studied in a university setting. This aesthetic principle of ease, that 
philosophy was done best when done at ease, reflected his non-traditional academic 
orientation and way of coming to know. James argued that one must live in the 
emotional present. The first act of free will, according to James, was the belief in free 
will. His idea that the roots of moral behavior can be found in the unconscious and not 
in the conscious choice of free will opened the way for psychological interpretation of 
good and evil. 
James changed the way of knowing evil in America from the perspective of 
metaphysical monism to a paradigm of pluralism. Evil was transformed from a problem 
requiring solution into a mystery to be lived. Because absolute idealism denied the 
reality of evil and classical theism was mired in the difficulties of dualism, James 
suggested a kind of Manichaean account in which evil originated outside God. He 
attempted to scrap the monistic view and "allow the world to have existed from its origin 
in a pluralistic form, as an aggregate or collection of higher and lower things and 
principles" (Fontinell, 1986, p. 151). Following from this way of knowing, evil "might 
be and may always have been, an independent portion that had no rational or absolute 
right to live with the rest, and which, we might conceivably hope to see got rid of at 
last" (James, 1902, p. 113). 
James's contribution to the shift in thinking about evil from the philosophical and 
metaphysical realms into the psychological domain was clearly American in character. 
In his practical, or popular, theism, James declared that "God is not necessarily 
responsible for the existence of evil; he would only be responsible if it were not finally 
overcome" (James, 1902, p. 112). The problem of evil thus became a practical rather 
than a speculative problem regarded from the viewpoint that humanity should be 
concerned "[n]ot why evil should exist at all, but how we can lessen the actual amount 
of it... " (James, 1977). 
Envisaging God also took on pragmatic American overtones. In the religious life 
of ordinary people, God was no longer, James wrote, the entirety of things. God could 
be known as a superhuman person who called us to cooperate in his purposes and who 
furthered ours if our purposes were worthy. The only philosophical account of evil that 
could reside alongside pragmatism for James was one that energized human beings in 
their struggle to lessen and overcome it. This constituted an alternative position to those 
proposed by Nietzsche, Sartre, and Camus that the world was essentially meaningless and 
absurd, and our incorrigible longings for justice, peace, harmony, and life were doomed 
to utter frustration (Fontinell, 1986). James's pragmatism proposed that we may believe 
that the world was becoming rational and moral, and humanity could overcome the 
feature of absurdity. 
Limiting God was a feature of James's pragmatism that reconceptualized the way 
we have come to know both God and the problem of evil. God was now recognized as 
having an environment and was in some respects limited in power and knowledge. To 
reply to the question regarding the existence of evil in a world of an all-knowing and all-
powerful God, James declared that God could not be all-powerful or all-knowing. Above 
all else, James's American pragmatism sought to reconcile great mysteries with the 
barometer of practicality. His concept of God's power and limitation was "[t]he one of 
least resistance, then, as it seems to me, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, 
along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the 
notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in 
knowledge, or both at once" (James, 1977, p. 141). Evil therefore could exist because 
God was not in complete control; because God was partially ignorant of what was 
happening; or because God was both ignorant and partially powerless (Ford, 1982). 
Many modern psychologists other than James, such as Viktor Frankl, Erich 
Fromm, and especially Sigmund Freud, dismissed the notion of evil and substituted 
societal concepts of violence or aggression. Freud, the primary voice of modern 
psychology and psychoanalysis, asserted that religion was a psychological phenomenon 
whose origin and nature could be both explained and explained away. Although he did 
not believe in metaphysical evil, he was interested in demonic possession and developed 
a diabology in which the force of evil could be known as a substitute for a seductive 
father or parent hatred. It represented an element of the unconscious in opposition to 
conscious will. The central position of Freud's work was repression and sublimation and 
their dominating significance of the whole structure of personal and communal life. 
Freud's investigation into the problem of evil took direction into the mythical 
character of the symbolism of evil. Freud postulated four cycles of myths: (1) myths 
of primal chaos, (2) myths of wicked god(s), (3) myths of souls exiled in evil voids, and 
(4) myths concerning historical faults of individuals who were both ancestor to and 
prototype of humanity (Ricoeur, 1970). Myths of evil yielded temporal orientations that 
were satisfying to modern men and women because they happened "once upon a time," 
and presented insulated spheres of investigation. Citing the heuristic value of exploring 
myths for ontological value, Freud posited that such investigation conferred universality, 
temporality, and ontological import on our self-understanding. Investigating myths of 
evil became, for Freud, a hermeneutic problem which did not impose upon reflection 
from without, but from within by the very movement of meaning and by the implicit life 
of symbols taken at their semantic and mythical level. 
Such symbology pointed to a way of knowing that implied opposite relationships. 
The symbol of wandering of sin corresponded to pardon in the symbol of return. The 
symbols used to describe the weight of sin implied deliverance, and the symbol of 
slavery called forth the symbol of liberation. Images of beginnings received their true 
meaning from the images of the opposite end of the dichotomy. Ultimately, to the 
symbol of the figure of Adam corresponded successive figures of a King, a Messiah, a 
Just One Who Suffers, the Son of Man, the Lord, and Logos (Ricoeur, 1970). In 
Freud's paradigm of id, ego, and superego, there was a one-to-one correspondence 
between the two dichotomous symbolisms. Thus the symbol of evil received its true 
meaning from the symbolism of salvation. As example, Freud cited the Christian Credo 
which stated, "I believe in the remission of sins" (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 40). 
Critical to Freud's interpretation of the symbolism of evil was that the "end" was 
not absolute knowledge; rather, such final knowledge was foreshadowed by prophecy. 
Absolute knowledge became impossible in the problem of evil. The symbols of nature 
and of evil were not simply one set of symbols out of many, but were privileged symbols 
which resisted any reduction to rational knowledge. The failure of all theodicies, of all 
systems concerning evil, Freud implied, was their inadequacy regarding absolute 
knowledge in the Hegelian sense. 
Freud also insisted that philosophical interpretation of symbols would never 
become absolute knowledge. In this regard, Freud moved from the system of Hegel to 
that of Kant and moved from a dissolution of the problem of evil in dialectic to the 
recognition of the emergence of evil as something inscrutable, something that could not 
be captured in a total and absolute knowledge. Symbols of evil attested to the 
unsurpassable character of all symbolism and they declared the failure of systems of 
thought that swallowed up symbols in an absolute knowledge. Symbolism of evil was 
therefore for Freud the implication of the symbolism of reconciliation. Because they 
were given only in signs that were its promise, such symbolism invited thought on the 
understanding of faith, an understanding Freud described as threshold understanding. 
Religion therefore took on the character of an art of bearing the hardships of life. 
Further, Freud regarded the cultural function of consolation as that which placed religion 
beyond the sphere of fear, into the sphere of desire. 
Melanie Klein took Freud's ideas to the conclusion of "splitting," in which one's 
desire to preserve the absolute goodness of a beloved object caused one to deny it any 
imperfection and transfer it from the beloved object to something else. Carl Jung, in 
disagreement with Freud's psychology, recognized religion as a necessary, 
psychologically valid part of the psyche and of civilization. 
Good and evil for Jung were psychological realities that people must face them 
squarely and integrate the unconscious with the conscious in the light of reason. His 
doctrine of modern society's universal unconscious structure archetypes which produced 
societal myths and images, rejected radical evil because it was unwilling to face the 
reality of evil. To Jung, evil was as real as good and was a necessary part of the cosmos 
and of God. When enormously powerful cosmic energy represented by radical evil was 
denied or repressed, Jung warned that it would burst forth with a destructiveness 
proportional to the degree of its repression. If it were integrated, its energy could be 
turned toward the greater good. 
In his theory of individuation, Jung took a gnostic position, that of knowing about 
faith, rather than a devotional framework, that is, actually living faith. Jung's collective 
unconscious or objective psyche was a transpersonal, objective, and awe-inspiring account 
that made religion, in its historical and biographical forms, the subject of comprehensive 
observations (Friedman, 1983a). In an analysis that bridged the division between 
psychology and religion, Jung defined religion as a living relation to psychical events 
which took place in the darkness of the psychical hinterland (Friedman, 1983a, p. 170). 
Further, Jung implied that the soul was that aspect of the human person through which 
alone the collective unconscious could enter into experience. 
An adherent of modern consciousness, Jung turned from faith and the religions 
that have emanated from it to a new psychology in which a new religion was proclaimed, 
one of pure psychic immanence. This religion turned to the soul in the Gnostic sense as 
the new arena which replaced the conscience by the unity of good and evil. In this 
manner, Jung united the opposites and created a balance of the two forces. The place 
of the deity, Jung wrote, was replaced by the wholeness of man. Although Jung stopped 
short of deifying man, the marriage of good and evil was elevated by him to a position 
as the new Incarnation. The unconscious, however, created the idea of a deified or 
divine person. 
Jung disagreed profoundly with theologians who wrote or said "God" and assumed 
others understood what was meant by the author(s). He challenged such theologians to 
offer proof that the "God" they had chosen was the "right" or only deity that the modern 
consciousness could relate to or accept. Because he saw himself as a full empirical 
psychologist, Jung stated that he believed all statements about God were necessarily 
psychic statements and were thus subject to the realm of psychology. His epistemology 
was based on the contrast between inner and outer with a distinct depreciation of the 
outers as the "persona," the social role, the ego which must submit to the unconscious 
or become neurotic, or the eternal world which finds its true meaning only in the depths 
within. Jung's philosophy was marked by a modern, post-Kantian idealism in which 
reality and thought were identical. 
Viktor Frankl was a proponent of an existential school of psychiatry based on: (1) 
freedom of the will, (2) the will to meaning, and (3) the meaning of life. In his work 
with modern patients, Frankl discovered profound and deep-rooted problems of personal 
emptiness and meaninglessness. People, he conjectured, were suffering because they 
were no longer told by their instincts what they must do. Unlike former times, men and 
women today were no longer instructed by their traditions precisely what they should do, 
and the confused individual no longer knew what he wished to do. Choices available 
seemed to fluctuate between the disparate ends of a dichotomy and forced individuals to 
choose between conformism and totalitarianism. Frankl's logotherapy was a realistic 
therapy that faced the tragic triad of human existence: pain, death, and guilt. The 
function of this therapy was to show patients how to transform despair into triumph. 
Reflecting that in our age traditions were on the wane, Frankl's logotherapy was 
designed to equip people with the ability to find meaning. Postulating that there was an 
essential self-transcendent quality of human existence, Frankl wrote that the human 
person was therefore able to reach out beyond himself. Similar to Buber's I-Thou 
philosophy of dialogue, Frankl's asserted that this dialogue defeated itself unless our / 
and Thou transcended ourselves to refer to meaning outside ourselves. Thus the 
encounter between and / and a Thou must involve confrontation; the one confronted the 
other with logos, the "meaning of being" (Frankl, 1970, pp. 8-9). 
Religion, Frankl wrote, provided the human person with a spiritual anchor that 
he could find nowhere else. The relationship between the animal world and the world 
of people was analogous to the relationship between the world of people and the realm 
of God. There may be, Frankl offered, a world beyond this world of human beings in 
which the question of the ultimate meaning of human suffering would find an answer. 
Albert Einstein remarked that "mere thinking cannot reveal to us the highest purpose," 
and Frankl added that suprameaning was not a matter of thinking, but of believing. One 
did not catch onto it on intellectual, but on existential grounds (Frankl, 1970, p. 145). 
Frankl's premise, that faith in ultimate meaning is preceded by trust in an ultimate 
being or trust in God, did not alter the fact that people could not break through the 
dimensional difference between the human and divine worlds. Humanity could reach out 
for ultimate meaning through faith that was mediated by trust in an ultimate being. This 
separating dimensional difference was similar to Heidegger's ontological difference that 
there was an essential difference between things and being. Being was not one thing 
among other things. This dimensional difference prevented man from really speaking to 
God and took on the character of an ontological difference. Frankl added that "[t]o Him 
of Whom one cannot speak, to Him one must pray" (Frankl, 1970, p. 146). 
Recognition of the difference between the world of people and the realm of God 
made for humanity's wisdom and things improbable in the lower dimension, (the world 
of people), could be perfectly possible in a higher one, (the realm of God). Even 
revelation did not break down the dimension barrier for Frankl and he refused to allow 
the inference of a supranatural being from the evidence of the existence of natural beings, 
or creation. Consequently, knowing the nature or purpose of evil was impossible to 
realize by human persons in their dimension of reality. This impossibility often caused 
despair, although Frankl's logotherapy was designed to counteract such negativity. To 
others, the result was a shift toward nihilism. 
The modern push toward nihilism can be found in the writings of Feodor 
Dostoyevsky in whose work is found the shift from anarchism, atheism, and revolution 
to a devout spirit of Russian Orthodoxy which was marked by a deep distrust of Roman 
Catholicism. Dostoyevsky's ideal was sobornost, an ancient Russian doctrine of the 
communion of believers centered on love of Christ and mutual responsibility and charity. 
Evil was known by facing the human condition squarely and with intense feelings of 
compassion, sin, and suffering. The form and substance of evil was the cruelty of 
sinners and the suffering of the poor and weak. Human beings were worse than beasts 
because only humanity was deliberately cruel. How God could tolerate or even create 
such beings was, for Dostoyevsky, evidence that He could not exist. 
Modern society was faced with a force that urged us to deploy weapons of mass 
destruction that could result in planetary annihilation. The horrors of the twentieth 
century have resulted in a sharpened sense of evil characterized by cynical dullness, 
relativism, and cultural despair (Russell, 1988). The twentieth century has also seen a 
return to consideration of evil as well as the end of optimistic progressivism in theology. 
New Christian theological arguments attempted to shift the blame for evil from human 
beings to angels and were not designed to explain the existence of evil in the world. 
Some church doctrine has argued that Old Testament post-exile Hebrews created a devil 
figure for evil to explain the existence of evil and not blame God. The position has 
resurfaced that Jesus and the apostles' use of a devil figure was metaphorical and was a 
result of their attempt to communicate with unsophisticated masses. 
Albert Camus faced the enigma of evil in a world without transcendent values. 
In The Plague, he tried to make sense of, or explain disaster and concluded that one must 
simply do one's best in a world where horrors have no meaning except in our resistance 
to them; and in a world without absolute values, courage and honesty are intrinsically no 
better than selfishness, cowardice, and cruelty. 
Our vocabulary for knowing evil has been defined by historical tradition, and 
religions have passed down such nomenclature with dynamic changes. The world "devil" 
was not an acronym or encoding of the word "evil;" rather it was derived from the Greek 
diabolos, or slanderer, peijurer, or adversary (Russell, 1988). The Hebrew word satan, 
translated as adversary, obstacle, or opponent. The naming of evil may have stemmed 
in part from our unconscious perception of ourselves in which we sensed ambivalence. 
Because the unconscious was ambivalent and creation of myth was close to our 
unconscious, and because myth tended not to create wholly evil beings, "[it] is usually 
the conscious that rationalizes and distorts, splitting the natural ambivalence of good and 
evil into polarities, opposite absolutes" (Russell, 1988, p. 8). Myth was not; however, 
an unformed outpouring of the unconscious. "Like poetry, art, or music, it arises from 
a creative tension between unconscious materials and conscious forms. Myth, like 
theology, often tries to separate the good from the evil in the God" (Russell, 1988, p.8). 
Buber's Philosophical Anthropology: Good, Evil, Radical Evil 
Martin Buber's philosophical anthropology was based on the thought of Ludwig 
Feuerbach. Feuerbach placed emphasis on the question of man at the center of his 
philosophical enterprise, a movement which was in direct opposition to that of Kant and 
Hegel who focused on human cognition as the center (Wood, 1969, p. 5). Buber moved 
from the idea of the question of man as central to regarding man in relation with others 
as the focus of his coming to know. According to Buber, man was no longer located 
philosophically as an individual, but in the relationship of man with man. This 
relationship's ontology is the between, and the locus of Buber's philosophical 
anthropology was in this relation. As man and woman engaged in evil actions, Buber's 
philosophy broadened and discussed the radical nature of the dilemma of the modern 
human person in the society he witnessed. 
Radical evil was a symptom of modern society which poured money into arms and 
was unwilling to face moral and social problems. By trying to deal with it in scientific, 
genetic, or environmental terms, society excluded the concept of transcendence. The 
flat, materialistic assumptions of contemporary Western society have effectively censored 
concern with radical evil by expressions of contempt or condescension for transcendent 
views (Russell, 1988). 
Martin Buber's thought regarding the tension in which man lived has been the 
central focus of his writings. Even before his writing of the I and Thou, Buber 
recognized and agonized over the concepts of confrontation and the between. As this 
thought progressed, he concentrated on describing the human person's position as being 
on the narrow rocky ridge, constantly striving to enter into relation with others. Part of 
the human person's existential tension was reflected in this narrow ridge between 
authentic encounter between an I and a Thou, and those encounters which were described 
as 1-lt relations. Buber, who was originally interested in Hasidic and mystical thought, 
eventually replaced the idea of mystical union with the idea of the human person's 
encounter with God as the Eternal Thou. 
Simply stated, Buber's philosophy regarding such holy encounter between person 
and person was reflected in "I confront a human being as my Thou and speak the basic 
word 'I-Thou' to him" (Buber, 1958). However, with the potential for moments of holy 
communion between two persons and between individual and God, there lay the potential 
also for the opposite relation, described by Buber as the 1-lt. The concept of the 1-lt 
became more neutral, although it originally contained a fundamental demonic or satanic 
idea, (Horwitz, 1988). Although both affiliations were necessary for man's survival, and 
"without it [the 1-lt relationship] man cannot live" (Buber, 1958), man must live within 
the tension of balancing both the I-Thou and I-lt relationships for personal wholeness, 
authentic relations, and hope of redemption. 
Whereas the 1-lt relationship still maintained some negative connotations, the 
demon temptation, Buber noted, was not a being in itself. Drawing on his strong Hasidic 
influences, by 1918 Buber wrote that the demon of the between was a non-substance and 
a hindrance to one's meeting with the Confronted (a term he eventually changed to the 
Thou), and the obstacles and powers of evil assumed forms and hindered us from 
reaching our goal of becoming all that we were supposed to become (Buber, 1957). By 
1922, Buber narrowed and elaborated the meaning of the Between not as the 
hypostatization of the relation, such as the figure of Christ which was viewed as a 
between, an idea Buber felt was an obstacle to direct relationship between man and God; 
nor as religion, which Buber felt that as a series of dogma and laws was merely the 
result of the human attempt to make the encounter with God comprehensible through a 
symbolic ordering of the knowable and the doable (Horwitz, 1988, p. 142). The 
Between can be known as a narrow rocky ridge between the gulfs where there was no 
sureness of expressible knowledge but the certainty of meeting what remained 
undisclosed (Buber, 1965). The unity of these contraries was the mystery at the 
innermost core of the dialogue (Buber, 1948). 
How then did Buber become known as a philosopher who maintained an 
unwavering insistence on the concrete? In part Buber has become known as an asker of 
real questions and a demander of real answers (Friedman, 1960). Before 1922, Buber 
had written of God in the third person, but his concept of relationship with the Eternal 
Thou shifted his focus to God in the second, more concrete person of speech. As his 
ideas developed, his conception of God as the true Thou of the human 1 solidified the 
relationship. He attacked the psychological, philosophical, metaphysical, mathematical, 
and scientific ways to reach God because he insisted these forms objectified God. 
Theology, Buber felt, was unimportant and worked against religious forms (Horwitz, 
1988). The only way to know God, Buber concluded, was through direct relationship. 
The original evil of all 'religion' was the separation of "living in God" from "living in 
the world" (Friedman, 1955, p. 117). A human being could not live in such a separated 
manner with his soul detached from life in relation with God. Such thinking misled the 
faithful into feeling secure with objective consummation without personal participation. 
God became displaced by a figment of the soul itself. The dialogue which the soul 
thought it was carrying on "[was] only a monologue with divided roles" (Buber, 1943). 
Without the dialogue of relationship, one cannot truly know another person and thus 
cannot achieve concrete knowing of another. Man cannot meet man, and woman cannot 
meet woman, as individuals, but they must meet person with person, the connection of 
the I and Thou. 
The individual man for himself does not have man's being in himself, 
either as a moral being or a thinking being. Man's being is contained 
only in community, in the unity of man with man-a unity which rests, 
however, only on the reality of the difference between / and Thou (Buber, 
1965, p. 136). 
The development of the 1-Thou relationship ran progressively through Buber's 
writings. In his early essay on Jacob Boehme (1900), the feeling of unity was used to 
illustrate the idea that the human person was the microcosm of the universe and all levels 
of the universe were contained in each individual, a thought drawn directly from 
kabbalistic interpretations. By 1909 in Ecstasy and Confession, Buber expanded the idea 
of unity to illustrate the oneness in ecstasy of the I and the world. By the time he 
completed Daniel in 1913, unity became known as having been created and realized in 
the world. And in his masterpiece, The I and Thou, it was used to illustrate the I and 
Thou relation, an event which took place between two human beings who none the less 
remained separate. The philosophy of realization was concomitantly transformed into the 
philosophy of dialogue which explained that when a person truly experienced a thing that 
leaped to meet him of itself had known therein the world (Friedman, 1960). The reality 
of the experienced world was so much more powerful that when the person experienced 
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it powerfully, the more he realized it. The world therefore cannot be known in any way 
other than through things and not otherwise than with the active sense-spirit of the loving 
man (Friedman, 1960). 
Real living was authentic, genuine meeting according to Buber's philosophical 
anthropology. The sphere of real living included both the world of the here and now, 
along with the relationship between the individual person and the Eternal Thou. Man did 
not possess God; he met Him. True community, Buber wrote, could be founded only 
on changed relations and relationships between and among people. True community, or 
real living, illustrated each person's infinite sphere of responsiblity, which Buber 
described as one's infinite responsibility. The really responsible men were those who can 
withstand the thousandfold questioning glance of individual lives, who gave true answer 
to the trembling mouths that time after time demanded from them decision (Buber, 
1958). The obstacle to real living for modern society was the dualism which separted 
life into two unrelated spheres: one of truth of the spirit, and the other of the reality of 
life. Real living united the spheres into one and the individual met the everyday as 
sacred meeting. 
Because all real living was meeting, people lived from moment of meeting and 
ending of that moment, with the ending of the moment as one's realization of the 
meeting, to the potential for new moments of similarly profound or more greatly 
significant meetings. Living on the rocky narrow ridge of the between, we experienced 
existential tension. Living within this creative tension characterized modern man and 
woman. 
There were four types of evil which the modern age was particularly aware: (1) 
the loneliness of the modern person before an unfriendly universe and before those with 
whom he associated with but did not meet, (2) the increasing tendency for scientific 
instruments and techniques to outrun our ability to integrate those techniques into our 
lives in some meaningful and constructive way, (3) the inner duality of which modern 
society has become aware through the writings of Dostoyevsky and Freud and the 
development of psychoanalysis, and (4) the deliberate and large-scale degradation of 
human life within the totalitarian state (Friedman, 1960). "Good and evil form together 
the body of the world. If man had simply to live in the good, then there would be no 
work of man" (Kohn, 1930, p. 308). Buber's vocabulary for evil and good revolved 
around the work of modern society, their successes and failures, and the forces that 
helped determine their victory or defeat. Man's work, Buber wrote, "[is] to make the 
broken world whole . . . Evil is the hardness which divides being from being, being 
from God" (Kohn, 1930, p. 308). 
The work of man and woman was to overcome the divisiveness between 
individuals and among communities. One of the primary motivations for Buber's interest 
in mysticism in his early studies was his concern with the problem of the relation 
between the individual and the world. First, he recognized the division between the 1 
and the world and the duality within the individual. Later, he argued for the unity of the 
1 and the world in both intellectual and emotional vocabulary. This experience and 
change in perspective regarding aloneness and division may have caused Buber to shift 
from his earlier monism regarding an already existing unity which only needed to be 
discovered, to a later emphasis on realizing unity in the world through genuine and 
fulfilled life (Friedman, 1960). Concomitant to this shift in emphasis was Buber's 
recognition of the dialectic between primal unity and the multiplicity of the world; the 
dialectic between conflict and love. Conflict, the bridge in and through which one / 
revealed itself in its beauty to another /, and love, the bridge through which being united 
itself with God, created a tension in which the person seeking real living struggled. 
The human person's anxiety also centered on another conflict, one between evil, 
the rebellion against God with the power He had given each individual to do evil; and 
good, the turning toward God with this same power. Evil could be described in this 
thinking as a lack of direction; and good as finding direction, the direction toward God. 
Additionally, Buber's vocabulary portrayed evil as the condition in which the I-It 
predominated; good as the meeting of the 1 with the Thou, and the permeation of the 1-lt 
by the 1-Thou. 
Good and evil, then, cannot be a pair of opposites like right and left or 
above and beneath. 'Good' is the movement in the direction of home, 
'evil' is the aimless whirl of human potentialities without which nothing 
can be achieved and by which, if they take no direction but remain 
trapped in themselves, everything goes awry (Buber, 1965, p. 78). 
Many of Martin Buber's writings were concerned with the dilemma, origin, and 
nature of good and evil. Of special concern to Buber was the issue of right and wrong 
and its place in modern society's observation of the human world. An important theme 
of his writings was that of our images of good and evil and the place of evil in the 
personal development of each modern individual. Rather than considering evil and good 
as a dichotomy or as an existential abstraction, Buber considered what the origin of evil 
was and why evil was so powerful in the world. Having spent more than thirty years as 
a co-translator of the Hebrew Bible into German with his colleague, Franz Rosenzweig, 
Buber's biblical orientation caused him to examine the Psalms to discover "how gradually 
arising and growing insight into the relation between wrongdoing and true existence is 
expressed in them" (Buber, 1953). In his examination of Israelite and Persian 
mythology, Buber presented a twofold prehistorical origin of what we call evil and 
"thereby enable[d] the modern thinker to point out what corresponds to this twofoldness 
in that biographical reality of present-day man which is known to us" (Buber, 1953, 
Foreward). 
Buber's curiosity with people's struggle with good and evil led him to recognize 
that although the stories and myths may have been told by more than one author, they 
espoused the same basic view and attitude that yielded a single figure's voice. When 
examined thoughtfully, he concluded that, taken in the right sequence, the myths and 
stories of good and evil seemed to lead along the stages of a personal and human way. 
This personal way of stages required the genuine participation of the authentic individual. 
Buber's philosophical anthropology characterized his consideration of good and 
evil and was the result of his preoccupation and struggle with the problem of evil since 
his youth, although he did not approach the topic in his writings until after World War 
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I was concerned above all to show that in their anthropological reality, 
that is, in the factual context of the life of the human person, good and 
evil are not, as they are usually thought to be, two structurally similar 
qualities situated at opposite poles, but two qualities of totally different 
structure (Buber, 1953, p. 64). 
Nicolai Berdayaeff, who characterized the "paradoxical problem of evil," 
disagreed with Buber's premise and maintained that Buber's was an impossible solution 
because we needed a point of attack in our struggle against evil. Berdayaeff saw Jewish 
messianic thinking as dualistic, that is, the expectation of the Messiah's coming alongside 
the passionate longing for His coming. This idea of dualism affected his criticism of the 
/ and Thou because he did not understand the meaning of the "between" and could not 
therefore give it ontological significance. Rather, Berdayaeff posited, the Christian 
principle of freedom of choice between good and evil was the very root of the Christian 
spiritual situation. Christianity was based essentially upon freedom of good and evil, that 
is, upon an antithesis giving it a tragic and dynamic character absent from the pre-
Christian and non-Christian worlds (Berdayaeff, 1962). Because where there was crisis 
there was hope, Berdayaeff wrote that we can shape history by shaping our inner life. 
Berdayaeff, a religious and historical analyst, wrote that finding meaning in life would 
offer an antidote to the disintegration of the human personality in the modern age 
(Berdayaeff, 1962). 
The chief villain to the relocation of meaning was technology. The result of 
increased technical living was the complete spiritual disorientation of modern life, 
illustrated in part in art and literature, the faithful mirrors of their times. Proposing a 
dialectic both to grasp and oppose social and cultural disintegration, Berdayeff stressed 
that we must integrate our historical experience in religion, specifically, Christianity. 
This particular religion was based on freedom for him and this condition gave it a special 
character. "Christianity is based essentially upon freedom of good and evil; that is, upon 
an antithesis giving it a tragic and dynamic character absent from the pre-Christian and 
non-Christian worlds" (Berdayaeff, 1962, p. 7). The choice between good and evil was 
at the heart of the human spiritual situation and where crisis existed, Berdayeff 
maintained, hope could be found. Hope personified the human crisis in this system of 
thought. 
In place of such solution-oriented thinking, Buber proposed a synthetic description 
of evil happening. First, he argued, "The struggle must begin within one's own soul-all 
else will follow upon this" (Buber, 1953, p. 64). Our crucial experiences did not take 
place within a sphere in which creative energy operated without contradiction, but in a 
sphere in which good and evil, despair and hope, the power of destruction and the power 
of rebirth, dwelt side by side. The divine force which the human person actually 
encountered in life did not hover above the demonic, but penetrated it (Buber, 1952). 
Secondly, Buber introduced the Gog, the mythical incarnation of external 
metaphysical evil, and asked, 
What is the nature of this Gog? Can he exist in the outer world only 
because he exists within us? The darkness out of which he was hewn 
needed to be taken from nowhere else than from our own slothful and 
malicious hearts. It is our betrayal of God that has made Gog to grow so 
great (Buber, 1945, p. 65). 
In his reading of the biblical, Zoroastrian Avestic and post-Avestic myths of good 
and evil, Buber distinguished between two fundamentally different kinds and stages of 
evil. His writing of Good and Evil: Two Interpretations was in part an answer to 
Berdayaeff's challenge and in part Buber's recognition of the fact that the meaning he 
posited for good and evil transcended even the anthropological. Buber's love of Hasidic 
story and mythical parable was evidenced through his insistence that truths such as those 
regarding good and evil could be communicated adequately to the generality of mankind 
only in the form of myths, (Buber, 1953). All human concepts are bridges between 
myths and reality and we need them because 
[m]an knows of chaos and creation in the cosmogonic myth and he learns 
that chaos and creation take place in himself, but he does not see the 
former and the latter together; he listens to the myth of Lucifer and hushes 
it up in his own life. He needs the bridge (Buber, 1953, p. 66). 
Human knowledge of good and evil, Buber continued, was really our knowledge 
of the myths that have defined good and evil for us. Knowing the "opposites inherent 
in all being within the world" enabled people to have, based on our knowledge of the 
creation-myth, "adequate awareness of the opposites latent in creation." Knowledge of 
good and evil, Buber maintained, 
. . . means nothing else than: cognizance of the opposites which the early 
literature of mankind designated by these two terms; they still include the 
fortune and the misfortune or the order and the disorder which is 
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experienced by a person, as well as that which he causes (Buber, 1953, 
pp. 73-4). 
Because such knowledge was thought to be the primordial possession of God, the 
idea of its attainment by the human person were worlds apart in nature. God "knew" the 
opposite of His being from His own creation because He was untouched by them while 
He was encompassed by them. In this characterization, God was thought to be familiar 
yet superior to His human creation. God could achieve direct intercourse with His 
creations and through this direct discussion, people and God functioned as opposite poles 
of the world's being. 
Our knowledge of good and evil, however, was acquired through the eating of 
miraculous fruit. This knowledge was of an essentially different kind from God's 
knowledge of good and evil. The superior-familiar encompassing of opposites was 
denied to man and woman because they achieved only part of knowledge; he could beget, 
she could give birth, but this was not equivalent to Godly creation. Because humanity 
and God could never be temporally coexistent, human beings knew oppositeness only by 
their situation within it. Each of us only knew evil when he recognized the condition 
wherein he had transgressed the command of God and he knew what he had lost (evil) 
and what he had lost became temporarily inaccessible to him (good). 
Classical Kabbalistic View of Good and Evil 
Classical Jewish philosophy, in its disdain of the primitive levels of human life, 
did not address the terrors people faced nor did it assuage their fear of life and death. 
By denying the myths that sprang from these terrors, such philosophy seemed to deny 
the very existence of the problem of evil. Nothing so sharply distinguished philosophers 
and Kabbalists as did their attitudes toward the problem of evil and the demonic 
(Scholem, 1969). Whereas Jewish philosophers attempted to dismiss it as a pseudo-
problem, Kabbalists made it one of their chief motives of thinking. Kabbalists treated 
evil as reality and the horror of the demonic in a straightforward fashion. 
In their attempt to reach the popular masses, Kabbalists inculcated the demonic 
into ritual and treated it as a central point in their faith. This "demonization" of life was 
both an appeal and a driving force that brought Kabbalistic Judaism to the masses. It 
was an example of the descent from the heights of theosophical speculation to the depths 
of popular thought and action. It cast good and evil into separate strata amid the ten 
sefirot, or mythical levels of the universe, and afforded evil its metaphysical ontology. 
Both good and evil are represented in the Shekhinah, the spirit of the exiled God. 
Because the human being was at the core imperfect, the world could not have survived 
if the Shekhinah exercised only stern judgment. Therefore the powers of mercy and 
stern judgment were alternately preponderant in the Shekhinah. The Kabbalists, 
however, related that there were states of the world in which the Shekhinah was 
dominated by the powers of stern judgment. As the Zohar put it, "[a]t times the 
Shekhinah tastes the other, bitter side, and then her face is dark" (Scholem, 1969, p. 
117). An age-old moon symbolism was used to complete this connection and the 
Shekhinah, when seen under this symbol, became the "Tree of Death," demonically cut 
off from the Tree of Life by spirits that had escaped from the sefirah of judgment 
(Scholem, 1969). Although in most Talmudic and Kabbalistic concepts the Shekhinah 
was the merciful mother of Israel, she became at this stage the vehicle of the power of 
punishment and stern judgment. Kabbalists related this alternating ambivalence to the 
exile of the Jewish people. The exile of the Shekhinah was Talmudic in origin, "[i]n 
every exile into which the children of Israel went, the Shekhinah was with them" 
(Megillah 29a). Although the Talmud stated that in every exile, the presence of God was 
with Israel, the Kabbalists insisted that a part of God Himself was and remained exiled 
from God. 
The Talmudic doctrine of two urges or yetsers, was the imagery Buber used to 
name the impulses given to created humankind by God. Although these two urges were 
given in complete liberty of free will to humanity by God, man and woman were 
reminded that they must keep the commandments and maintain faith to do the will of God 
with both of their urges. The Talmud split these urges in the opposites of good and evil 
urges, with the yetser rah, or evil urge, seen as elemental. Buber saw the two urges as 
necessary collaborators to accomplish service, the precursor of the Messianic redemption, 
to God. The greater the person, Buber wrote, the greater her urges. Man and woman's 
task was therefore not to extirpate the evil urge, but to reunite it with the good urge. 
Buber's reading of Deut. 6:5 wherein people were told to love the Lord with all their 
heart, implied a reunification of the evil urge with the good, the perfect urge. Humanity 
could not with only their own strength or prayer prevail upon the evil urge. 
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This important doctrine cannot be understood as long as good and evil are 
conceived, as they usually are, as two diametrically opposite forces or 
directions. Its meaning is not revealed to us until we recognize them as 
similar in nature, the evil 'urge' as passion, that is the power peculiar to 
man, without which he can neither beget nor bring forth, but which, left 
to itself, remains without direction and leads astray, and the 'good urge' 
as pure direction, in other words, as an unconditional direction, that 
towards God. To unite the two urges implies: to equip the absolute 
passion with the one direction that renders it capable of great love and of 
great service. Thus and not otherwise can man become whole (Buber, 
1953, p. 97). 
The Zohar, the Book of Splendor of the Kabbalistic writers, provided mythology 
regarding the first action of God that challenged and reinterpreted the more classical 
creation story of Genesis. 
In the beginning before the world existed, all the expanses, the void that 
would later become the home of heaven and earth, the stars, the lights, 
the depths, the water, and the layers of the world, was filled with God. 
God is and always will be unending. God created the world after having 
created many worlds. None of the worlds was tov m'od, very good. 
Because God was complete and unending, there was no room in the 
universe for the physical world, the world of man. And God contracted. 
He took His presence of light and pulled back into Himself and the world 
became possible. This tzimtzum [contraction] preceded God's emitting 
light; the light that created the world. God emitted beams of light into the 
vacuum that enabled His creation of the world. Before God created the 
world of man, God contracted. (Graves & Patai, 1964, pp. 34-40). 
God's contraction made possible the existence of something other than God and 
implicit in Kabbalistic symbolism was that this withdrawal of the divine essence into 
itself was a primordial exile, or self-banishment. In this contraction, the powers of 
judgment, which in God's essence were united in infinite harmony with the roots of all 
other potencies, were gathered and concentrated in a single point, namely, the primordial 
space from which God withdrew. But the powers of stern judgment ultimately included 
evil (Scholem, 1969). The entire process that ensued was a gradual purification of the 
divine organism from the elements of evil. Although theologically questionable, this 
myth represented the critical good/evil balance that became our modern concept of God. 
Disciples of Isaac Luria viewed the contraction not as a fundamental or necessary crisis 
in God Himself, but as a free act of love, which however, paradoxically enough, first 
unleashed the power of stern judgment. The general Judaic view was that God made a 
decision to contract and that decision marked God's first action. 
Buber's Biblical Foundation of Evil 
This was humanity's ironic dialectic: as we strived to become like God with His 
knowledge of good and evil, we knew that this was not God's intention for us. Our 
knowledge of good and evil was limited to earthly events. Buber's position was that God 
had intended to protect man and woman from the opposites latent in the existence in the 
Garden of Eden, but they withdrew from the will of God as well as from His protection. 
With this unrealized deed, man and woman caused these latent opposites to break out at 
a dangerous point at which the world was at its closest proximity to God. 
From this point on, oppositeness took hold of humanity, but as " . . . ever-
recrudescent reaction to the no-position and its irredeemable perspective" (Buber, 1953). 
The expulsion from Eden, Buber continued, was not God's punishment against His 
creations; rather, it was His offering of protection. Had man and woman eaten of the 
Tree of Life, they would have been condemned to endure eons of suffering. "For man 
as a 'living soul' known death is the threatening boundary; from him as the being driven 
round amidst opposites it may become a haven, the knowledge of which brings comfort" 
(Buber, 1953, p. 79). Now for man and woman all things were drawn into the 
atmosphere of oppositeness; it set woman as dependent upon man for bearing children 
and man's work, which had already been planned, became an affliction. From their seat 
in the garden, man and woman were sent out upon a path, their own, human path. This 
path has become the world's history and only through this history can the world have an 
historical goal. 
Buber investigated the story of Kain, the first fratricide which was told in the 
bible without irony or lingering, as the story of the first iniquity in the universal human 
sense. Such a crime, Buber maintained, would have been punished in every known 
society no matter where it had taken place. Adam and Eve's sin was classified as "pre-
evil," and Kain's as "evil," because Kain's actions came into being only as such through 
the act of knowledge. Therefore Kain became the first person to become guilty in the 
human sense. In Avestic mythology, a distinction was made between the state of the soul 
in which it purposed good and one in which it did not. There was neither a "good" nor 
"evil" disposition; rather, there was either a disposition with "good," or one without it. 
Therefore, "... a man knows only factually what 'evil' is insofar as he knows about 
himself, everything else to which he gives this name is merely mirrored illusion; but self-
perception and self-relationship are the peculiarly human ... the inner lot of man" 
(Buber, 1953, p. 88). 
Because Kain would not reply to God's question, an answer Adam had given 
when he was confronted by God, Kain delivered himself into the hands of indecision. 
The intensification and confirmation of indecision, according to Buber, was the decision 
to evil. In this state, man was enmeshed within a swirling vortex of possibilities, a 
concept Buber further elaborated in his reconsideration of good and evil in his post-
Holocaust writing. Within this indecision, conscious decision to evil was not the result. 
Rather, "[in] the vortex of indecision Kain strikes out, at the point of greatest 
provocation and least resistance. He does not murder, he has murdered" (Buber, 1953, 
p. 89). The punishment meted out to Kain by God was that of a fugitive and vagabond 
on earth which became the incarnate representation of what took place within Kain's 
soul. 
Two Stages of Evil 
Later in his writings, Buber distinguished between two distinct and different 
stages of evil. The first stage of evil corresponded to the Biblical myth and the second 
stage was closer to that explained in Zoroastrian mythology. This change in thought was 
precipitated by Buber's knowing the evil that was the Holocaust in Europe and its 
immensity and enormity impelled him to reconsider his interpretation of the nature of evil 
and the human person. The first stage of evil was characterized by decisionlessness, 
such as that state of being in which Adam and Eve, Kain, and the Flood were 
experienced. The eating of the apple was not a good versus evil decision in that the pair 
imagined the possibilities of action without knowing it, without realizing what evil was, 
and while they were in a dreamlike, Utopian contemplation. Kain did not decide, Buber 
interpreted, to murder Abel because he did not know what death and killing were. 
Kain's anger and frustration intensified and while in this state, "[in] the vortex of 
indecision ... at the point of greatest provocation and least resistance" he strikes out 
(Friedman, 1960, p. 105). Buber continued, "[m]an grasps at every possibility in order 
to overcome the tension of omnipossibility" (Buber, 1952b, pp. 57-60). Regarding the 
myth of the Flood and God's intention of destroying His creations, Buber wrote that the 
wickedness of man's actions was not due to the corruption of his soul, but was caused 
by the intervention of evil imagery. 
Imagery, the play with possibility, self-temptation from which violence sprang, 
was not entirely evil; in fact, it was the human person's greatest danger and her greatest 
opportunity. Imagery unlocked a power which could be left undirected or directed to 
good. The yetser rah, or evil urge, was close to the imagery of woman's heart and may 
be thought of as passion. Without imagery woman could not beget or bring forth, but 
when left to herself, woman remained without direction. Similar to the evolutionary 
coincidence of puberty, woman became aware of possibility which took the form of 
imaginable actions which threatened to submerge her in swirling chaos. 
To escape from this dizzying whirlpool within the first stage of evil, a soul may 
embark on one of two courses. The former led itself out of chaos, and the latter 
descended into it. First, a human soul may have set out on the difficult path of bringing 
itself toward unity or second, it may have clutched at any object past which the vortex 
happened to carry it and cast its passions on it (Friedman, 1960). If an individual 
clutched wildly, he exchanged undirected possibility for undirected reality. Human 
beings then did what they ordinarily would will themselves not to have done, what was 
alien to them, what was evil. This swirling whirlpool broke out of undirected surging 
passion wherever a breach could be forced and each one found himself on a flight into 
delusion and ultimately into mania. 
Evil became, then, for Buber, the lack of direction and what was done out of it. 
Evil was not action, for action was only the type of evil happening which made evil 
manifest. The evil itself lay in the intention: "The project of the sin and the reflecting 
upon it and not its execution is the real guilt" (Buber, 1952b, p. 66-73). Evil was not 
the result of decision because true decision could never be partial; it could be 
accomplished only with the involvement of the whole soul. "Evil cannot be done with 
the whole soul; good can only be done with the whole soul" (Buber, 1952b). 
Characterizing this first stage of evil was that absence of personal wholeness was the 
complement to the absence of direction and the absence of relation. If the struggling 
human person did not become what she was meant to be when she originally set out in 
the direction of God, then no personal wholeness was possible. Finally, without attaining 
personal wholeness, one could neither keep to direction nor enter into full relation, 
(Friedman, 1960). 
The characterization of the second stage of evil was drawn from Zoroastrian 
myths of Avesta and post-Avestic literature. As people descended into the second stage 
of evil, good and evil were thought of as primal moving spirits in real opposition in 
which evil for the first time assumed a substantial and independent nature. In this 
mythology, which was similar to the Kabbalistic stories of pre-creation, God's primal act 
was one of decision within Himself which implied man and woman retained self-choice 
regarding good and evil. Man and woman ceased to be able to be introspective of their 
motives at the point they surrendered themselves to evil with their innermost beings. In 
the Avestic legend, Ahriman, the evil spirit, was forced to choose between good and evil, 
a choice made within pure paradox since in choosing he acknowledged himself precisely 
as the evil. 
Yima, another Avestic mythological character, added a further dimension to this 
characterization of evil. When he called himself his own creator, Yima allowed the lie 
to enter reality because he took it upon himself to call himself the creator. This 
existential lie against being was one in which the individual saw himself as a self-creator. 
The situation in which humanity dwelt within an existential lie against being depicted the 
reality of the second stage of evil. 
Decision became Buber's focal point for the distinction between stages of evil. 
Whereas the first stage of evil was marked by indecision, the second stage was 
distinguished by decision. Indecision led to a course of indecision which forced man and 
woman into a fixation in indecision. "As long as the will to simple self-preservation 
dominates that to being-able-to-affirm oneself, this self-knowledge is repressed. But 
when the will to affirm oneself asserts itself, man calls himself into question" (Buber, 
1952b, p. 60). 
This was the crisis of self in Buber's philosophical anthropology. Buber's 
dilemma for the modern person was that he participated in life and sought his direction 
for himself. "It is no more allowed to any man to live as if evil did not exist. One 
cannot serve God by merely avoiding evil; one must grapple with it" (Buber, 1947b, p. 
10). Man was a creature of possibility and needed confirmation by others in order to 
become the particular man that he was. "Again and again the Yes must be spoken to 
him, from the look of the confidant and from the stirrings of his own heart, to liberate 
him from the dread of abandonment, which is a foretaste of death" (Buber, 1953, p. 
136). But when the human being was mired within the course of indecision, and called 
himself into question, 
[ . . . this] condition now either assumes a pathological form ... or the 
person finds the way out . . . through an extreme effort of unification 
which astonishes him himself in its power and effectiveness, a decisive act 
of decision, ... or a third process takes place. (Buber, 1953, p. 135). 
If this third process took place, the troubled soul took on the mythical role of Yima and 
proclaimed himself his own creator. 
This absolute self-affirmation was the lie against being and truth was no longer 
what such a man experienced as truth but what he ordained to be true (Buber, 1952c, p. 
43-56). At this point in his descent, evil became radical because there humankind willed 
what they found in themselves. Such persons affirmed what they had recognized in self-
awareness as that which should be negated and thus gave evil substantial character which 
it did not previously possess. Whereas the first stage may be described as whirling 
movement, the second stage of evil can be imagined as the freezing of flowing water 
(Buber, 1948a). The immense significance of the second stage of evil which was the 
newest development in Buber's thought at this time was its concrete base in human 
existence which made understandable such extreme phenomena as Hitler and the Nazis 
without resorting to the dogma of original sin or agreeing with Sartre's assertion that the 
events of recent years made it necessary to recognize evil as absolute and unredeemable 
(Friedman, 1960). 
Only by knowing the differences between the first and second stages of evil could 
the difference between the wicked one and the sinner be perceived. The sinner could be 
known as the one who missed God's way again and again, while the wicked one is the 
one who opposed it. The modern individual's becoming a sinner was that state in which 
he found himself from time to time without it adhering to him while the wicked was a 
kind of man with a persistent disposition toward evil. "The sinner does evil, the wicked 
man is evil. That is why it is said only of the wicked, and not of the sinners, that their 
way vanishes" (Buber, 1952c, p. 51). The wicked person did not stand in judgment 
before God; his way became his own judgment. Such a person negated his own 
existence and became nothing. His way to God was closed only from his own side and 
the wicked person was distinct because he did not wish to be able to return. 
Knowing and recognizing the differentiation between these two stages of evil 
posed a dilemma around the question: Can we enlighten people to recognize radical, 
second stage evil through any form of instruction? In what sense did this become 
knowing? 
Buber cautioned against historicizing the moment and considered such temporal 
constraint as one of the reactions chosen by the person in the modern world to separate 
herself from real meeting, real communion, and real dialogue. By removing the moment 
from the constraints of time, we could come to know radical evil reflectively, and the 
truly wicked person could not, Buber warned, accomplish this personal insight because 
she was so completely self-affirmed that she could not recognize an Absolute other than 
her own being. 
Although Buber's differentiation between the stages of evil did not mature until 
1951, in 1944 he placed a new emphasis on the nature and role of the demonic in his 
writing. The "cruel antitheticalness of existence itself was the tragedy implicit in 
humankind's misuse of the freedom given them in their creation (Buber, 1945). In his 
1940-43 essays on Sabbatai Zevi and Jacob Frank as false messiahs, Buber wrote that a 
distinction must exist between evil as decisionlessness and evil as self-affirmation. When 
Zevi became apostate in order to avoid martyrdom, Buber wrote that "[it] is not the 
belief as such but his belief in himself that does not stand firm." Frank, who believed 
in nothing, not even himself, was not a liar but a lie. He "can only believe in himself 
after the manner of the lie by filling the space of the nothing with himself" (Friedman, 
1960, p. 110). 
Such persons depended on the affirmation of their followers and strove to 
maintain a magical or charismatic influence over them. When the lie was called into 
self-question, such a person had to nourish himself from the belief of others in him. He 
became a leader who led into nothing and ended in disintegration. 
Buber encountered many changes in his life during this tumultuous time in the 
world. Having moved to Palestine in the late 1930s at the urging of his colleagues to 
escape the life-threatening dangers in Nazi Germany, Buber lived through a time in 
which the world witnessed genocidal persecution of modern Jews and Judaism. His 
move to Palestine could not assuage the fears for the future of modern Jewry because 
there he experienced the War in Palestine in 1948, a conflict that was a beginning, rather 
than an end, of a series of conflicts between Arabs and Jewish settlers that would 
continue throughout the remainder of Buber's lifetime in the Jewish State and beyond. 
Buber's concern then became to describe evil in light of three terrors with which 
he had personal experience: the Nazi persecution of the Jews, World War II, and the 
War in Palestine, the last of which was for Buber the most grievous of the three wars, 
(Buber, 1961). In his comparison of Frank and Hitler, Buber wrote that "[i]t is 
significant that it is in our time that the man has arisen in whom the tension between 
what one is and what one should be is dissolved—the man without conscience" (Buber, 
1957, pp. 151-156). 
Hitler's effectiveness, Buber declared, was caused by his fundamental absence of 
restraint. He believed in nothing other than his own power, a condition in the human 
person which was possible only when one was convinced he was commissioned and 
empowered by the Absolute. Because those who did not believe in any absolute being 
could not believe in this sense of the self, Hitler's absence of restraint was a function of 
his natural ability to avoid that necessary reflection which would make this emptiness 
apparent (Buber, 1957). 
Critical to Buber's writing about evil was that a human person's nature was not 
evil, only his use of that nature could be described as evil. He reminded the reader again 
and again that there were no human beings God cut off as simply evil; there were no 
human beings who were by their very nature hostile and incompatible to His purposes. 
Although some people brought evil to its radical stage where it took on its own 
substantial quality, evil was not independent, absolute, or ultimately unredeemable. 
Good retained the character of direction at both stages because there was only one 
direction, that is, toward God. As man walked along the narrow ridge, faltered, and 
descended into indecision, God never hardened His heart against a person or a people. 
The individual as an impotent participant was one of Buber's themes when he 
suggested that the human person could not stop sin when the situation became critical. 
Although he began the process, control was withdrawn from him at a fixed moment. It 
took a special sort of strength to persevere in sin but God granted this to a sinning person 
by granting each one of us absolute self-affirmation. 
God could not, Buber warned, withdraw this freedom He gave humanity in 
creation, and His allowing individuals to close off the way was an example of severe 
grace. The way was never closed off from God's side, but for some of the wicked 
whose ways have vanished, only conversion or turning of the whole person would 
suffice. 
Radical Evil 
Buber's investigation into the problem, nature, and origin of radical evil 
culminated in his writing Eclipse of God, a response in part to his personal lifelong 
struggle with the question of evil, as well as to the radical evil displayed against the Jews 
throughout Hitler's years of power in Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, World War II, 
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and the tragic War in Palestine. He finally postulated six situations in which the modern 
individual may find himself that prevented his becoming an 1, that is, enabling him to 
enter into relation with God as the Eternal Thou. These conditions included 
1. one's concern with revelation and the future 
2. his attempt to get behind the problematic of life 
3. his desire to possess or use divine power 
4. his acceptance of tradition and law as "once for all" and 
his taking refuge in it 
5. his possible belief in immortality, a condition which 
makes death seem unreal or unserious 
6. his use of symbols to address God that stand in the way 
of that address (Buber, 1952, p. 62, p. 84). 
Buber's writings were characterized by the themes of decision and direction. 
When society became rooted in a way of thinking and coming to know that precluded 
genuine meeting and real living, the path toward decisionlessness and evil loomed before 
people as chosen direction. People knew evil, the result of decisionlessness and lack of 
direction, insofar as they knew about themselves. Because self-perception and self-
relationship were peculiarly human, when society undertook any or many of the 6 
conditions listed above, they embarked on a course toward the affirmation of evil (Buber, 
1952c). When humanity cut itself off from the possibility of relationship with the Eternal 
Thou and adopted the ways of knowing that separated man from man and man from God, 
man's conscience became stifled and ceased to compare what the individual was and what 
the individual was uniquely created to become. When such a comparison was no longer 
made, individuals no longer lived within existential tension, no longer felt guilt, and no 
longer strove for authentic existence. When such a bankrupt existence was established, 
the modern person no longer sought or was able to say Thou with his whole being either 
to God or person. The result of this inability to enter into relation with one's whole 
being was the modern person's certitude of self-affirmation and resoluteness in setting 
definitional parameters of good and evil, right and wrong, from his own flawed 
perception, disregarding the critical relationship between such concepts and God. 
In his discussion of Hasidic piety, Buber wrote that certitude was never 
accomplished. Ready-made knowledge was impotent knowing because it contradicted the 
holy insecurity that characterized the human dilemma. Such knowing was the real 
antagonist of the reality of faith (Buber, 1952). As the human person attempted to move 
behind the unknowable force of God's creation and intention for human experience, the 
individual moved away from the direct, genuine meeting with the Eternal Thou toward 
the direction of self-affirmation. The philosopher's job, according to Buber, was to 
restore the lived concrete to the religious person through the destruction of images which 
did injustice to God. Those who searched for the pure idea only interposed an obstacle 
to achieving relationship with God. Because much of philosophy began with the primary 
act of abstraction, man raised himself above the concrete situation into the sphere of 
precise conceptualization and the God of the philosophers became a knowable God, but 
not a living God. By engaging in the above-listed 6 endeavors, philosophers encouraged 
modern humanity away from the lived concrete and toward a direction away from 
genuine relationship with each's Eternal Thou. 
Buber's thought regarding humankind's imagining of themselves included a 
temporal sphere that set Buberian philosophical anthropology in disparity to that of 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, and Marx in this regard. In their systems, these eminent 
thinkers proposed that one could attain consciousness of oneself only in the third person. 
Hegel's philosophical man could attain certainty only in cosmological, not human time, 
a situation Buber found abstract and relativized. Marx and Hegel, Buber wrote, assured 
the proletariat success in the future, a situation Buber felt ignored the potential creativity 
of the human person's power of decision. 
The power to make decision was uniquely human and uniquely characterized the 
divine nature of humanity. Indecision was not lack of decision; rather, it illustrated 
another aspect of the decision-making process. Only through indecision that involved the 
individual's whole being in light of his meeting another and his relationship with the 
Eternal Thou\ that is, authentic living, could people arise from the struggle and tension 
with genuine decision. In fact, almost all traditional thought tended to submerge the 
dialogical life Buber espoused by the "once for all" of gnosis, theology, philosophy, and 
social theory. "The original evil of all 'religion' is the separation of 'living in God' 
from 'living in the world" (Buber, 1952c, p. 11). When God became displaced by the 
figment of the soul itself, the dialogue which the soul thought it was carrying on was 
only a monologue with divided roles (Buber, 1947). 
The dualism facing the modern individual, Buber wrote, existed in many forms 
and has caused our age to become the most problematic of all historical ages of society 
because in the modern age, the person had become expropriated and dispossessed. Each 
individual historicized, technicized, psychologized, and philosophized the moments of his 
life, techniques which relegated religion and divine communion to the status of an aspect 
of life, rather than its totality, (Friedman, 1960). 
We experienced dualism in the world of work when the Absolute was denied; but 
Buber cautioned that one should not work unless the one saw meaning in such work. 
Because everyone in society was and is in a growing measure sociologically determined, 
all were in the grip of incomprehensible powers from the technological, economic, and 
political spheres which joined to trample us again and again in all our human purposes, 
(Buber, 1952). The sickness of modern man and woman was manifested most clearly 
of all, however, in the individualism and nationalism which made power an end in itself 
(Buber, 1965). And power without faithfulness, Buber warned, was life without meaning 
(Buber, 1965, p. 39). 
Consequently, Buber ascribed to Hitler the status of the personification of the 
inevitable end of the will to power and the tendency faced by all modern men to use 
others as a means to their own ends. An individual's seeking to overrun reality has 
become the dualism in the soul of the modern person and has produced, in our age, those 
who have become so devoid of humanity and ability to enter into relation, that one such 
as a Hitler has been enabled to arise. The portent of the present hour for Buber was that 
each human being had to interpret his encounters with God as self-encounters, and each 
person's very structure was destroyed (Buber, 1952). Additionally, humanity faced a 
vital dissociation, which Buber saw as the sickness of people of our age, when our 
organic forms, such as family, union in work, community in villages or towns, have been 
lost. This has generated an inward decay which has succeeded in intensifying human 
solitude and in destroying our security. 
Although new community forms had arisen, they were unable to duplicate the 
security which had been lost, a price modern society continued to pay in part from the 
pivotal events of the French Revolution. Consequently, human beings had elemental 
difficulty in attaining genuine conversation, especially between those of different kinds 
and differing convictions, and open dialogue was becoming ever more difficult and more 
rare; the abysses between man and man threatened ever more pitilessly to become 
unbridgeable (Buber, 1952). 
It is through this philosophical/anthropological discourse that I chose to consider 
the problem of good and evil, and radical evil, through the metaphor of the Holocaust. 
As twentieth century humanity faces the destruction of their organic forms through 
increasing solitude and inability to communicate their individual I to the Thou of others, 
the act of rescue during the Holocaust of Jews by non-Jewish Europeans takes on a 
different and problematic character. If the human world today, more than ever, is split 
into two camps which each regards the other as the embodiment of falsehood and itself 
as the embodiment of truth as Buber claimed, the very act of such rescue defied the 
existential mistrust Buber characterized as an integral part of modern society's sickness. 
He decried the dualism of individualism versus collectivism as the false dichotomy of our 
age, and maintained that in neither situation can the individual know true personal 
wholeness or true responsibility. 
Rescuers, or righteous gentiles, who comprised less than one-half of one percent 
of non-Jewish wartime Europeans, were able to resist the bonds of collectivism, a 
position Buber saw as one of the greatest dangers to the modern world. Collectivism, 
Buber held, which gave the appearance but not the reality of relation, imperiled the very 
value which constituted man. It destroyed the dialogue between person and God as well 
as living communion between human being and human being. Our isolation in a 
collectivist situation was not overcome, but was overpowered and numbed (Buber, 1965). 
As a modern person found herself a stranger and solitary in the world, if she now 
existsed in cosmic as well as social insecurity, if she were as homeless in the world as 
she was in the universe, then the rescue actions that occurred during the Holocaust years 
must take on an added and more profound significance. 
For some reason, certain righteous gentiles were able to overcome their existential 
mistrust as well as their mistrust of their fellow human being, reject the ideal of 
collectivism, remain in touch with the / of their being, and achieve communication with 
the Thou of others and rescue virtual strangers, imperil their own lives and the lives of 
their families for the sake of strangers, and reach a remarkable communion with a reified 
collection of downtrodden outcasts, then their confidence in existence in general was not 
destroyed, a fear Buber held as ominously possible for each one in the modern society. 
Jewish survivors, but rarely rescuers, experienced a loss of trust in God, a loss that 
Buber described as a portent for mistrust in eternity. 
It was only in our time that Buber feared humanity had reached the condition in 
which they could not reach out from their solitude and touch the divine form. At the 
core of this conflict between mistrust and trust of eternity was the loss of confidence in 
human existence which yielded a concomitant loss of trust in God. It was only in our 
time that this solitude became so immense that the person was paralyzed in his 
subjectivity. This inability to reach God paralleled Nietzsche's "God is dead" 
proclamation, a description Buber called the solitary individual's imprisonment in 
subjectivity which caused him to relativize all values and seek communication with only 
himself. Mistrust reigned and we witnessed a radical dissolution of all mystery between 
person and person. Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud have promoted theories and ideologies 
which consisted of seeing through and unmasking the other in terms of individual 
psychology or sociology (Friedman, 1960). 
Disguised as objective judgment, one dissembled the other to see through false 
ideologies and unmask his opponent's position. And as society split into groups through 
its nationalistic tendency, we were no longer able to re-establish a sphere of values 
common to all humankind (Buber, 1965). Those rescued Jewish survivors who rejected 
God, retreated into nihilism (Rubenstein, 1975), or declared that any messianic 
deliverance that occurs in the near future must be profane in light of the Holocaust 
genocide (Stern, 1982), formed groups who virtually dare God to declare His presence 
through personal revelation. It was their reaction to their experiencing radical evil that 
continued the eclipse of the Eternal Thou necessary to achieve a world of relation and 
communion among people of different backgrounds and opinions. For the re-realization 
of the direction toward good, the problem of radical evil must be addressed and solutions 
offered that strive to end the eclipse and re-establish the light of God. 
The Eclipse of God 
The eclipse of God, a situation in which the light of heaven was shut off from 
humanity's side, characterized the historical hour through which the world was and is 
passing. This eclipse may be seen as not taking place in human subjectivity but in Being 
itself. This metaphor was the human side of the silence of God, or of God hiding His 
face, (Buber, 1952). Although God lived intact in the light of His eternity, we became 
His "slayer" and he who refused to submit himself to the effective reality of 
transcendence contributed to the human responsibility for the eclipse. If the human 
person became incapable of apprehending reality absolutely independent of himself and 
having a relation with it, there would have been no rescue work of Jews by non-Jews in 
Europe. If there had been no rescue work, Heidegger may have been right in saying that 
we can no longer image God. When the world seemed empty of God and irretrievably 
abandoned to the forces of tyranny, God is, Buber wrote, but He is not present (Buber, 
1945). The rise of Hitler and the immense scope of Nazi terror and genocide appeared 
to validate Buber's view. But the work of individual and groups of rescuers provided 
some answer to Buber's question 
How is a life with God still possible in a time in which there is an 
Oswiecim? The estrangement has become too cruel, the hiddenness too 
deep. One can still 'believe in the God who allowed these things to 
happen,' but can one still speak to Him? Can one still hear His word? . 
. . Dare we recommend to . . . the Job of the gas chambers: "Call to 
him; for He is kind, for His mercy endureth forever?" (Buber, 1961, p. 
162). 
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Buber's demand of himself and others to ask 'real' questions and accept only 
'real' answers reached its zenith in light of the evil he experienced in Europe during the 
Holocaust years. Understanding such evil personally posed a dilemma even Buber could 
not thoroughly confront. When he accepted the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade 
in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1953, much to the dismay and outrage of his fellow Israelis 
and world-wide Jewry, Buber outlined the tension with which he approached this 
controversial event. 
With those who took part in this action in any capacity, I, one of the 
survivors, have only in a formal sense a common humanity. They have 
so radically removed themselves from the human sphere, so transposed 
themselves into a sphere of monstrous inhumanity inaccessible to my 
power of conception, that not even hatred, much less an overcoming of 
hatred, was able to arise in me. And what am I that I could here presume 
to 'forgive'! (Friedman, 1983, p. 119). 
The exploration of evil and the forgiveness of evil through this vocabulary 
removes the ideas of good and evil from the category of ethical abstraction and transfers 
it into the domain of existent states of human reality. Without considering the reality of 
those involved within a cataclysmic struggle with good and evil, discussion of duality is 
relegated to the status theological abstraction. It is my purpose to investigate the idea 
of good and evil as one existent state of human reality and to discuss this state within the 
parameters of the modern metaphor of evil, the Holocaust, and entertain questions of 
absolute or radical evil as a state of man that reflects substantial character which is 
existent in man's reality. This will be accomplished through the development of moral 
vocabulary related to the historical development of the evil as well as this particular 
circumstance of evil in its temporal setting in mid-twentieth century Europe based on the 
philosophy of Martin Buber; the tracing of philosophical-historical roots of the playing 
out of similar situations of radical evil; the examination of radical evil defined by the 
Holocaust by investigating the nature and work of Christian and non-Jewish rescuers 
from the I-Thou perspective; the writing of a creative and perhaps poetic representation 
of the discussion of coming to know evil personally through Hasidic parable style of the 
Ba'al Shem Tov, Rabbi Nachman, the Early and Later Masters as rendered by Martin 
Buber; and the consideration of the implications for the teaching of good, evil, and the 
forgiveness of radical evil as it relates to Holocaust rescuers in schools, utilizing 
Buberian educational methods and moral vocabulary. 
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CHAPTER H 
n. HASIDIC AND KABBALISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF RADICAL EVIL 
Although the teachings of the Ba'al Shem Tov were preserved incompletely, both 
his legacy and the legacies of other Hasidic zaddikim have been transmitted and received 
through their disciples' hastily written as well as oral renditions. Martin Buber has 
become known as the twentieth century transcriber, translator, and historian of the 
renditions of the Ba'al Shem Tov and other Hasidic masters' teachings through this 
unique style of parable. 
The Ba'al Shem Tov 
Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer, the Ba'al Shem Tov, or Master of the Good Name, 
personified the epitome of Poland's influence as the creative ground for Hasidism. In 
this first flowering of Judaism since the Spanish expulsion, Poland produced an indigent, 
frail, young, yet independent Jewish culture (Buber, 1956). The Ba'al Shem, a zaddik 
from the city of Mesbisz, was a simple yet genuine man who was subject to experiences 
of fervor. He was reputed to have prayed and conducted his life as if he were in the 
hands of some great guiding power. Although he felt that no one person was worthy to 
receive all of his thought and teaching, the Ba'al Shem left seven loosely written tenets 
of religious philosophy. The Ba'al Shem's seven themes revolved around this concept 
of soul entry and soul building that lead to salvation, although he stressed that such 
salvation could only be experienced by he who submerged himself in the holy. A human 
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person's thought constituted his being and he who thought of the upper world was 
therefore in it. Thus the movement from the world of humanity to the upper world of 
light was understandable from this perspective of the Ba'al Shem's teachings. The seven 
teachings built one upon the prior: 
1. God is in each thing as its primal essence. 
2. God can only be apprehended by the innermost strength 
of the soul. 
3. If a soul's strength is liberated, man can receive the 
divine at any place and at any time. 
4. Each action dedicated in itself is the way to the heart of 
the world. 
5. In all things, even dead things, there dwell sparks of life 
that fall into the ready souls. 
6. There is nothing that is evil and unworthy of love. 
Man's urges are not evil; "the greater a man, the greater 
his urge." 
7. The pure and holy man makes his urge a "chariot for 
God" and delivers it from all shells and allows his soul 
to complete itself. Thus man must feel his urges and 
take possession of them (Buber, 1956, p. 13). 
These tenets cannot be understood completely, however, without consideration of 
the story of the sparks of pre-creation, a story that preceded but was alluded to in The 
Zohar, (The Book of Splendor). This text was written at the end of the thirteenth century 
C.E., and received its messianic drive after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain at the 
end of the fifteenth century. Known as the "Bible of the Mystics", the Zohar was widely 
assumed to have been written in the 1280s by Moses ben Shem Tov de Leon in 
Guadalajara, a small town northeast of Madrid. De Leon attributed the original writing 
of the Zohar to the rabbinic legend, Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, in the second century C.E. 
Written mostly in Aramaic, the Zohar's fundamental aims were to explain the mitzvot in 
a mystical way and to encourage the performance of mitzvot for mystical purposes 
(Sonsino & Syme, 1986). The lessons of the mystics from the Zohar revolved around 
hidden meanings of particular Torah texts and explanations of the mysteries of the soul. 
Also of concern were: the mysterious powers of the Hebrew aleph-bet, the profound 
nature of God, and the kabbalistic significance of the ten commandments (Sonsino & 
Syme, 1986). 
The legends of the sparks were derived from the Zohar, the masterpiece of 
Spanish kabbalism, and its discussion of pre-Creation. In this account, God's first action 
was not creation, but was tsimtsum, or contracting of Himself, to enable the creation of 
the physical and heavenly worlds. When God sought to house His perfect light of 
creation within vessels, many of the vessels could not hold such perfect light and 
shattered. Others could not contain the perfect light and overflowed. In both cases, 
sparks of the perfect light fell to the earth and became housed within the creatures of 
creation. 
Isaac Luria and Kabbalism 
The middle of the sixteenth century C.E. witnessed a new era of Jewish 
mysticism that exalted the ecstatic act of the individual as co-worker with God to achieve 
the redemption of all people. This movement was inaugurated by the postclassicist, Isaac 
Luria. Luria was often referred to as Ha-Ari (The Lion), from the Hebrew initials of the 
words Ha-Elohi Rabbi Yitzhak (The Divine Rabbi Isaac). Born in Jerusalem in 1534 of 
a Polish-German father and Sephardic mother, Luria later lived in Cairo where he studied 
kabbala. He led an ascetic, solitary life and settled in Safed in 1570. There he became 
the student of Moses Cordobero, one of the most learned kabbalistic thinkers of the time. 
Luria's reputation grew and many considered him one of the special scholars of the 
mystic tradition who was possessed by a "holy spirit," or had received special revelations 
and messages from the prophet Elijah, the predecessor of the Messiah. Some of his 
students suggested Luria himself might be the Messiah or his forerunner. Lurianic 
kabbalah recognized the eternal validity of the historical facts of the Torah and Koran 
and was thus classified as conservative kabbalistic thinking. Because he and his disciples 
preserved the foundations of traditional authority for all time, they were able to treat the 
scriptures with almost unlimited freedom. Luria's writing introduced the freedom to 
despair for the first time into classical scripture. Luria therefore represented a 
paradoxical combination that included both aspects of mysticism in its fullest 
development: the legitimate completion of Rabbinical doctrine and a use of symbols to 
communicate a new revelation in an intense and dangerous manner. He claimed his 
source of inspiration was the prophet Elijah. Because Luria was intensely pious and had 
an impressive personality, this source of inspiration engendered a new authority in its 
own right. And this new authority brought profound changes into Judaism. Although 
Luria himself was reticent about his source of inspiration and claimed each new 
revelation was lower in rank that the previous one, "[t]he mystical experience that was 
his source is still as authentic as any, and as high in rank as any earlier phenomenon in 
the world of Rabbinical Judaism" (Scholem, 1969, p. 21). 
Luna's orthodox orientation toward kabbala was radically different from the 
revolutionary heretical kabbala of Nathan of Gaza (d. 1680). Although both represented 
gnostic myth formation which placed them at the fringes of Rabbinic Judaism, only 
Luria's involved an orthodox form of gnosis. Followers of the revolutionary school 
named Nathan of Gaza the prophet and theologian of the mystics. They also established 
Sabbatai Zevi as the messiah. Their mythology was characterized as an heretical 
antinomian deviation (Scholem, 1969). Luria's fundamental myth underlaid kabbala. 
Luria wrote as a reaction to the expulsion of Jews from Spain, an edict that again 
raised the question: Why the exile of the Jews and just what is their vocation in the 
world? Luria's Zohar addressed the question of Jewish exile in history, and, coupled 
with his three great symbols, constituted the new conceptions which were at the heart of 
and essence of Luria's system. These symbols were: tsimtsum (self-limitation of God); 
shevirah (breaking of the vessels); and tikkun (harmonious correction and mending of 
the flaw which came into the world through shevirah) (Scholem, 1969). Although the 
concept of tsimtsum came into being and pre-dated Luria's work, it was only through his 
efforts that this idea became significant. 
Using the concept of God's becoming more hidden, rather than His stepping out 
of Himself or revealing Himself, Luria introduced cosmic drama into Jewish writings. 
The act of tsimtsum created empty, pneumatic, and primordial space which made possible 
something other than God and His pure essence. Before the contraction, all God's 
powers of judgment were in infinite harmony with the roots of all other potencies. After 
tsimtsum, they were concentrated in a single point; namely, primordial space (pleroma) 
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(Scholem, 1969, p. 111). At this mighty point in the cosmic drama, the powers of stern 
judgment included evil and the whole ensuing process of creation attempted to remove 
the evil from powers of judgment which were not eliminated from God. 
Luria termed the events in the pleroma as intradivine because the nature of the 
forms that came into being in this pleroma were determined by the cooperation and 
conflict between the two elements of stern judgment and evil but were modified by the 
workings of a third element, a ray from God's essence, which had broken through and 
fallen back into primordial space. 
Luria also introduced the conception of Torah as a living organism. This idea has 
become fundamental to the Zohar and could be traced from Philo's account of the Jewish 
sect of Therapeutae In Egypt. "For the entire Torah (nomothesia) seems to these people 
something akin to a living being; the literal sense is the body, while the soul is the secret 
sense underlying the written word" (Philo, De vita contemplativa, p. 119). Similarly, 
another image of Zohar as a living organism was contained in the writings of Moses de 
Leon, one of the main authors of the Zohar. 
For the Torah is called the Tree of Life...Just as a tree consists of 
branches and leaves, bark, sap, and roots, each one of which components 
can be termed tree, there being no substantial difference between them, 
you will also find that the Torah contains many inner and outward things, 
and all form a single Torah and a tree, without difference between 
them...And although among the sages of the Talmud one forbids what the 
other allows, one declares a thing to be ritually clean which another terms 
impermissible, one says this and another that, nevertheless it is necessary 
to know that the whole is one unity (de Leon, Fol. 100b.). 
Although Luria and his followers were the first to connect symbols used but not 
related to each other in the Zohar, his most controversial symbolic connection was the 
origin and meaning of the relationships between written and oral law. The written 
Torah, or Pentateuch, was known as the codified history and laws given to Moses by 
God at Mount Sinai. The oral law, the sum total of everything that had been said by 
scholars and sages in the explanation of the written corpus, performed the necessary role 
of completing the written Torah and making it more concrete. In Rabbinic tradition, 
Moses received both the written and oral laws on Mount Sinai so that everything said 
later was known as having been derived from Moses' original receipt of revelation. In 
Rabbinic Judaism, the "two" Torahs were one. Their view was that the oral tradition 
and written word completed one another; neither was conceivable without the other. 
The kabbalists, through Luria, connected the two traditions with the symbolism 
of the sefirot, or layers of the cosmological universe. The written Torah became known 
as the symbol of the giving sphere of the Godhead and was aligned with the sefirah of 
tiferoth. The oral Torah tradition became the symbol of the receptive sphere, and at 
once established the shekhinah (the exiled spirit of God), and the notion of the 
"Congregation of Israel" (Scholem, 1969). Luria died in 1572 at the age of thirty-eight 
having written very little. His legacy was preserved by his most brilliant students, most 
notably Hayyim Vital Calabrese (d. 1620) (Sonsino & Syme, 1986). 
Luria's premise that influenced Hasidic thought and writing was that the world 
emanated out of God. He believed in a demiurgic intermediary power almost entirely 
dependent on the kabbala (Buber, 1956). Luria wrote that there was a direct influence 
on Good and a redeeming power of the human soul that purified and perfected itself. 
Whereas the Talmud taught that the Messiah would come when all souls have entered 
into corporeal life, many Kabbalists, like Luria, of the Middle Ages could tell "whether 
the soul of a man who stood before them had descended into him from the world of the 
unborn or was temporarily staying with him in the midst of its wanderings," (Buber, 
1956, p.7). 
This thought introduced the concept of gilgul, or the revolution and wandering 
of a soul that was on a journey. Such a wandering soul may have entered a person at 
his conception or birth, but even if he had received such a soul on its journey, he could 
also receive one or more souls at that certain moment in which these souls united 
themselves with his own. Such souls could be souls of dead men which joined with the 
living to complete unfinished work; higher, detached spirits which descended in the 
complete fullness of light; or individual rays which assisted an incomplete or imperfect 
soul that was dwelling within a person and whose task is to help that person to 
completion, a situation in which one soul supplemented and purified the other. The 
ibbur, or impregnation of a human being by one or more souls was the moment at which 
a soul's entry took place. 
Kabbalists did not consider such soul movement extraordinary; rather, they 
attributed this metempsychosis to the idea that each soul took upon itself the role needed 
at that moment of ibbur. Of Luria's contribution, Buber wrote that 
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[b]y all these means the souls are purified of the primal darkening and the 
world redeemed from the original confusion. Only when this is done, 
when all the journeys are completed, then only does time shatter and the 
Kingdom of God begin. Last of all, the soul of the Messiah descends into 
life (Buber, 1956, p. 8). 
Luria wanted to found this process of ascension to the world to come as 
determined by the actions of some special people. Through the teachings and messianic 
fervor of the Ba'al Shem Tov, these followers became the Hasidim of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century Poland. 
Buber's Interpretation of Hasidic and Kabbalistic Thought 
Hasidic teaching in the style of the Ba'al Shem Tov and as interpreted by Buber 
in light of Luria's contributions was concerned with four levels of religious philosophy: 
hitlahavut, avoda, kavannah, and shiflut. These four levels mingled and were 
intertwined in almost all Hasidic parables recounted by Buber. Hitlahavut, or ecstasy, 
was considered the place of the world and in it the meaning of life was unlocked. In this 
moment, all that was past and that would become future drew near to the present; time 
shrank; and the line between eternities disappeared. Only the moment lived and the 
moment became eternity. Avoda, or service, referred to the service of God in time and 
space. Whereas hitlahavut may be considered as the mystic meal or fulfillment, avoda 
should be thought of as the mystic offering or longing. Hasidic legend taught that from 
every deed an angel was born, thus avoda encouraged action. The human spirit, through 
service, should bring the shekhinah to its source. Ecstasy and service can be known as 
a duality and only redemption would unite the two in eternity. Kavannah, or intention, 
was not will; it was the mystery of the soul directed to a goal. It did not mean purpose, 
but it did imply goal. Mystically, kavannah was the ray of God's glory that dwelt in 
each person and meant redemption. Because the coming of the Messiah was the signal 
of redemption and because this redemption must happen here and now, the Hasidic 
follower felt therefore that eternity was in the ground of time. This moment will be the 
chosen moment and the Hasid lives in life of the fervor of this moment (Buber, 1969). 
Fourth, the understanding of shiflut, or humility, centered on recognizing that all 
things were new and without a past. This quality of uniqueness implied that there was 
essential good in every human person that each one was given to unfold. Because every 
person was unique, the one who became entirely individual precluded otherness from 
having any power over the individual. Thus a person could become redeemed, and his 
journey and wanderings could be completed. Redemption of the world would take place 
when "all weep because the Divine Presence is exiled and all yearn for its return" 
(Buber, 1947). The existential dilemma for the Hasidic person was that the person 
sought God in lonely fervor, yet each person needed to fulfill service that only living 
within a community could fulfill. 
Yet redemption could take place only within the individual. The more unique a 
person became, the more such a person could give to others. The mystery of humility 
of each person within humanity was expressed in the thought that "...[e]very man has a 
light over him, and when the souls of the two men meet, the two lights join each other 
and from them goes forth one light. And this is called generation," (Buber, 1953, p. 
43). To feel universal generation as a sea and as oneself as a wave comprised the 
mystery. By recognizing his uniqueness, his smallness, and his potential for redemption, 
the person became humble. The individual's inability to conquer evil also helped each 
one recognize the need for humility within creation. Earthly rulers, Buber wrote, cannot 
subjugate the 1 that is intent on evil. Rather, the sparks must find their kin, behold the 
primal light because the demonic cannot exist within its brilliance, (Buber, 1947b). 
The interaction of nature, individual person, and God achieved significance in 
Hasidic stories. Luria's interpretation of the concept of holy actions, such as ritual 
immersion baths, night watches, ecstatic contemplation and unconditional love were 
meant to achieve the purification of souls in a storm. Another recurring theme in 
Hasidic storytelling was the idea that zaddikim had the ability to compel the upper world 
through mystical exercises (Buber, 1956). This constant interaction precluded the 
Hasidic men from becoming ascetics. Hasid, which means "world piety," implied the 
urging of people to become pious and to bring the transcendent over into the immanent. 
At its core was the attributing of highly realistic guidance to ecstasy as the epitome of 
existence. The Ba'al Shem Tov's role in Hasidic history was that to him was attributed 
the ability to unite the power of the knowledge of the name of God and the possession 
of a "good name," that is, being trusted by people (Buber, 1956). Hasidic stories, 
therefore, paralleled the idea that "...only in joy can the spiritual being awaken and fulfill 
itself until, free from all lack, it matures to the divine" (Buber, 1956, p. 10-11). 
In recording and rendering the Hasidic stories of the Ba'al Shem and Rabbi 
Nachman of Bratzlav (d. 1810), Buber introduced three themes that underlaid such 
parables. These themes centered around the mystic concepts of time, sparks, and the 
spoken word. When Buber came to know from Kant that time was merely a structure 
of the mind, he was able to bypass traditional writing style that demanded dissociation 
from the source or subject in both the spheres of time and space. Thus when he 
rendered the stories of the Ba'al Shem, Rabbi Nachman, the Early and Later Masters, 
the idea of time became central to his understanding and therefore to his rendering of 
Hasidic stories. Buber described each person as having his sphere of being in space and 
time which was allotted to him to be redeemed through him. He must journey and 
wander through this time to raise the sparks of primal being and original creation which 
wait for the word of freedom. Journeys such as these always had secret destinations of 
which the traveller was unaware and each person must become or seek a zaddik to aid 
his soul which was abandoned to this whirlpool of wandering. 
Sparks in inanimate objects were thought to be imprisoned, and if a person was 
able to lift the holy spark, he freed the imprisoned light (Graves & Patai, 1964). 
Because this was not a prescribed, methodical ritual, there was no leap from the 
everyday into the miraculous to effect such a release. "It is not a matter of the action, 
but only its dedication that is decisive," (Buber, 1955, p. 37). But those sparks which 
had entered man's soul belonged to him and he must redeem them by his own power, 
for example, when he allowed each impulse intent on the particular to flow into the 
divine creative impulse. This then was the kavanna of receiving, that one redeemed the 
sparks in the surrounding things and the sparks that drew near out of the invisible 
(Buber, 1955). 
The Spoken Word's importance in Buber's writings of the Ba'al Shem Tov and 
other Hasidic masters was drawn from the understanding that to the Hasidic community, 
speech was considered rare and therefore awe-inspiring. The letters of the aleph-bet 
were thought to be the elements of the world and their intermixture was equivalent to the 
inwardness of reality. The Word became known as the abyss through which the speaker 
strode. Buber wrote that "...one should speak words as if the heavens were opened in 
them. And as if it were not so that you take the word in your mouth, but rather as if 
you entered the word" (Buber, 1955, p.39). The paramount importance of the Word was 
seen in its derivation: world, soul, and divinity rose, joined, and united, and became the 
Word. Words united themselves in God to genuine unity. Man's soul was set in them. 
And when man prayed in the "fire of his being," (Buber, 1956) God spoke the innermost 
Word. 
An Hasidic parable adhered to the steps of the way of humankind. Buber (1950) 
outlined these steps in six interactive plateaus, beginning with the individual himself; 
continuing through each person's particularity; individuality; beginning; need to look 
outward as well as inward; and the idea of time and space. Clearly clouded by mysteries 
and impossibilities, Hasidic parables could be known through the dilemma that there was 
something a person could not find anywhere in the world; nevertheless, there was a place 
where one could find it. The Ba'al Shem Tov advised that there was no encounter with 
any being or any thing in the course of our lives that was without a hidden significance. 
Because the philosophy of Judaism linked the world of here and now with the world to 
come, Hasidic parables often related divine experiences of zaddikim as expressions of the 
individual's fundamental purpose: that each person was created to unify the two worlds. 
Thus the zaddik's purpose was not to take the place of the Hasidic man, but was to 
empower him, to help his ailing body as well as his ailing soul by recognizing how the 
two were bound up with one another (Buber, 1947a). 
The zaddik made communication with God easier for his Hasidim by 
strengthening the Hasid in his hour of doubt, without infiltrating him with truth, and 
teaching him how to give the words of prayer the right direction. Hasidic stories 
remained true to this premise and the role of the zaddik as guide and his function as co-
creator with both man and God became fundamental. 
Hasidic stories were not Talmudic stories because replies given in Hasidic stories, 
unlike those of Talmudic stories, were given on different planes from that on which 
questions were asked. The text of such a story became a starting point from which 
personal questions and personal admonitions could be inferred. For example, when 
considering the Talmudic question of God asking Adam, "Where art thou?" the Hasidic 
interpreter immediately was confronted with a different question of meaning. Certainly 
God knew where Adam was and the inference that must be made was that this was not 
a question of locus or geography, but was on a higher plane and could be interpreted as: 
"What have you done with your life that I gave you?" 
The lesson to be drawn might be that an individual could not escape from the eye 
of God, but in trying to hide from Him, he was hiding from himself. And all depended 
on whether the person faced the question. Thus the Hasidic story was not an 
interpretation of Talmud or a fable, and the conclusion drawn was not a conclusion at 
all; rather, it was a beginning. 
The purpose of teaching in the Hasidic manner of the zaddikim as we know it 
from Buber was to generate complete turning of the whole person toward divine service 
and the bringing about of redemption through unification of the world of the here and 
now and the world to come. As the Messiah's time approached, Buber wrote, the first 
two pillars, teaching and service, shrank, and the third pillar, good deeds, was enlarged 
in scope and significance (Buber, 1947b). 
Also clearly implicit in Buber's renderings of Hasidic stories was that of total and 
complete human person. Stories were not simply words strung together; rather, they 
were expressions of the totality of the teller. In Hasidic stories, the forces of nature, 
God, and individual person came together to speak to and to learn from each other. Such 
stories were always concerned with the "simple person" living his life in fervent joy. 
Very often these stories illustrated how each person must recast the evil urge into an urge 
for what was good; how to develop rapturous bonds with the upper worlds; how to grow 
aware of the divine sparks hidden within creatures and things; how, through kavanna, 
to illumine the everyday life; and how we were to keep our holy goal in sight, (Buber, 
1947a). In such stories the role of the zaddik was the focal point. 
Although the zaddik had the greatest possible influence on the total religious and 
worldly being of the Hasid, he did not relieve anyone of what he must do for himself 
(Buber, 1947a). Therefore the Hasidic story was one of interdependence and man's need 
75 
to "participate in the multitude," as the zaddik must teach the multitude in his service 
toward God (Buber, 1947a, p. 7). 
Buber's Recounting of Hasidic Parable 
Many of the tales set by Buber illustrated interdependence of person, nature, and 
God. Often he wrote about how the teacher helped his disciples find themselves, and 
later included passages in which the disciples brought about their teacher finding himself 
again (Buber, 1948b). Zaddikim, we were told, must occasionally work together and one 
pre-ordained absence from the group's efforts could condemn the group's actions to 
failure. Other times, disciples participated as individuals to bring about one or more 
zaddikim1 s successes. Buber described this union of zaddik with his circle of disciples 
as a powerful dynamic unit which could climb the ladder toward unity and redemption 
(Buber, 1947a). This ladder of ten rungs was the path on which people wandered on 
their way toward redemption (Buber, 1947b). The zaddik as well as the Hasid could 
climb the ten rungs, and they could rise and fall according to the successes and failures 
of their daily experiences. The rungs are described as: 
1. The Rung of God and Man 
2. The Rung of Prayer 
3. The Rung of Heaven and Earth 
4. The Rung of Service 
5. The Rung of Teachings 
6. The Rung of The Way 
7. The Rung of Love 
8. The Rung of Good and Evil 
9. The Rung of Pride and Humility 
10. The Rung of Redemption (Buber, 1947b). 
Ascending the ten rungs was the person's path toward answering the question: How 
could we find meaning of our existence on earth? And each story related by Buber 
illustrated the way each person could achieve greater meaning for oneself and for 
redemption of the world. 
Appended is my attempt to relate a story that could have been written in the spirit 
of the Ba'al Shem Tov, Rabbi Nachman, or the Early or Later Masters to elicit questions 
a person must ask herself regarding the concepts of good and evil, especially the manner 
in which they related to the modern metaphor of evil, the Holocaust. My premise for 
writing this story was that through the story format we can ask questions that do not fit 
directly or singularly into spheres of religion, ethics, metaphysics, or philosophy. 
Because the Holocaust was a unique event in modern history, questions regarding it may 
have to be posed in alternative fashions. According to the tenets of the Hasidic story as 
outlined above, I have written an original story to consider those alternative methods of 
questioning. The story and commentary by Rabbi Joan Glazer Farber are appended to 
this document. 
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CHAPTER m 
ffl. DEVELOPMENT OF RADICAL GOODNESS 
The concept of radical evil can be understood through the analysis of the 
seemingly dichotomous idea of radical goodness. Philosophers, theologians, and ethicists 
have considered the idea of evil in great detail; however, the positions of such thinkers 
toward goodness have been less intense and more difficult to extract from their writings. 
This section attempts to produce an ordered presentation from which will evolve a 
modern conception of radical goodness or ultimate happiness, to which Martin Buber's 
philosophical anthropology will respond. 
Martin Buber's Unity of Good and Evil 
Martin Buber's (1878-1965) images of good and evil corresponded to 
anthropologically apprehensible occurrences in the life-path of the human being (Buber, 
1953). Considering the images of evil as belonging to two phases on the human person's 
path, Buber asserted that images of good could occur at either the first or second stage. 
Whereas the first image of evil corresponded to a Hebrew Scripture interpretation and 
the second image parallelled Iranian myth, the innovative introduction of the potentiality 
of good within either stage marked a radical shift in the coming to know of radical 
goodness. 
The first stage of evil was in the state of living reality in which the purpose of 
humankind was to overcome the naturally chaotic state of the soul. Within this stage, 
the person experienced undirected surging passion and sought to overcome it by breaking 
out of it violently wherever a breach was forced. Buber decried this turbulent attempt 
at such overcoming as delusional; instead, he posed the person's potential and striving 
to achieve direction by unifying human energies. This unification represented the only 
manner in which such re-direction could be achieved (Buber, 1953). 
Persian legends surrounded humankind's situation within the ensuing second stage 
of living reality, that is, the person's undirected urge to overcome this contradictory state 
of being. The later stage was a culmination of the person's inability to gain direction as 
a result of pseudo-decision making and often became a self-affirmed position in which 
one could be found within an absolute total constitution of personality. Within the first 
stage, the person did not choose but merely acted. In the second stage, the person chose, 
but chose himself, in the sense of "his being-constituted-thus or having-become-thus" 
(Buber, 1953, p. 140). 
Radical evil did not occur in the first stage. Whatever errors, misdeeds, or 
directionless actions were undertaken while in this stage, their commission was not an 
actual doing of a chosen deed, but a sliding into it. In the second stage, evil became 
radical, that is, the person within this phase of being found himself self-willed and 
. . . whoever lends to that which, in the depths of self-awareness was time 
and again recognized by him as what should be negated, the mark of 
being affirmed, because it is his, gives it the substantial character which 
it did not previously possess. If we may compare the occurrence of the 
first stage to an eccentric whirling movement, the process of the freezing 
of flowing water may serve as a simile to illustrate the second (Buber, 
1953, p. 140). 
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Buber's concept of goodness was different from this growing of decisionless and 
self-affirmed evil. Good retained the character of direction at both stages. His belief 
that there was only one direction for the unified soul to undertake meant that to whatever 
end a current decision was reached, in the reality of existence all the potentially and 
seemingly diverse available decisions, were simply variations on a single one. The 
reality of this decision was that it was made continually in a single direction. 
Understanding the direction that characterized the good can be understood in two 
ways. First, direction can be known as the way towards the person that I am supposed 
to be. I can apprehend and come to know this person only within self-awareness that 
both divided and decided from without and did not return my energy back to me. 
Rather, it transformed my undirected energies into it by conferring on them a direction 
that enabled me to recognize more clearly that singular person I am supposed to become. 
Each person's results became similar at this point: precisely because the person 
conferred the direction upon it and took direction toward it within vital lived experience, 
the person was immersed within paradox of actuality and significance (Friedman, 1960). 
The second understanding of direction related to the good was that of direction 
toward God. Only through both understandings of direction did Buber allow for the 
attainment of the way toward the achievement of ultimate good. Insisting upon a duality 
of comprehension demanded a concomitant understanding that the person understood the 
vortex of decisionlessness that could persuade the person to apply the name "God" to a 
projection of oneself. He insisted that the person develop a personal, intimate 
relationship with the Eternal Thou of the dialogue of being, and ascribe to the Eternal 
Thou the authorship of the human person's uniqueness, which could not be derived from 
within the human world. 
Human uniqueness constituted the unrepeatable form of being here and could not 
be particularized or analyzed into any elements. It could not be created out of any 
elemental forms. Humanity's individual experiences evolved within this uniqueness and 
were entrusted to each for execution to the fullest ability of one's specific capabilities and 
potentialities. No one was placed within the human world merely for the execution of 
existence; rather, Buber envisioned a person's progress and actualization as the 
fu l f i l lmen t  o f  a  "be ing - in t en t ion ,  an  in t en t ion  o f  be ing  wh ich  was  pe r sona l  . . .  a  
realization of the right in infinite personal shapes" (Buber, 1953, p. 142). 
Buber's answer to the questions of doubt, uncertainty, and decisionlessness was 
creation and it had a goal. The goal was evidenced in humanly right service in the 
direction toward God. Such service formed the extent and scope to which a single 
person could glimpse the uniqueness purposed for the person in creation. In deciding, 
the person chose direction. The choice was fraught with meaning: taking the direction 
toward the point of being at which one encountered the divine mystery of the one's 
created uniqueness that awaited us all. 
Buber believed that such a concept of good could not be located within any system 
of ethics because all such systems that we knew came into being because of mystery and 
existed by virtue of it. Revelation accounted for the ethos of every ethical system, even 
when the system overcame the ethos and failed to recognize its origin. The human 
person was authenticated in the service performed to the goal of creation. Without 
setting off upon and keeping to the one divine direction as far as one was able, humanity 
certainly could have what it termed, "life," perhaps the life of the soul and even the life 
of the spirit in all its freedom. Yet without the path toward the good (direction), 
humanity lacked genuine existence. 
Buber recounted his coming to know supreme goodness, or the true meaning of 
life, in his interpretation of Psalm 73. The significance of this psalm was multi-fold for 
him because this psalm played a profound role in course of events that was Buber's life. 
In accordance with the wishes of Franz Rosenzweig, Buber's great friend and co-
translator of the Hebrew Bible into German, Buber read this psalm at Rosenzweig's 
funeral. In his last completed work, Buber wrote 
What is it that so draws me to this poem [Psalm 73] that, pieced together 
out of description, report, and confession, it draws me ever more strongly 
the older I become? I think it is this, that here a person reports how he 
attained to the true sense of his life experience and that this sense touches 
directly on the eternal (Buber, 1953, p. 31). 
What has become known as Buber's "death poem" was also his "life poem," for 
it captured the trust and remarkable intuition of the eternal that accompanied him on the 
way from the time of his crisis over the infinity of time and space that brought him close 
to suicide at the age of fourteen (Friedman, 1991). And in the end, it was four lines of 
this poem that were inscribed upon Buber's tombstone at his own request. It has been 
through critical interpretation of Psalm 73 that we have come to know the deepest 
attitude toward death and the concomitant ultimate significance in life that Buber 
affirmed. 
Buber considered that our coming to know the world through our decisive 
experiences in relation was a gradual process. We first accepted what those experiences 
seemed to offer us and we then wove that acceptance into a view that made us think we 
had become aware of our world. What we often tragically realized was that view 
constituted only an appearance. Although our experiences had not deceived us, we took 
them, turned them into our own use, and did not penetrate to their heart. Buber believed 
the way to such profound penetration was deeper experience. 
Psalm 73 told the story of a man whose experiences affirmed that the wicked in 
this world did prosper, not as the question appeared to Job as why the good did not 
prosper. The deeper experience was played out not in individual terms, as a confusion 
of Hebrew translation often afforded; rather, it could be known only through the 
happiness or unhappiness of Israel as a people, a nation, a culture, and a way of life. 
Specific to the psalmist's intention was the unhappiness of Israel's suffering both in the 
catastrophe which led to the Babylonian exile and in the beginning of the exile itself 
(Buber, 1953). Buber interpreted that only the one who had experienced the depths of 
this personal suffering could speak in this voice. 
The authentic person's destiny included the destiny of one's people. The ultimate 
message became clear: one experienced God's goodness, not as some reward, but as the 
revelation of what the one could not know from the singularly human side of the 
dialogue—that the person was continually with God (Friedman, 1991). One who was or 
became pure in heart could not draw the conclusion that God was not good to Israel. 
The dividing line was not between those who sinned and those who did not, but between 
those who were pure in heart and those who were impure in heart. Even the sinner 
whose heart became pure experienced God's goodness as it was revealed to the sinner 
(Buber, 1953). 
The truly wicked, therefore, were those who deliberately persisted in impurity of 
heart. Ultimate goodness was consistent with experience of God's goodness to the extent 
that the person could purify the heart. "The state of the heart determines," Buber wrote. 
"That is why 'heart' [was] the dominant key-word in this psalm, which recurs six times" 
(Buber, 1953, p. 35). Buber's approach to goodness was through investigation and 
examination of the ways that prevented the person's coming to know this goodness. 
Psalm 73 recounted the false ways in which the one of impure heart could experience 
life, yet miss the opportunities to realize the goodness. Through the suffering of the 
psalmist who traveled the road of endurance of the trials of life rather than the way of 
knowing that God was continually with him was illustrated the inability to know goodness 
through human consciousness or feeling. No human being was able to be continually 
turned to the presence of God. When the person doubted or became uncertain, Buber 
pointed to the very act of revelation as proof of God's continued presence. 
The manifestation of this continued presence was the sign that Buber inserted into 
his poem on mystic ecstasy: that God had taken the sufferer's right hand. Analogizing 
in human terms, Buber compared this dialogue with God to the way in which in the dark 
a father takes his little child by the hand, only partially to lead him "but primarily in 
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order to make present to him, in the warm touch of coursing blood, the fact that he, the 
father, is continually with him" (Friedman, 1991, p. 452). 
God counseled and revealed by making His presence known. Although He led 
the child from darkness into the light and the child was capable of walking alone, the 
child was not relieved of directing his own steps. The ultimate good changed not only 
the meaning of the psalmist's life, but it also changed his perspective on death, an 
interpretation Buber conceded was inextricably altered by both his experience of the 
Nazis and the war in Palestine. For the oppressed one, death was only the mouth 
towards which the sluggish stream of suffering and trouble flowed, but in death it had 
become the event in which God, the One who grasped the person's hand, "takes" the 
person. The kavod, or honor, did not consist in any glorious afterlife; rather, from the 
human point of view it represented the fulfillment of existence. From God's point of 
view it was the entrance into eternity. Buber envisioned neither human aspiration to 
enter heaven after death nor one to remain on earth. He imagined no personal 
immortality and no continuation in time's dimension (Friedman, 1991). 
It is not merely the flesh which vanishes in death, but also his heart, that 
inmost personal organ of the soul, which formerly, "rose up" in rebellion 
against the human fate and which he then "purified" till he became pure 
in heart-this personal soul also vanishes. But He who was the true part 
and true fate of this person, the "rock" of his heart, God, is eternal. It 
is into His eternity that he who is pure in heart moves in death, and this 
eternity is something absolutely different from any kind of time (Buber, 
1953, p. 47). 
The finality of mankind which has existed within the tension of holy insecurity 
of the dynamic of farness and nearness from God was shattered by the coming of death. 
When death occurred, the human being's heart vanished; the very heart from which the 
appearances of imagination arose. The human heart, which had previously been capable 
of arising up in defiance and self-affirmation, was now capable of purification. 
"Separation, separate souls, and time itself vanish . . . The time of the world disappears 
before eternity, but existing man dies into eternity as into the perfect existence" 
(Friedman, 1991, p. 453). 
Both Martin Buber and his biographer, Maurice Friedman, agreed that Buber had 
been troubled by and had investigated the problem and nature of evil since the time of 
Buber's youth. Often absent from consideration of Buber's philosophical anthropology 
has been discussion of his radical departure from the philosophical norm of his day 
regarding the questions of goodness, the good person, the good character, and the good 
spirit. His often-overlooked work, Gog und Magog (For the Sake of Heaven, 1945), has 
become known as his definitive and poetic testament to the phenomenon of the goodness 
of the spirit of humanity. 
Buber's radical departure from traditional philosophical thought in the sphere of 
supreme, or radical goodness consisted in his decision to allow the good as well as the 
evil, that is, the holy as well as the dangerous, to appear within the special realms of 
human existence (Friedman, 1960). Buber (1945) gave a vivid, dramatic, and emotional 
accounting of the nature of evil as well as the understandings that underlaid its 
redemption within the individual and community, thereby defining and contextualizing 
the nature of the good within the totality of the sphere of the conflict between the good 
urge and the evil urge. In this work, he gave goodness an ontology equivalent to that 
which he had so urgently outlined for evil, and he supplied the connecting links in the 
spirit that made that intricate relationship come alive. That equivalence and possibility 
of redemption of the human spirit became a central focus of his later writings. "He who 
expects from me a teaching which is anything other than a pointing of this kind will 
always be disappointed" (Friedman, 1960, p. 149). This pointing developed into the 
focus and intention of Buber's subsequent philosophy and educational direction for 
humankind. 
Buber could no longer conceive of the opposition of good and evil as an 
opposition of a good and an evil will; rather, he posited the relationship as a cruel 
struggle within existence itself. Placing the encounter of the spirit within the mystical 
thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Hasidic movement based on its 
manuscripts and legends, the struggle issued from the release of the magic which the 
Baal Shem had kept in check and which had then broken loose and wreaked its work of 
destruction (Buber, 1947a). The central theme, that of the evil-doer who knew himself 
to be evil, rather than that of a just man who knew himself to be just, formed the focus 
of the investigation into the moral regeneration that defined the nature of the supreme 
good within Buberian thought. This type of person was one who was both humble and 
proud yet was too wrapped up in his personal world of spiritual urges to have a real 
relation with those outside him (Buber, 1945). 
Initially, religious figures of this era defined good and evil in terms of what things 
were and were not forbidden. Buber's serpent of the Genesis story referred clearly to 
a different type of knowing, illustrated when he said Adam and Eve (and, by implication, 
humanity) had to become as God to know good and evil. This revolutionary type of 
knowing could be accomplished only by becoming as the One who had created both, that 
is, not as something to do or not to do, but as two contradictory forms of being. The 
mystical notion of God's tstimtsum (contracting) afforded genuine power to every human 
being to accomplish this knowing as well as to rebel against God. The good became 
known as the turning of the individual's soul toward God with the whole of this power 
to do evil (Buber, 1945). 
The object of the good, characterized by Buber as love of God, was the ultimate 
level to which the human person could strive as it constituted the ontological proof of the 
1-Eternal Thou relationship. Buber's theological stress was that God really tempted each 
person and demanded that each give up everything and go through the extremity, danger 
and the gate of dread before anyone could receive the grace which enabled the love of 
God (Friedman, 1960). This extraordinary kind of love was imagined as humanity's love 
of God in the unique manner in which only He could be loved. 
This struggle created the tension in which humanity lived because although God 
sewed the seed of light that would eventually enable humanity to recognize this sort of 
love, those individuals alienated from their human power to accomplish such love had 
cast the lie before being which swelled and extended in its full soreness and sorrow 
(Buber, 1945). Yet that seed of light contained a hidden power that would reveal itself 
only in the final conflict which would arise, Buber predicted, in the land of Gog and 
Magog who would lead the final battle of the darkness against the light and would be 
struck down eventually by the Messiah himself (Friedman, 1960). 
Redemption was the locus of the supreme good of humankind. Dogmatic in his 
reliance on mystical elements to reveal the means to redemption, Buber posited that the 
redemption of God "waxed in secret" and through the very evil which tried to destroy 
it, an illusion to the concept that the powers of destruction and redemption stemmed from 
the same original source. Examples of this mysticism include the dot (yod) in God's 
Hebrew name (Shaddai) conceived as "the primeval originating point of creation which, 
prior to any creative act, stood above the radiance of God" (Buber, 1945, p. 58). It was 
by virtue of this dot, Buber wrote, that humanity realized that the awful power of God 
was both capable of utterly devastating and annihilating the world as well as powerful 
enough to bring about the world's redemption instead. The location of this realization 
was critical. "We come to learn about the darkness when we enter into the gate of fear, 
and we come to learn about the light, when we issue forth from that gate; but we come 
to learn about that dot only when we reach love" (Buber, 1945, p. 45). 
Part of Buber's radical departure from traditional German Judaism of his time was 
apparent in conception of humanity's appropriate response to the evil-doer. Rather than 
ostracize such a person, Buber offered that we help others by meeting their evil lovingly. 
Acting otherwise, a person could not help another human being who was troubled. 
Hatred and condemnation of the evil-doer, Buber stressed, would make the evil-doer evil 
himself and not just in his actions because it would cause him to cut himself off and 
imprison himself in the world of his actions. Later in his life in post-Holocaust Israel, 
Buber again ostracized himself from world-wide contemporary Judaism when he publicly 
opposed the legal execution of Adolph Eichmann, a convicted Nazi exterminator of 
millions of European Jews. His philosophy was so absolutely and fundamentally 
intertwined with his lived life that he risked and received almost universal condemnation 
for that position. 
Redemption, the ultimate expression of the supreme good, could not be divided 
into a part that was dependent on man and a part that was dependent on God. The 
human person in his humanity must be concerned only with his action alone when he 
acted, and should concentrate on God's grace alone after the person's action was 
successfully done. Man's expression of good was known through man's actions, an 
underscoring of traditional Jewish thought that without the deed, the ethic became empty. 
Buber's attitude toward repentance, the ultimate traditional Jewish expression of turning, 
was unusual. Repentance, he wrote, was purely an inward and psychological deed and 
could not be equated with the decisive turning which was not merely an attitude of the 
soul but was something effective in the whole corporeality of life (Buber, 1949). 
Repentance was revealed outwardly only in its consequences and effects. The turning 
was something which happened in the immediacy of the reality between the individual 
and God. Repentance was, at best, only an incentive to this turning. 
The actions of the state of supreme goodness could now properly be called 
teshuvah, or (returning to God. Born in the depths of the soul out of "the despair which 
shatters the prison of our latent energies" and out of the suffering which purified the 
soul, teshuvah was experienced by the person who, in his darkest hours, felt the hand of 
God reaching down to him. Only if the person had "the incredible courage" to take the 
hand of God and let it draw him up out of the darkness, could he taste the essence of 
redemption (Buber, 1945, p. 113). To assemble this courage, each individual must 
"know that his redeemer liveth" (Job 9:18) and that this redeemer wished to redeem the 
individual. Such an individual must accept this redemption with the turning of his whole 
being and therefore extricate himself from this tangled web of selfishness which had 
formerly presented itself to him as the means to find God as well as the particular task 
for which he had been intended (Buber, 1945). 
Each person, Buber believed, had been created for the fulfillment of a unique 
purpose. His foremost task was "the actualization of his unique, unprecedented, and 
never-recurring potentialities, and not the repetition of something that another, and be 
it even the greatest, ha[d] already achieved" (Buber, 1947a). A new direction had been 
realized by Buber, who had incorporated several Kantian positions within his thought and 
writing, and the locus of the supreme good gracefully slid to encompass the individual, 
even the most ordinary who could now be conceived of as existing within individual 
splendor, as the one who could be assured the possibility of redemption, rather than 
envisioning the ultimate or supreme good as reserved for an Aristotelian select few or 
a Kantian categorical imperative with its all-encompassing perspective. The way by 
which each person could reach God was revealed only through the knowledge of each 
one's essential qualities and inclinations. 
The individual was urged to recognize the objects that prevented his 
accomplishing this direction toward redemption and establish genuine relationship with 
them. "Man's task, therefore, is not to extirpate the evil urge, but to reunite it with the 
good" (Buber, 1950, p. 19). Each person was required to lend his personal will to the 
direction of his passions and reunite the good and evil urges to begin the movement of 
holiness which God would eventually complete. In the hallowing which resulted, "the 
total man [was] accepted, confirmed, and fulfilled. This [was] the true integration of 
man" (Buber, 1948a, p. 181). 
Buber did not afford the individual personal security in this philosophy. The 
belief in redemption of evil did not mean the security of salvation. Upholding the 
prophetic writings as his source of this dilemma, Buber wrote that these prophets always 
aimed to shatter all security and to proclaim "in the opened abyss of the final insecurity 
the unwished-for God who demands that His human creatures become real . . . and 
confounds all who imagine that they can take refuge in the certainty that the temple of 
God is in their midst" (Buber, 1952b, p. 97). Furthermore, there was no other path for 
the responsible modern person than this "holy insecurity" (Buber, 1952b, p. 63). 
The fear of God, the essence of "holy insecurity," entered into each person's 
struggle when the person's existence became utterly incomprehensible to oneself and 
one's personal existence was shattered through the mystery of the journey toward the 
ultimate good. Within this mystery and the journey through it, the human person stepped 
forth directed and assigned to the concrete, contextual situations of his existence. Thus 
no one could extricate himself from his lived concrete reality in order to traverse the path 
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toward the state of supreme goodness. This person might not accept the evil he found 
within this concrete reality. Rather, the person's task was to penetrate the impure with 
the pure. Results of such interpenetration yielded a composition of both elements, but 
did not denigrate the product by "saying 'yes' to the evil in advance" (Friedman, 1960, 
p. 137). Thus the fear of God became the indispensable gate to the love of God because 
the love of a god which did not comprehend fear was really idolatry, Buber wrote, and 
was really the adoration of a god whom one had constructed oneself. 
Both the responsibility and the potential for redemption had been moved by Buber 
to encompass the individual yet he did not fail to recognize the critical role of community 
in modern society in this realization. The modern person was insecure and repressed, 
isolated from his fellow person yet clung desperately to the collectivity that he trusted 
to protect him from the might of other collectivities. This division within the modern 
person split each member of society into instincts and spirit, repressions and 
sublimations. The person now found himself incapable of direct relation with his fellow 
person either as a member of the body-politic or as a fellow member of a community 
(Friedman, 1960). This tremendous collective power had rendered the modern person's 
life a sterile alternation between universal war and armed peace. This modern crisis thus 
could be known as a crisis both of the individual and of society at large. Although Buber 
had moved the locus of potentiality for attainment of the supreme good to encompass the 
individual, he recognized the sacred and powerful status of the role of the individual 
within community and the interactions of communities within the total context of this 
struggle. 
Buber saw both moral and social philosophy as determined by whether one 
believed in the individual, the organic group, or the dialogue between man and man to 
be of basic reality and value (Friedman, 1960). Unquestionably, he recognized that both 
individual and society existed in reality and value but they were both derived from the 
basic reality of the meeting between man and man. "The individual is a fact of existence 
in so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. The aggregate is a fact 
of existence in so far as it is built up of living units of relation" (Buber, 1965a, p. 202). 
In light of this recognition, Buber developed the idea of "the essential We" to 
correspond on the level of the relation to a host of people to the "essential Thou on the 
level of self-being." A person therefore was truly saved from the "'one' not by a 
separation but only by being bound up in genuine communion" (Buber, 1965a, p. 175). 
He warned against the blurring of the distinction between 'social' in general and the 
togetherness brought about by true dialogue. And the path toward the ultimate good of 
both the individual and that togetherness consisted in "the life of men together and in all 
its forms and actions" overcoming the modern tendency toward the suppression of the 
elements of personal relation in favor of the elements of pure collectivity (Kohn, 1930, 
p. 310). 
Buber's social principle meant the dialogical and he restricted the definition of the 
political principle to the necessary and ordered realm of the world of It. Although he 
called for a true social restructuring of society to enable humanity to realize goodness, 
it could not take place as a result of the blind working of economic forces or success in 
production. This restructuring demanded extraordinary efforts based on the longing for 
rightness, that is, the vision of perfection that in religious expectation took the form of 
Messianism (perfection in time) and in social expectation took the form of Utopia 
(perfection in space). He developed the idea of genuine Utopian socialism that did not 
expect blind providence to save humanity though technical and material change, nor did 
it trust to a "free-ranging human intellect which contrive[d] to systems of absolute 
validity." True community, he insisted, could only be built if it satisfied a concrete 
situation and not simply an abstraction. Such a movement must be topical, that is, grown 
out of the needs of a given situation and realizing itself to the greatest possible degree 
here and now. Simultaneously, this local and topical realization must be nothing but a 
point of departure for the larger goal of organic cells unified in a restructured society" 
(Buber, 1958b, p. 26). 
The individual's capacity to effect such a restructuring was greater than his 
technical efficiency and could be seen in his banding together with others in a social life 
which was at once mutually dependent and independent. All of human life, Buber 
thought, was a progression of forming and re-forming communities on the basis of 
growing personal independence, an idea he defined as "functional autonomy, mutual 
recognition and mutual responsibility" (Buber, 1958b, p.39). The natural human impulse 
toward mutual dependence of increasingly free and independent individuals, or the 
decentralistic social principle, has been subordinated in the modern world to the 
"centralistic political principle," and has been illustrated through modern industrial 
development and an economy which have created a struggle of all against all for markets 
and raw materials. Struggles between entire societies have replaced old struggles 
between political states. The result has become an emphasis on the organization of 
power which has afforded a legacy to both democratic and totalitarian forms to make 
complete submission to centralized power their guiding principle (Buber, 1958b, p. 129-
132). 
Consequently, the modern world had experienced a loss of social vitality, cultural 
unity, and cultural dependence. We had lost the idea of administrative control as the 
capacity for making dispositions limited by available technical facilities and recognized 
in theory and practice within those limits and have unfortunately gained the omnipresent 
figure of government as a constitutionally limited body that signified continuous loss of 
the idea of those limits. This has become our notion of political power, the excess in 
capacity for making dispositions beyond that required by given conditions. Society now 
had become diminished by the continued supremacy of the centralistic political principle 
and peace, Buber warned, could not be attained through political organization but only 
through "the resolute will of all peoples to cultivate the territories and raw materials of 
our planet and govern its inhabitants together" (Buber, 1951, p. 11). The results of this 
failure to imagine a true Utopian Socialism which could bring about peace was seen by 
Buber as the fundamental threat to humanity's basic purposes. 
Nothing stands so much in the way of the rise of a Civilization of 
Dialogue as the demonic power which rules our world, the demonry of 
basic mistrust. What does it help to induce the other to speak if basically 
one puts no faith in what he says? The meeting with him already takes 
place under the perspective of his untrustworthiness. And this perspective 
is not incorrect, for his meeting with me takes place under a 
corresponding perspective (Buber, 1952d). 
Buber believed in the meeting of idea and fate in the creative hour, rather than 
in the natural end of the present decay which would result in the technically perfect 
suicide of the human race (Buber, 1957). He called for people to come out of their 
camps and talk with one another despite their criticism of the opposing system and their 
loyalty to their own. With such a renewed dialogue between man and man, Buber 
envisioned a tiny seed of change that could lead to a transformation of the whole 
situation. 
I mean especially those who are basically convinced of the lightness of the 
idea from which their government ultimately stems and know, just for that 
reason, that the catastrophe which would flow from the victory of the 
regime would mean the collapse of the idea (Buber, 1952d). 
Such people would be independent persons with no other authority than that of the spirit 
and would not be bound by the aims of the political hour. The fundamental question that 
liberated each individual from planetary annihilation was, for Buber, "What does every 
man need in order to live as man?" Only through genuine dialogue "between them in 
which each of the partners, even when he stands in opposition to the other, attends to, 
affirms, and confirms him as this existing other, can the opposition, certainly not be 
removed from the world, but be humanly arbitrated and led toward its overcoming" 
(Buber, 1957). 
Thus Buber envisioned the attainment of the absolute, supreme, or radical good 
of the individual person as the basis of, means toward, and completion of the 
concomitant and fundamental restructuring of the human society. This concept was 
entrenched in his basic assumption of the nature of the Eternal Thou as not a symbol of 
God but of our relation with God, and therefore our relation with humanity as personified 
by the relationship between man and man. "The personal manifestation of the divine is 
not decisive for the genuineness of religion. What is decisive is that I relate myself to 
the divine as to Being which is over against me, though not over against me alone" 
(Buber, 1952b, p. 39). 
Early Civilizations' Conceptions of Radical Goodness 
Hedonism 
The term hedonism was derived from the Greek hSdonS, and signified pleasure. 
When used to refer to moral values, it was termed ethical hedonism and was defined as 
the view that only pleasure was intrinsically good and that pain was evil. Through 
investigation of the development of hedonistic philosophers, we have come to know an 
ethical philosophy that provided Western civilization with a formulation of the concept 
of radical goodness. 
Cyrenaic hedonism appeared during the last half of the fourth and the early 
quarter of the third century B.C.E. through the writings of Aristippus of Cyrene, an 
admirer of Socrates. His doctrine showed a committment to pleasure as the only good, 
but referred mainly to momentary pleasures (Sahakian, 1974). Cyrenaic hedonism was 
influenced by Socratic teaching and emphasized happiness which was attributed to the 
virtuous person. 
Virtue was defined by Cyrenaic hedonists as the capacity for enjoyment, which 
became known as the state of happiness resulting from a satisfied will with its attendant 
pleasures fulfilled. Pleasure was the summum bonum (the highest good). All pleasures 
shared a common characteristic and differed from each other in intensity, degree, and 
purity. To the extent that a particular experience was unadulterated by pain, it became 
a finer pleasure. 
Cyrenaic hedonists considered gentle motion, rather than emotion, as pleasure's 
definition. Aristippus believed that all things worked toward a good purpose (Sahakian, 
1974). Those ultimate purposes were earth- and temporal-bound. Recognizing that the 
person maintained power only over the present, Cyrenaics urged sensual enjoyment of 
the present, yet they decried indiscriminate gratification of pleasure without regard to 
purity, intensity, or degree. 
The Cyrenaic Sage was an arbitrator of choosing. He alone understood how to 
enjoy the present wisely. He mastered and enjoyed his pleasures without risking 
enslavement to a life inteijected by singular meaningless pleasures. Ideal happiness grew 
into the control of pleasure in the midst of enjoyment, that is, the conscience of self-
control. Wisdom, only tangentially attached to goodness, became an instrumental value 
and not an end-in-itself. Serving mainly to educate the hedonist to exercise command 
over pleasure, wisdom was used to enable the Cyrenaic hedonist to explain that "[m]y 
machine is so happily compounded that I am sufficiently sensitive to things to enjoy 
them, but not to suffer from them" (Sahakian, 1975, p. 24). 
The second phase of hedonism, or the Egoistic Hedonism of Theodorus replced 
Cyrenaic. Theodorus repudiated altruistic propensity and all political and religious 
institutions and chose to direct the experiences of his life toward sensual enjoyment. 
This shift in hedonistic philosophy can be known as a dissolution of Cyrenaic into an 
egoistic form in which each person was involved in personal pleasures. Such an egoist 
was divorced intellectually and emotionally from social responsibilities and the welfare 
of others. Concomitant to this withdrawal from social concerns was a rejection of laws 
and moral codes. Egoistic hedonists accepted the positive attributes afforded by 
civilization yet entertained no imperative to repayment social, political, or other 
organized duties. Their dichotomy of radical evil, known as sadness, and ultimate 
goodness, seen as a happy disposition, structured this ethical thought. 
The third development within hedonism was brought about by Hegesias in which 
pessimism emerged as the dominant theme. This conception maintained that the person 
who sought the hedonistic goal was doomed to utter frustration since the summum bonwn 
was beyond the majority's attainment. Citing as evidence humankind's failure to achieve 
a life of pleasure, Hegesias maintained that without pleasure, life became worthless and 
should be discarded as valueless endeavor. 
The summum bonum of this pessimism was transformed into escape from pain. 
Early pessimists recognized that neither wealth nor power served to render humankind 
immune from pain, and death, as the only possible assured escape from condemnation, 
was embraced as the only certain path. Because pleasure and pain were capable of 
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influencing human attitude and the sage was indifferent to life itself, Hedonistic 
pessimists recognized ambivalence as the supreme good. 
Cyrenaic supremacy of momentary pleasure dissolved into Hegesias' pessimism 
and changed ethical hedonism into a self-defeating philosophy that paralleled the Cynic 
position of independence of externals as the supreme good. Epicureanism arose and 
flourished in response to this disintegration of hedonism and emphasized the superiority 
of mental pleasures over the sensual or material. Epicurean hedonsim gave expression 
to the pleasures of a cultured and noble individual and granted intellectual happiness the 
capability to exercise personal control. Adding to the hedonistic valuing of pleasure and 
disparagement of pain, Epicurus developed the ideas that remain intrinsic to our 
understanding of hedonism: friendship, contentment, peace, morality, and aesthetic 
pursuits (Sahakian, 1975). 
Epicurus and his circle undertook an early discussion of supreme goodness in the 
pre-Socratic period. Epicureans or egoists did not regard the human being as a creature 
who should believe in metaphysical imaginings, add to the sum of human knowledge, toil 
for future generations, or be satisfied with only a portion of the great whole (Sedgwick, 
1970). Rather, their notion was that a person was a creature whose right was to pursue 
happiness, whose business was to pursue happiness, and whose duty was to pursue 
happiness. This led future philosophers and theologians to view the dual concepts of 
goodness and happiness as a single and inclusive framework. 
Epicurans held that pleasure or happiness was both the beginning and end of a 
blessed life. A person's responsibility was only for the self because impulses and actions 
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that led to destructive tendencies stemmed from chaos, were prenatal, environmental, or 
routine. Therefore, people could not be responsible except for those actions that were 
specifically chosen. "Take the path that leads to pleasure" was his simple advice to his 
followers. 
The critical nature of Epicurus' writings was that the gods and the idea of death 
were merely preludes to his teaching which was characterized by concern with living life. 
Hedonists were men who discussed and analyzed what pleasure was and what pain was, 
deciding that pleasure could be the only meaning and justification of life. Pleasure, or 
the goodness that each person should seek, was protean matter and received as many 
interpretations as there were minds of men. Hedonistic goodness could be defined as the 
sweet life, one that was pleasant, agreeable, comfortable, beautiful, and celebrated the 
joy of living. Whatever good things happen to people must be ascribed to them and 
whatever evil things happened must be ascribed to the sufferers themselves. The concept 
of divinely inspired or caused good or evil was absent from this philosophy because 
adherence to religion and belief in gods has implanted and encouraged the notion of 
sacrifice, first of people, then beasts, fruits, and finally of human pleasures, hopes, and 
desires. 
Epicurus's doctrine of self-sufficiency held that happiness was illustrated in the 
simple life and he encouraged his followers to be independent of gods, their fellows, and 
possessions. "The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom . . . [n]othing satisfies a 
man who is not satisfied with little ..." are two ideas which preceded his proclamation 
that 
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. . . [w]hen I maintain that pleasure is the end of life, I do not mean 
sensual pleasures, those of the profligate, as our antagonists ignorantly or 
willfully assent, but a body free from pain and a mind free from trouble. 
It is not eating or drinking, revelling or lust, that makes life sweet. We 
must use our reason, we must seek the wisest choices of action and the 
banishment of all wrong ideas (Sedgwick, 1970, p. 61-2). 
The Articles of the Creed have been transmitted by Epicurus' disciples and have 
engendered frequent reconsideration and criticism in ethical study. This Creed included 
that (1) the gods are immersed in blessedness and give no heed to men, (2) there is no 
life after death, (3) the end of life is the greatest sum of pleasure that a man is capable 
of, and (4) more life and fuller is what we want. 
Epicurus' equating of happiness and goodness and his postulating happiness as the 
center of a person's goal has become a central premise in historical discussion of 
goodness. Greek philosophy seized the Hedonistic conception of goodness and 
extrapolated from it a systematic approach that has evolved into Western culture's 
definitions of the idea of goodness. 
Hedonism has been subjected to criticism in four areas: (1) lack of evidence 
supporting the idea of pleasure as the greatest good, (2) that some pleasures were 
unworthy and hedonists insisted upon severing the idea of pleasure from the idea of 
value, (3) that some pleasure were unsatisfying and unfulling, and (4) that pleasure is 
ironic in that many of the good things in life were unpleasant or unwanted by many 
persons. Buber's philosophical anthropology refused to excise the human person's 
ultimate goodness from concrete existence grounded in dialogical relationship between 
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person and person, and person and God. How would this voice address Hedonism as 
developed by the Cyrenaics, Aristippus, Theordorus, Hegesias, and ultimately, Epicurus? 
Buber's Perspective on Hedonism 
Buber regarded the problem of evil and of goodness as the most difficult place 
within which to preserve the narrow ridge attitude that described his standpoint. Simply, 
there could be no absolute statements involved in coming to know. He described a 
narrow, rocky ridge between gulfs where there was no sureness of expressible 
knowledge, but only the certainty of meeting what remained undisclosed. Maintaining 
that the either/or attitude was not only dangerous but impossible within the discussion of 
good and evil, Buber assumed a dialectical position. He argued that evil was both real 
and redeemable and chose to abnegate the position of the "is" of human reality to the 
"ought" of human possibility (Friedman, 1960). Hedonistic philosophy dichotomized 
pleasure and pain as good and evil and set up an opposition that viewed absolutes within 
universals. The absolutizing of pleasure and pain was the philosophical opposition that 
troubled Buber. Within his theory of knowledge, Buber described knowing as that which 
meant the bond of the absolute with the particular and pointed the human person back 
to the reality of the lived concrete, to the immediacy of real meeting with beings over 
against one another (Buber, 1952b). Whereas the early Hedonists eschewed political 
involvement, social obligations, and sympathy, Buber declared that human truth was 
equivalent to participation in Being; a human life-relationship to a Divine Being within 
ultimate truth (Friedman, 1960). Although Buber and the Hedonists might have agreed 
that the human person pledged oneself to truth and verified it by being true, their 
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divergence may be expressed as Buber's existential position that religion and ethics 
answered the felt need of many in his age to break through to a more humanly realistic 
account of the way in which we learned to know. Hedonists were traditional 
epistemologists and they reflected exclusively within the reality of subject-object 
relationship. Buber's I-Thou dialogical relationship presented a totally other way of 
knowing that avoided the idealism of the Hedonists that pleasure, the ultimate good, was 
supremely desirable as an end for all people. 
By moving reality into the of knowing of a subject, Hedonists immersed 
themselves and their philosophy into the world's experiences deemed pleasurable or 
painful as a priori knowledge. Buber insisted that we must have distance from the world 
to enter into relation with a Thou in order to become an I. Only then could a person 
enter into genuine authentic relationship. From the prior reality of I-Thou knowing 
issued direct knowing, that is, "the genuinely reciprocal meeting in the fullness of life 
between one active existence and another" (Buber, 1952b, p. 46). Hegesias' Hedonistic 
pessimism developed into the antithesis of this genuinely reciprocal meeting. 
In order to know and therefore to value, Buber wrote that the person must assume 
true presentness, that is, "[be] willing to see each new event as something which is, 
despite all resemblance to what has gone before, unique and unexpected" (Buber, 1965, 
p. 10). By granting similarity of characteristics to all forms of pleasure, Hedonists 
avoided this presentness by enforcing similarities and ordered categories of thought, the 
very description of Buber's 1-lt knowing. The concept of "address" involved a difficult 
distinction between Buber's and Hedonistic ethics and can be understood from the idea 
105 
of communication. Hedonists valued, accepted, or rejected states of being as pleasurable 
or painful and sought to maximize the pleasurable by reducing, or as the Hedonistic 
pessimists sought, eliminating the painful. Each situation of valuing, accepting, or 
rejecting involved a communication between the Hedonist and the resultant state of being 
caused by an event. The lived life was an incessant barrage of concrete experiences and 
the Hedonist was forced to choose continuously between those state of being deemed 
pleasant and those termed painful. Could the Hedonist evaluate such a continous 
onslaught of experience in a true knowing? 
Buber insisted that true knowing was constituted as a total moral action, a 
becoming aware of the signs and responding. He rejected the possibility that we could 
know everything we met in our concrete experiences equally within the context of total 
moral action. He posed instead that humankind could respond only to that which really 
addressed us, and real address could not be known as objective phenomena. An action 
or state of events did not speak to everyone; rather, it spoke only to the one who saw 
that it truly said something to that one as an individual. The same action could have said 
other things to different people, and to an observer, it might have said nothing at all. 
Without full participation in true presentness, there could be no knowing (Buber, 1965). 
Non-reciprocity of address was a basis of Hedonistic ethics. 
The purpose of Buber's study of humankind was the development of an 
anthropological epistemology through the 1-Thou relationship. This produced an image 
of the person as a creature who became only what one could become through confronting 
reality with one's whole being. Scientific methodology had reduced the investigation of 
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the person into selective aspects, not as a whole or part of the natural world. This social 
interpretation forced Buber to affirm that the observation of the social sphere as a whole, 
the determination of the categories which rule within it, the knowledge of its relations 
to other spheres of life, and the understanding of the meaning of social existence and 
happening are and remain philosophical tasks (Buber, 1965). Hedonistic ethics that 
espoused momentary pleasure, immediate gratification of pleasure, egoism, and 
pessimism while stressing a dichotomy of pleasure and pain within objects of the world 
and without social relations was antagonistic to Buber's epistemological foundation. 
Stoicism and Cynicism . 
The Stoic school, founded by Zeno (356-264 B.C.E.), shared with the Epicureans 
the subordination of logic and physical science to morals (Tsanoff, 1942). However 
Stoics addressed their divergence around the sensual variety of Epicureanism, although 
the Stoics had much in common with the higher version of those ethics. The Stoic 
account of the world and human nature consisted in similarly materialistic concerns, but 
added a more cosmic dimension, that is, the relation of moral conduct to the world 
process. Refuting the Epicurean desire to "make the most of what we yet may spend" 
(Tsanoff, 1942, p. 25), Stoics regarded moral conduct as one's conscious participation 
in a rational world order with a concomitant proclamation of reason as sovereign reality 
and worship of it as divine. Human life was completed by recognition and spirit of 
worship. Whereas Socrates declared that virtue was knowledge, the Stoics deified the 
life of virtue as philosophy in action, as knowledge of nature translated into conduct. 
Zeno's philosophy advocated freedom from passion and total indifference to joy 
and grief (Sahakian, 1975). Stoic virtue was living harmoniously with nature and 
consisted in life's chief good as living according to one's own nature and avoiding that 
which was forbidden by right reason and Zeus. Virtue, good, and reason were 
inextricably bound to the happiness of humanity which was understood as a flowing 
within life's current in harmony with the universe's will. 
The ultimate good for Stoics was acting in accordance with sound reason, a state 
of intellectual being that propelled a person to select goals that comported with nature 
and produced a comparison of virtue with the ideal of perfection. In addition to being 
perfection, virtue (or good) was determined by the extent it afforded the bearer an 
advantage or usefulness. Stoic supreme happiness consisted in life lived in accordance 
with virtue, the will of God, or with reason, the highest part of the soul. 
The locus of good within Stoic ethical thought was either internal or external of 
the person. Internal goods included the virtues, while external goods were exemplified 
by friendship. Perfect goods were harmonious. Duty, defined as that which reason 
elected to do, included obligation to one's parents, brothers, and country, and bringing 
pleasure to one's friends, but did not imply approval of everything done from impulse 
or inclination (Sahakian, 1975). 
Because Stoics were determinists and regarded happiness as the result of the 
steady disposition to restrict our will to what was within our power, the expression of 
attainment of happiness was mathematical. Realizing that happiness was achieved only 
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when humankind abandoned all desires they did not have the power to satisfy at all 
times, the equation for happiness appeared as 
happiness = satisfied desires 
desires 
and the achievement of happiness could be enhanced by increasing the number of 
satisfied desires or decreasing the number of desires (McGill, 1967). 
Epictetus' ethical position partly paralleled Aristotle's regarding attaining 
happiness; however, Aristotle emphasized increasing satisfied desires whereas Epictetus, 
as a contractionist similar to primitive Buddhists and Vedantists relied almost exclusively 
on the reduction of number of desires. Contrary to Aristotle's individualistic conception 
of happiness, Epictetus stressed that happiness could be attained by any person whose 
desires were restricted to those easily satisfied and that people were born to be happy and 
to be happy with one another. This inclusiveness was of divine origin. 
Let not that which in another is contrary to nature be an evil to you: for 
you are not formed by nature to be depressed with others nor to be 
unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a man is unhappy, 
remember that his happiness is his own fault: for God has made all men 
to be happy, to be free from perturbations (Epictetus, 1940, III, 24). 
Epictetus' ethics recognized virtue as the highest good and included three further 
dimensions: (1) the invincible will, (2) resignation, acceptance, and contentment, and 
(3) living in accordance with virtue. The invincible will was maintained by the Stoic 
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sage at all costs because surrendering one's free will or permitting another to break one's 
spirit or will was considered blasphemous rejection of Zeus's purpose in the creation of 
humanity. When a person surrendered her will, she gave satisfaction to her enemies. 
Admonishing the Stoic to rely on no things beyond one's own control, Epictetus assured 
the sage of insulation from disaster. Resignation, acceptance, and contentment cautioned 
the Stoic sage to seek tranquility or eternal calm of inner spirit. Even death must be 
taken in stride as the Stoic regarded individual existence as part of a whole that must 
both begin and pass away. In the face of catastrophe, Epictetus urged his followers to 
utilize the inner gifts they possessed, such as fortitude, patience, and magnanimity. 
When the wise person recognized and utilized inner strengths, habits developed that made 
life pleasant. 
Finally, living in accordance with virtue meant choosing obedience to reason and 
to the laws of nature. Irrational life was an emotionally disorganized cacophany that 
precluded rationality in purpose. "To the reasonable creature, that alone is unsupportable 
which is unreasonable" (Epictetus, 1940, 2) could produce an irrational life that 
encompassed the soul within a diseased state. This state was the Stoic definition of evil. 
Their goal was mastery over life and was identified with total control of one's passions. 
Epictetus's ethical philosophy was Stoic pessimism which shunned as undesirable 
sexual cravings in addition to emotions, and maintained that such cravings for sex and 
women were enslaving (Sahakian, 1974). Moral principles were innate in men and the 
only powers possessed by human beings were individual will and the use of rational 
ideas. The summum bonum was virtue, defined as living in accordance with nature, and 
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the supreme virtue was endurance of this life. We must "make the best of what is in our 
power, and take the rest as it occurs" (Epictetus, 1940, 1, 1). Negatively stated, the 
Cynic's goal was repudiation of avoidable desires. This was accomplished through 
virtue, and virtue was seen as enabling human independence of circumstances that 
controlled fortune. Therefore, Cynic virtue could be interpreted as freedom from want, 
need, desire, or passion. Life's fundamental responsibility was the reduction of wants 
to the absolute minimum which resulted in indifference to all other desires so the human 
being came to regard all unnecessary striving as evil. Traditional values of civilization 
were dispensable and included wealth, refinement, fame, and honor. Art, science, 
family, and nationality were also deemed superfluous and unworthy of aspiration. 
Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 400-325 B.C.E.) exemplified the Cynic ethics in his 
contempt for common goals. Diogenes assigned himself a dual vocation of practice of 
virtue and assisting the morally corrupt. He was a relentless preacher of morality and 
his vitriolic denunciations of the frivolities of society culminated in exposing humanity's 
contempt for their neighbors. This contemptuous attitude converted the essentially 
constructive term cynicism into an opprobrious one (Sahakian, 1974). 
The Cynics and Stoics shared a narrow, practical view of virtue and viewed the 
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake as valueless. They had little use for Aristotle's 
intellectual virtues and simplified his idea of happiness into specific efforts and teachings. 
They also eliminated all degrees between virtue and vice concluding that a person could 
be either perfectly just or totally unjust, a delineation that resulted in the cloud of 
pessimism that overshadowed Cynic and Stoic philosophies. The idea of happiness as 
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specificity of pleasure or avoidance of worldliness was a contraction that was a suitable 
response to the evil times in which they lived (McGill, 1967). By classifying human 
endeavor into the categories of good, bad, or indifferent, Stoics and Cynics were 
entangled in the problematic that only the completely virtuous were happy and most of 
humankind was necessarily excluded. 
Buber's Perspective on Stocism and Cynicism 
The thesis of such a philosophical and ethical system was that virtue, which was 
desirable in itself, was sufficient for happiness and was the only means to it. Martin 
Buber would agree that hasidut, or allegiance and piety, was fundamental to the 
fulfillment of a person. He wrote that the believer could achieve a perfect relationship 
to God by renouncing the world of the senses and overcoming his own natural being. 
However, even for the most pious Hasidic man, cleaving to God was a significant 
priority but to achieve it he was not required to abandon the external and internal reality 
of earthly being, but to affirm it in its true, God-oriented essence and to transform it so 
that he could offer it up to God (Buber, 1950). 
Stoic and Cynic ethics portrayed the virtuous human being as one who was able 
to master totally and control his passions, sensual pleasures, and desires. Rather than 
engaging in Hasidic heart-searching, the Stoic or Cynic performed acts of physical, 
emotional, and intellectual denial in personal striving for virtuous perfection. Severing 
oneself from humanity and the human condition seemed to afford the ancient Stoics and 
Cynics a measure of harmonious wholeness untouched by the joys, sorrows, affirmations, 
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or hardships of life on earth. Above all else, Stoic and Cynic philosophy was grounded 
within the individual pursuing an isolated, individual path toward self-perfection. 
Buber would counter that the world, an irradiation of God, was endowed with 
independence of existence and concomitant striving. Because the divine spark lived in 
every thing and every being, each spark was enclosed in an isolating shell. Only the 
authentic human person could pierce the shell, liberate the spark, and re-join it with its 
divine origin. The divine force was within every creature and was subject to misuse by 
every human being. What facilitated misuse was an individual's directionless pursuit, 
seizing, and grasping at everything that offered itself, rather than the hallowing of the 
very same passion. Unhallowed passion undirected toward its origin was evil. Stoic and 
Cynic directionlessness and denegration of divinity within each person and each action 
directly contradicted Buber's Hasidic philosophy. 
Buber and the Cynic/Stoic philosophers may have agreed that disciples must have 
knowledge of their own beings as well as of their own essential qualities and inclinations. 
Buber's divergence from the ancient thought was in his belief that such disciples must 
truly perceive their own strongest feelings, their most central wishes, and their inmost 
beings (Buber, 1950). It was the manner in which disciples acted upon these perceptions 
that provided a pivotal alienation of Buberian thought from Cynical or Stoic ethical 
philosophy. If the disciples saw only the objects of desire, the evil urge would have led 
them astray as they rushed in to seize the first objects that crossed their paths. Seekers 
of truth must divert this human impulse from the casual to the essential, from the relative 
to the absolute, to find their particular ways. Hasidism taught rejoicing in the world and 
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hallowing it with one's whole being. This was the antithesis of Stoic and Cynic ultimate 
goodness. 
Self-Realization: The Good Life 
Platonic theology included an idea of a Maker, or mind, from whom the fixed 
stars and earth and divine creatures endowed with minds and souls were created. Plato 
(428-348 BCE) spent little consideration on their origins; rather, he wrote 
[t]o narrate and understand the birth of the other divinities is beyond our 
power. We must believe those who have spoken of these things before 
us, for, as they said, they were descendants of the gods and clearly knew 
their own ancestors. It is impossible not to believe those who are the 
children of the gods, even though they speak without probability or 
compelling proof. As they are speaking of their own, we must obey the 
law and believe them (Gruge, 1980, p. 165). 
With this testimony of faith, Plato introduced the need for a metaphysical trust 
and belief in the theological system of Greek thought. Postulating the Olympians as 
secondary gods who were eternal but served at the pleasure of the Maker, Plato ascribed 
to them the creation of human beings. Although the Maker created humanity's immortal 
souls, it was impossible to attribute any responsibility for the deeds of mortal creatures 
to the perfect Maker. These souls were therefore a necessarily less pure mixture. The 
divinity was rendered blameless for man and woman's evil actions. 
Yet human beings retained an immortal, divine ember and through Socrates, Plato 
considered why people were capable of doing wrong. Plato believed no one did 
purposive wrong actions because knowledge of what was right was enough to ensure 
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right action. Goodness could not be knowledge in the same sense as other kinds (Gruge, 
1980). Socratic dialogue investigated the nature of ethics and determined they were not 
sciences like medicine, engineering, or carpentry. Virtue, the Platonic equivalent of 
radical goodness, was more than craft. If one maintained that goodness and knowledge 
were equivalent and no one sinned on purpose, one must find the way this knowledge 
was different from others since it could not be used for evil purposes. 
The domain of the special knowledge attributed to goodness could not be found 
within the Platonic definition of wisdom. Although wisdom was a goal for the 
philosophic thinker, it detached itself from goodness in that it was possible to be wise 
without being good as it was equally possible to be good without being wise. This was 
the distinction between knowledge and right opinion or belief. Good conduct could be 
based on such right opinion or belief, and much of Plato's Republic was devoted to the 
discussion of moderation, self-control, and courage, all of which led to knowledge and 
goodness, but could exist without wisdom. 
Wisdom was assumed to be the property of the ruling class within Plato's 
society. Of the three classes in the state, the rulers, the auxiliaries, and the people, only 
the rulers, who were by far the fewest in number, were assumed to possess this wisdom, 
although the nature of this wisdom was not clearly defined (Gruge, 1980). The other 
strata of Greek society possessed right belief after careful education designed by the 
rulers in culture and art. What maintained this stratified social system was the belief that 
the rulers must know what the others believed because the rulers alone had knowledge. 
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What the rulers knew as the Forms became the knowledge that supported the knowing 
of the supreme good. 
Plato and Socrates' philosophy introduced a metaphysical aspect of knowing into 
the consideration of the question of supreme goodness. The knowledge of eternal ideas 
was a supreme knowledge and the Ideas became known as the object of the science of 
science. But why did this sort of metaphysical knowledge ensure goodness? 
The Republic stressed the importance of order and harmony in the human soul. 
All philosophical virtues were seen as truly one since all inevitably followed from his 
wisdom and knowledge of the Forms. However, because even the lowest class must 
possess a sense of justice, there had to be two kinds of virtue: that of the ordinary 
person and another of the philosopher. Both types of people had harmony in their souls, 
but only the philosophers had knowledge coexisting with the immortal spark. 
Corresponding to the two types of virtue within human souls, Plato differentiated 
two levels of vice. The more common vice was analogous to a disease in the body; a 
discord between opinion and desire, between feelings and pleasure, between reason and 
pain. In inferior people, these different parts were at variance and led to cowardice, 
depravity, and sinfulness. The second type of vice, ignorance, was more fundamental 
and was analogous to something greater than disease. All people wanted the good, but 
when they set out it attain it, their lack of knowledge caused them to miss their aim. 
The idea of ignorance, or lack of philosophic knowledge, could not be mended 
within the Platonic system of thought when the ignorant person believed he knew what 
truly he did not know. Those with these wrong moral beliefs could be cured only by 
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teaching. According to Plato, education was more powerful a fighter against evil than 
mere corrective justice. 
Socrates' concept of a "good" was necessarily bound up with observing a limit. 
Any way of living must have had an order or form to distinguish it from other ways of 
living. Therefore any good that people desire could be specified only by specifying the 
rule which would govern the behavior which would become or procure that particular 
good (Maclntyre, 1966). If anything were to be a good and a possible object of desire, 
it must have been specifiable in terms of some set of rules which governed behavior. 
Humanity, whose behavior was never rule-governed, would cease to be able to 
participate as intelligible agents in human society without a concept of rules or 
moderation. The concept of moderation was later discussed and developed into the 
Aristotelian "golden mean" and profoundly influenced philosophical, religious, and 
theological ethical discussion. The Idea of the Good, a combination of pleasure and 
wisdom, was a direct correlative of this knowledge. 
The Form of the Good was the criterion by which pleasure could be judged. 
Using a geometrical metaphor, Plato wrote that "[i]t is clear that in the simile of the 
Line, the pleasures will be good in so far as they approach the highest point B, the Good, 
and that they will be so to the same extent as the objective reality and the functions of 
the soul which correspond to each section" (Gruge, 1980, p. 67). The philosopher and 
the ideal Forms were described when Plato finally constructed his ideal city. He outlined 
the different types of government and individuals corresponding to those Forms. Because 
Plato drew a hierarchical, tripartite society, and each of the three parts of the soul had 
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its specific pleasures and passions, Plato analogized an ascending order of pleasures and 
passions that corresponded to each level of society and to each type of individual 
inhabiting them. "As there are three parts of the soul, so it seems to me there are also 
three kinds of pleasure, a particular one for each, and so also with passions and ways of 
ruling the soul" (Plato, 1956, p. 379). 
Only those dwelling on the highest rung on the societal ladder could seek the 
greatest pleasure. For this purpose, the rulers needed three corresponding attributes for 
correct judgment: experience, knowledge, and the power of expressing it. Only the 
philosopher had the experience, the wisdom, and power of expression required to make 
any true comparison forjudging the qualities of virtues. Thus his opinion was the only 
true one. Platonic philosophers accorded pleasures of the mind as the greatest; those of 
honor inferior; and physical pleasures the least of them all. Although physical pleasure 
was not simply a delusion and honor was not an empty thing, they paled into 
insignificance alongside the pleasure, or goodness, one received from the search for 
truth. 
The supreme good of Platonic thought was neither pleasure nor wisdom alone. 
Rather, it was something beyond either of them, something that was complete and 
perfect, and was the final aim of all desire (Plato, 1956, p. 427). Therefore in the fifth 
century B.C.E., a new class of teachers and pupils developed and a moral philosophy 
was construed that concentrated on the teachers, or sophists. The idea of virtue as a 
quality possessed by the "good man" took hold in ethical studies and produced conflicting 
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opinions regarding what virtue was and what constituted a good person (Maclntyre, 
1966). 
Although Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) declared his fundamental treatise on ethics 
to be concerned with politics, an idea later taken up by Jeremy Bentham, the 
Nicomachean Ethics (1985) claimed that "[e]very craft and every inquiry, and similarly 
every action and project, seems to aim at some good; hence the good has been well 
defined as that at which everything aims." Its follower, Politics, was concerned with the 
practical science of human happiness in which we studied what happiness was, what 
activities it consisted in, and how to become happy. Whereas the Ethics illustrated what 
form and style of life were necessary to happiness, the Politics engaged in a description 
of what form of constitution and what set of institutions were necessary to make this 
form of life possible and to safeguard it. Aristotle's influence on modern ideas of the 
supreme good afforded to humankind as the goal of happiness has been profound. 
Aristotle defined good as the goal, purpose, or aim to which something or 
somebody moved (Maclntyre, 1966). To call something good was similar to outlining 
the conditions sought that constituted the end. Because there were numerous activities 
and multiple aims of individuals, there were manifold expressions and types of good. 
Good existed in a state conditioned by two underlying presuppositions. First, for 
something to be good, it must be sought by others. Second, to call something good and 
to allow that it was not a thing which anyone who wanted that sort of thing would want 
would be to speak unintelligibly. Thus Aristotle derived a contingent matter of fact, that 
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people in general wanted what was good, and he established an internal relationship of 
the concept of being good and being an object of desire. 
Aristotle's definition of happiness was the activity of the soul according to virtue, 
accompanied by pleasure, and provided with sufficient external goods and fair fortune 
(McGill, 1967). By considering and rejecting that possession of virtue alone consituted 
felicity, Aristotle directly opposed the thought of Platonic Socratics and Stoics. He 
repudiated Hedonism as such, but incorporated much of it into his own eudaemonism 
which held that pleasure was something good in itself and always accompanied activity 
that constituted happiness. Recognizing that the hedonist's doctrine of qualitative 
sameness of pleasures had a certain appealing rationale, Aristotle's supernatural view of 
happiness as unattainable by humankind left open a distinct possibility for divine gods 
within his ethics. 
One limitation of Aristotelian ethics was that "[e]ven the Aristotelian base was not 
wide enough to include everything. Aristotle does not have any intimation of the later, 
utilitarian formula of 'the greatest pleasure of the greatest number,' with its radical 
egalitarian implications" (McGill, 1967, p. 5). Centuries of commentary and criticism 
emerged from this implication which was intermixed with theology and founded an 
ethical system in which the supreme good would become linked with intellect, 
contemplation, and particularity. 
Aristotle's definition of the supreme good opened the question of whether or not 
there were such a good. 
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If, then, there is some goal among those which we pursue in our actions, 
which we desire for its sake, and if we do not choose everything for the 
sake of something else—in that case we should proceed to choose ad 
infinitum, so that all desire would be empty and futile—it is plain that this 
would be the good and the best of goods (Allen, 1966, p. 362). 
Later writers, especially those in the medieval period, seized upon this question and 
reinterpreted it theologically to indicate that because everything was chosen for the sake 
of some good, there must be one good for the sake of which everything was chosen. 
Aristotle was careful with warnings related to the concept of the possibility of a 
supreme, universal good. He was cautious regarding method of inquiry. Stating that 
every sort of inquiry had its own standards and possibilities for precision, Aristotle 
examined existing opinions on this topic with the same critical nature he expected others 
to employ in considering his own. Every ethical system was guided by general 
considerations and posited general conclusions, each of which admitted to possible 
exceptions. Within this framework, Aristotle named his notion of supreme good as that 
idea of happiness that included both the notion of behaving well and of faring well. The 
original Greek word for this good reflected the sense that virtue and happiness, in the 
sense of prosperity, could not be entirely divorced (Maclntyre, 1966). The root meaning 
of happiness was a lasting state of affairs in which the most favorable ratio of satisfied 
desires to desires was realized with the provisio that the satisfied desires included 
satisfactions that were not preceded by specific desires for them, but came by surprise 
(McGill, 1967). Aristotle insisted only on a favorable ratio of satisfied desires to desires, 
while Plotinus later insisted that happiness involved an absolute optimum, not a simple 
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preponderance. Aristotle viewed the situation regarding happiness from the persepctive 
of approximation and agreed that one person could actually be happier than another. 
Aristotle held that the most favorable ratio was obtained mainly by increasing 
one's satisfied desires and the Stoics obtained it only by decreasing the number of 
desires; and others raised questions of whether some kinds of satisfactions made for 
optimum ratio and should be given preference. The only thing that mattered, they held, 
was the intensity, duration of satisfaction, that is, the greatest sum of pleasure (McGill, 
1967). 
In this divergence from Plato's Forms, Aristotle seemed to diverge from the 
Socratic position that "it is better to suffer tortures on the rack than to have a soul 
burdened with the guilt of doing evil" (Maclntyre, 1966, p. 60). Rather, Aristotle 
emphasized that it was better still both to be free from having done evil and to be free 
from being tortured on the rack. This idea appeared to be a minor alternative method 
of considering; however, it accumulated significant proportions when scholars began 
consideration of the questions that inquired as to the sort of goodness which was 
compatible with the good person suffering any degree of torture or injustice. With this 
questioning, ethical exploration changed from the Aristotelian framework regarding in 
what form of life doing well and faring well might be found together. Aristotle 
considered the potential framework of the suffering of the good incompatible and 
irrelevant to the task of creating such a form of life. "No one," Aristotle commented in 
his discussion of the positive intention of his ethics, "would call a man suffering miseries 
and misfortunes happy, unless he were merely arguing a case" (Johnson, 1989, p. 65). 
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Aristotle took issue with Plato's having made goodness independent of any this-
worldly happiness, as well as his establishment of the paradigmatic meaning of the word 
good as identical with the Form of the Good. As a consequence, Plato had installed the 
good as a single and unitary notion. Aristotle's repudiation of this singularity centered 
on his argument that the word good was used in judgments across all the categories, of 
some subjects (such as god or the intelligence), and of the mode of a subject (how it was 
or the excellence it had). Of special significance in this new inquiry as to the nature and 
kind of supreme or radical goodness was that it crossed disciplines. Platonic thought that 
the good fell under a single Form must indicate, Aristotle thought, that good must be the 
subject of a single science or method of inquiry. However, things that were described 
as good were dealt with by a number of sciences and thus it must be outside the 
singularity imposed on it falsely by naming it Form. Aristotle moved the nature of 
inquiry of good from the intellect alone into the sense in which it appears in human 
language. This idea of good became defined according to the sense of that which people 
sought or desired and could no longer be considered the name of a transcendental object. 
Happiness replaced the Form as the final end or goal. Identification of the good 
enabling such happiness was mediated by two properties which anything which was to 
be the final end must possess: (1) it must be something which was always chosen for 
its own sake and never merely as a means to something else and (2) it must be a self-
sufficient good. Thus the concept of happiness was such that we could not use it for 
anything but a final end and equally that happiness was not a component in some other 
state of affairs, nor was it just one good among others (Zeller, 1980). 
His next progression was considering in what activities or context the final end 
of a person consisted. Arguing that rationality was specifically human, Aristotle wrote 
that in humanity's exercise of its rational powers the specific human activity consisted, 
and in the right and able exercise of them lay the specific human excellence (Maclntyre, 
1966). Within the Aristotelian view of the universe, this position was obvious. 
The Aristotelian concept of nature and the universe as composed of distinct kinds 
of being set that each of these beings moved and was moved from its potentiality to a 
state of activity in which it achieved its end. Highest on this scale was the Unmoved 
Mover, or thought unchangingly thinking itself to which all things were moved. The 
human being, like every species, moved toward the individual's end, and this end could 
be determined by what distinguished human beings from other species. Aristotle held 
the view that rational behavior was a uniquely human characteristic and any human good 
must be defined in light of it. The good of the individual person was defined as the 
activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and with the possibility that there could be 
discerned several human excellences or virtues, in accordance with the best and most 
perfect of them. "What is more, it is this activity throughout a whole life. One swallow 
does not make a summer, nor one fine day. So one good day or short period does not 
make a man blessed and happy" (Maclntyre, 1966, p. 63). 
Being happy predicated one's entire life. Because Aristotle considered the 
person's life as the object of judgment rather than his actions or states, the connection 
between happiness understood in this context brought a new meaning to Aristotelian 
ethical thought. Virtue, though not the human being's final end, was an essential part 
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of the form of life. A person could take pleasure in virtuous activity, but pleasure did 
not constitute supreme goodness. A modicum of external goods was needed for 
characteristic human well-being and well-doing. Yet it was the entirety of the 
individual's existence, not specific modes or means, that became the focus of this new 
definition of happiness. 
In his discussion of the activities necessary to bring a person to such a life of 
virtue, Aristotle subdivided the possibilities according to his division of the mortal soul, 
another area in which he diverged from the Platonic view. Plato's view was that the soul 
and body constituted two entities, contingently and unhappily united. Aristotle spoke of 
the soul as form to the body's matter (Maclntyre, 1966). Analogous to personality, the 
soul retained both rational and nonrational parts, similar to the contrast between 
reasoning and other human faculties. 
In another departure from Platonic thought, he posed that there was no necessary 
conflict between reason and desire although Aristotle admitted to awareness of such 
conflicts. However, he postulated the existence of two kinds of rational activity: 
thinking and activities other than thinking. The excellences of thinking were intellectual 
virtues (such as wisdom, intelligence, and prudence); the excellences of the other were 
moral virtues (such as liberality and temperance). Intellectual virtue was the result of 
explicit instruction whereas moral virtue became known as a product of habit. Both 
positions indicated that virtue was not inborn. 
Because the virtuous person derived pleasure from virtuous activity and knew how 
to choose among pleasures and pains, making choices became inextricably bound up with 
125 
virtue and rendered it neither emotion nor capacity. The human person was not labelled 
good or bad by reason of emotions or capacities; rather, what the person chose to do 
with those emotions and capacities entitled him to be called virtuous or the opposite, 
vicious. This freedom of choice was mediated by the "mean." 
This mean was a level of virtue that existed between two vices, such as the virtue 
of courage existing between the vice of excess (rashness) and the vice of deficiency 
(cowardice). A mean was a rule or principle of choice between two extremes of emotion 
or of action. Virtue emerged from proper decision-making that involved both a judgment 
and balance. Therefore virtue can be known and described singularly in moral terms. 
In deciding which virtues one should follow to become good, Aristotle argued that 
because happiness consisted in activity according to virtue, it was reasonable that one 
should pursue activity in accordance with the highest virtue. This was the virtue of what 
was best in each of us. What was best in us was reason; the characteristic activity of 
reason was speculative reason which dealt with unchanging truths. This became a self-
sufficient occupation, had no practical outcome, and could thus not be a means to 
anything else. Above all, it was concerned with what was timeless and unchanging, that 
is, the Platonic divine. 
Aristotle's audience of the Lyceum in Athens, a small, leisured, and moderately 
wealthy minority of men, conceived of devoting their leisure to metaphysical speculation, 
and easily accepted his claim that the end of human life was the metaphysical 
contemplation of the truth. His advice that external goods were partly necessary and that 
wealth required for such activity was only moderate brought the conclusion that the 
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whole of human life reached its highest point in the activity of speculative philosophy, 
an occupation affordable only by the upper social classes. As only the ruling class of 
philosophers were now considered the proper individuals to undertake such speculative 
philosophy, the concern for the masses within the context of supreme or radical goodness 
was thus restricted; rather, supreme goodness pertained now to only a few people. 
The results of Aristotle's considerations and arguments regarding virtue and the 
supreme good were seized upon by classical Christian writers and manipulated into a 
modified and divergent understanding that became, over time, radically different from 
the classical Greek views. Using Aristotle's premise that a supreme good existed and 
could be pursued, religious clerics posited that this supreme good must be associated with 
God, that supreme goodness could be attained by the human person if that person 
undertook a carefully-designed, logical series of rational steps toward it, and that failure 
to achieve this supreme good was the definition of evil. 
Buber's Perspective on Self-Realization 
Platonic and Aristotelian thought have influenced profoundly several subsequent 
ethical systems that attempted to define ultimate goodness or virtue. Even Buber's 
biblical existentialism was influenced by the Platonism of Philo Judaeus, by the 
Aristotelianism of Maimonides, as well as by the neo-Kantism of Hermann Cohen. What 
Buber developed was a philosophical anthropology that was more replete in Jewish 
sources and Hegelian in its dialectic, but not in its content. There was a narrow ridge 
between knowing Buber as a thinker who read his philosophy into his interpretations and 
that of considering him a thinker who derived his philosophy from his religious tradition 
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(Friedman, 1986). It was through this narrow ridge separating Buber's existentialism, 
his philosophy of community, his religious socialism, and his dialogical philosophy that 
we have come to know his divergence from Platonic and Aristotelian notions of ultimate 
goodness. This coming to know has taken place within the conceptions of creation, 
revelation, and redemption. 
Through his Socratic voice, Plato developed, defined, and refined the concept of 
the Form of the Good, that is, that ultimate or supreme goodness was equated with 
knowledge of this divinely-inspired Form. The fundamental Socratic principle may be 
stated, "Knowledge was virtue, and virtue issued happiness" (Sahakian, 1974, p. 8). 
Although Socrates did not define "the good," he was comfortable deciding that the 
equation of virtue and knowledge implied that a person who knew what was right would 
by virtue of such knowledge do what was right. Conversely, doing wrong stemmed from 
ignorance, and evildoing therefore became known through Socratic and Platonic thought 
as involuntary acting. 
Although Plato identified virtue and knowledge as a single concept, virtue was 
actually the result of knowledge and therefore was dependent upon it. The special 
knowledge that enabled the realizing of virtue was moral insight, a type of knowing that 
both Socrates and Plato valued as the highest, most supreme, and divinely inspired 
realization. Such knowledge was elevated to a point that it became known as the most 
excellent of all possessions. Knowledge as a possession, and as a possession of only a 
select and specially educated few, comprised a characteristic of Socractic, Platonic, and 
Aristotelian knowing. 
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Knowledge as possession was alien to both Buber's epistemology and his regard 
of the human person' relationship to the eternal. In addition, the Platonic/Aristotelian 
conception of knowledge as a form or category brought about a worship of the symbol 
of knowing, its attainment, and the specified educative process of coming to know that 
characterized Idealism. Buber decried the worship of symbols because he claimed they 
often came to be regarded as more than simply signs and pointers; rather, they evolved 
into obstructions that separated the human person from the way to God. 
What was missing from the Platonic or Aristotelian way of knowing and its 
concomitant road to virtue was Buberian emunah, that is, the unconditional trust in the 
relationship achievable by the human person with God (Friedman, 1986). A fundamental 
tension of this unconditional trust was expressed within the idea of holy insecurity, the 
willingness to go out and meet the unique present, which culminated in Buber's "narrow 
ridge" conception. The metaphysical speculation of divinity which characterized the 
definition of ultimate goodness for Aristotle was absent within the Buberian view that 
relocated the human/divine relationship to a position within the human being, as opposed 
to any external "knowing" of a symbol, figure, or icon. 
The fact of creation of the human world was rather abruptly introduced by Plato 
into his discussion of the original primary spirit of the Unmoved Mover and the 
subsequent promulgation of the Olympic divinities. By considering humankind as tertiary 
creations, Plato distanced the human person from the original logos of the creative 
power. Consequently, metaphysical speculation of the divine constituted the closest 
approximation of knowing absolute goodness attainable by individuals. This distancing 
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posed a remoteness and separation of person and divine being and was alien to Buber's 
epistemology. Creation, the basis for the 1-Thou, constituted the ground on which the 
human being could stand, a firmament that enabled the person to meet God. The 
distance between the Creator and the original creation was transcended in the immediacy 
of the 1-Thou knowing and was never abridged or mediated by any original sin or fate. 
The absoluteness of supreme virtue found within Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy was 
absent within Buber's characterization of God, not as an absolute person, but as one who 
had the potential to become one for the human person through loving and being loved. 
Through such reciprocity, absent from ancient Greek thought, God could be known. 
Consideration of revelation also separated Buberian thought of ultimate goodness 
from Platonic and Aristotelian ideas of ultimate virtue and knowledge. Buber's was an 
anti-hierarchical way of realizing ultimate goodness whereas both Plato and Aristotle 
segregated and classified their societies into orders or strata of human beings, each of 
which entertained certain prescribed potentialities and limitations. Buber considered 
revelation, a dynamic event between person and God, available to all who sought the 
relation; however, the person did not have to leave the circle of the 1-Thou relationship 
to recognize or realize the revelation. Temporal considerations surrounding revelation 
also served to distance the two philosophies. Both Aristotle and Plato conceived of 
metaphysical speculation and ultimate knowledge of the absolute truth as the culmination 
of the worthwhile life. Buber recognized revelation as a continuing process in which 
mutual communication led to the completion of creation, an event seen as the proper 
response to revelation. Combined, these two turnings comprised the beginning of 
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redemption. The human person's foremost task, according to Buber, was the actualizing 
of one's unique, unprecedented, and never-recurring potentialities. This regard for the 
ultimate potential of all created creatures was absent from the tripartate class distinctions 
outlined in the Republic and furthered by Aristotle in his description of the moderate 
means and comforts required by the speculative philosopher on his search for ultimate 
knowledge. 
Scholasticism 
Scholasticism derived its name from the medieval philosophers who were 
schoolmen, professors in the universities then in existence. Many of what have come to 
be recognized at Catholic and Christian dogmas were derived by the Scholastics from the 
writings and thoughts of St. Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, ideas which were 
dominated by Platonic virtues and Aristotelian concepts of ultimate or supreme goodness. 
Traditional Christian theological views of goodness and happiness often stemmed 
from the writings and theology of St. Augustine, a fourth century former Manichean who 
later adopted a certain mysticism from the Neo-Platonists whose influence was 
discernible throughout his writings. In 395 C.E. he became the Bishop of Hippo until 
his death in 430 C.E. and during this period he wrote specifically and definitively in the 
field of Christian concepts related to goodness, happiness, and morality. His importance 
was related to his systematic development of the doctrine of original sin which has been 
formulated by the Apostle Paul (Johnson, 1989). Much of subsequent Christian theology 
has been built on the foundation of Augustine's work. 
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Augustinian ethics concerned various ways that a person expressed love for the 
Deity and Augustine's ethics constituted each Platonic virtue it incorporated through the 
lens of love. His fundamental virtues considered nature as essentially good, evil as 
perversion or nature disorganized, freedom of the will, a conglomeration of freedom and 
predestination, the greatest virtue as love, and the greatest good as God. It was the final 
ultimate virtue and good that will be interpreted in this section. 
Augustine posited God as the beginning and end of happiness. "God then 
remains, in following after whom we live well, and in reaching whom we live both well 
and happily" (Johnson, 1989, p. 105) was the result into his theologically-oriented 
investigation into the existence of evil in a universe created by an omniscient and 
omnipresent perfect God. In Of the Morals of the Catholic Church, Augustine addressed 
directly the formula for right living by individuals in this corrupted world. Humanity's 
chief good was not the good the of the body only, he criticized Epicuran Hedonism, but 
was the good of the soul. The good of the soul, he continued, was the happiness that 
humanity could find in the enjoyment of this chief good. One's happiness was 
accomplished by pursuing virtue which gave perfection to the soul. The soul, in turn, 
obtained virtue by following God. Simply put, following God's laws, bestowed upon 
humanity in both written and revealed fashion, was the road to the happy and good life. 
Augustine introduced conditional aspects to the attainment of the perfection which 
this highest good required. Without achieving such perfection, the human person could 
not enter into the heavenly kingdom and was condemned to eternal torture and 
damnation. 
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If you ask us now what the city of God says, first to this question of the 
supreme good and evil, it will answer you at once: Eternal life is the 
perfection of good, and eternal death the consummation of evil; and the 
aim of our life must be to avoid the one, and attain the other (Augustine, 
1950, Bk. 19, Ch. 4). 
Eternal life was now recognized merely as a precondition to the enjoyment of the real 
highest good, that is, God. Augustine wrote adamantly that "[the] highest good, than 
which there is no higher, is God, and consequently, He is unchangeable good, hence 
truly eternal and truly immortal. All other things are only from Him" (Augustine, 1948 
, p. 43). The greatest good was transposed from speculative metaphysical contemplation 
of the ancient Greeks to that of the beholding of God, receiving divine truth, and 
becoming eternally blessed. His belief that the human being's innate will sought after 
good convinced Augustine that this was equated with humanity's search for happiness. 
Once within this satisfaction of a blessed state, a condition comparable to that type of 
contemplation posited by Plato and Aristotle, the person's striving of the will ceased 
because it had found its peace and its goal in God (Sahakian, 1974). 
Within Augustinian Scholasticism, four specific individual virtues emerged, ideals 
that were identical with Plato's four cardinal virtues, but were interpreted through the 
ideal of love. "Temperance is love love giving itself entirely to God; fortitude is love 
bearing everything readily for the sake of God; justice is love serving God only, and 
therefore ruling well all else, as subject to man; prudence is love making a distinction 
between what it helps toward God" (Augustine, 1872, Ch. 15). By means of these four 
virtues, by love, we were led to God and, consequently, to our reward, eternal life and 
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knowledge of truth which was our highest good, that is, God. Accordingly, to live well 
was to love God (Sahakian, 1974, p. 81). Relegated to an ancillary position to the love 
of God was the love of self and neighbor, although accomplishment of this love was 
considered to mark the best path to the love of God. 
Augustine's impact on centuries of philosophical, theological, and ethical 
consideration cannot be minimized. He shifted the locus of responsibility from the 
sphere of the person's freedom to that of his finitude by defining evil as the absence of 
good and stating that all beings were made good, but not being made perfectly good, 
were liable to corruption. Equating, each individual person with an inherent, prenatal 
original sin, Augustine posited the God of redemption and salvation directly as the end 
of man's happiness. 
Thomas Aquinas (ca1225-1274), the most important ethical figure of high 
medieval civilization, developed Augustine's Christian theology by combining it with the 
works of the newly-rediscovered Aristotelian thought. The Thomistic ethic was 
eudaemonistic in espousing the search for happiness; teleological in designating the 
purpose or striving of humanity as the search for goodness, namely, God; and 
intellectualistic in concluding that the final end of humanity was the contemplation of 
God. 
In Summa Contra Gentiles (1957), Aquinas established the agency of the person 
as always acting for an end. By including that every agent acted for a good and that all 
things were directed to one end (which was God), Aquinas redirected the human person 
to shun evil and to seek good. He abnegated from the definition of happiness wealth, 
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worldly power, the goods of the body, and the perceptions of the senses, and he pursued 
a path that led to the modern Christian theology of "other-worldliness," or the concept 
that humanity's ultimate happiness consisted in contemplating God. He declared that 
humanity's ultimate happiness was not in this life and was therefore impossible to realize 
in this life and thus relocated philosophical and theological speculation beyond the 
temporal and spatial restraints of physical life on earth. 
In his opus, Summa Theologica (1955), Aquinas transferred the question of virtue 
into the category of natural law and stated that the "... natural law is what is contained 
in the Law and the Gospel ... by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he 
would be done by" (Aquinas, 1955, Fourth Article, Reply Obj. 1). Aquinas called both 
natural and divine law radiations of the divine being: the one law destined for earthly 
ends, the other ordained by revelation for super-terrestrial ends (Cassier, 1951). 
Humanity's supreme goodness was divided into two categories by Aquinas, a dualism 
that has characterized Christian theology and philosophy until the era of the 
Enlightenment. The human person was taught to believe by the Church that supreme 
goodness was to be achieved after earthly existence. 
Aquinas's summum bonum identified happiness in the vision of God as the human 
person's highest good. Similar to Aristotelian thinking, Aquinas held that all nature, 
including the nonhuman, was designed to act for some end. He identified that end with 
the ultimate good, that is, God. Furthering this line of reasoning, Aquinas posited that 
since all entities were inclined to seek that same end, they similarly tended to be like 
God, had a disposition to be like God, and sought to imitate divine goodness. This 
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constituted a natural tendency of created things to become like God and all intellectual 
substance endeavored throughout the human lifetime to reach its goal, fulfill its nature, 
and attain its own good, that is, the knowledge of God. 
Thomistic valuing and ethics divided virtues into the categories of: (1) natural, 
(2) intellectual, and (3) moral (Sahakian, 1974, p. 83). As its ultimate goal, Thomistic 
ethics viewed the human will as that which desired happiness, the right act as that which 
was the means to the attainment of ultimate happiness. For any action, either that of will 
or deliberateness, to be moral, it must have been in accord with right reason, since 
Aquinas believed that our reason directed us to God. Accordingly, for humanity's lower 
natures of sensation, sexual desire, and urges of passion, to be aligned with morality, 
they also must have been ordered according to reason and rationally directed. 
The dominant view of Christianity in the Middle Ages consisted in a 
subordination of the earthly. The Church, with its emphasis on the idea of purgatory, 
sought to teach obedience because the human person's conditions in this life would 
certainly affect the next life. Attention was paid to religious salvation in terms of bliss 
in the future life. Effects of Renaissance philosophy and theology consisted in the 
incorporation of aesthetics and sensuousness into classical thought and the beginning of 
suspicion to and rejection of contemplative Christianity. A new nature of supreme 
goodness emerged from the repudiation of the Church's pursuit of fame and glory as 
opposed to the religious philosophical ideal of holiness. 
The locus and focus of goodness, often posited as the synonym of happiness, had 
shifted historically from the Hedonistic vision of individual responsibility based on non-
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ascetic pleasure to the Platonic and Aristotelian supremacy of absolute virtue through the 
Christian domain of God-oriented and God-caused goodness. The role of God in this 
domain related to a transcendent element wherein evil may find its account wholly within 
human nature; the good cannot be located in this position (Suchocki, 1988). 
Ruber's Perspective on Scholasticism 
Martin Buber entertained respect, excitement, and interpretation of Christianity 
in his philosophical anthropology. He considered Christianity has having begun with a 
diaspora and a consequent mission that equated to the very life-breath of the idea of 
community, the basis of a people. He found similarities between early Israel and the 
early stages of Christianity in that they both arose from communities of faith even though 
the two groups diverged in their expressions of the nature of that faith. Further, both 
faiths arose as responses to a summons; Israel's summons from God at Sinai and 
Christianity's summons of Jesus to turn into a kingship of God (Buber, 1961). Buber 
viewed the teaching of Jesus himself from the words of the gospels as the framework in 
which the genuine Jewish principle became manifest. Declaring that "[from] my youth 
onwards I have found in Jesus my great brother," Buber viewed the differences between 
Christianity and Judaism as illustrated in the contents of the two faith-types (Buber, 1961, 
p. 12). These differences forced Buber to conclude that although biblical Judaism and 
gospel Christianity had similarities in ethics and fundamental principles, the Greek faith 
principle of acknowledgment, that action acknowledged truth, comprised a notion of 
"facing-about" as opposed to "turning," and differentiated the two types of faith. 
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Buber was appreciative of Jesus's message which he envisioned as three-fold: (1) 
realization of a superhistorical, cosmic, and super-cosmic kingship that concerned the 
existence of all that existed, (2) effecting of turning to God by the man addressed, 
thereby giving the addressed man concrete reality, and (3) relationship of faith toward 
God that was concerned with the person alone, giving reality of relationship an exclusive 
home in man's personal life. Buber summed up New Testament faith as the assurance 
of what was hoped for and a conviction of things unseen, thus developing a unique 
joining of Jewish and Greek concepts of faith. This new conception had a specific 
relationship to the future without which the human person could not exist, and what had 
been a hoping for Israel had become an assurance for the Christian because the Christian 
could now trust God with whom he had become intimate. From the Greek philosophies, 
Christianity drew the requirement of proof, demonstration, and conviction. The practical 
nature of these requirements constituted the division Buber theorized between Scholastic 
Christianity and Jesus's message to the Christian people. 
The Scholastic Christian mode of faith was distinguished by its making everything 
dependent on faith instead of as an actual trust in God. Such faith, Buber commented, 
was fashioned on a representation of Abraham as a "man of faith," a concept Scholastic 
Christians drew from the Hellenized Bible. Fastening on Abraham's immovable 
steadfastness, the Scholastics like Augustine and Aquinas utilized the writings of the 
Apostle Paul to move from the paradigm of Job in which the suffering innocent person 
reproached God for the world but did not diminish his trust in Him, to the position of 
unquestioning acceptance of truth of proposition within religion. From the Gospel of 
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John the Scholastics interpreted that Christians had obtained both faith and knowledge 
under command and through possible penalty of judgment. This necessary decision 
between faith or unbelief was lacking in Israel's mode of faith because the faith of Israel 
had been formed, Buber wrote, eternally with the revelation and covenant. Thus Buber 
found the separation of the faiths located in the division between those who realized faith, 
and those who did not. 
Scholastics interpreted the New Testament's fundamental tenet as the concept, "to 
believe." Linking belief to ability, Scholastic writers redefined the human condition as 
being able to believe. This position was aligned closely with the meaning of Buber's 
authentic relation. Buber and the Scholastics diverged around the idea of belief in God. 
For Christian Scholastics, the belief in God was relegated to a more distant position than 
that of the means to achieve entrance into the heavenly kingdom of eternal bliss. Buber 
declared the fundamental nature of the directness between person and God that enabled 
ability to believe by stating "[if] to believe in God means to be able to talk about Him 
in the third person, then I do not believe in God. If to believe in Him means to be able 
to talk to Him, then I believe in God" (Buber, 1973a, p. 44). 
Buber distinguished the history of the human spirit into epochs of habitation and 
epochs of homelessness. He recognized Augustine as the first philosopher to pose the 
genuine anthropological question around the divided soul of the human person. This 
divided soul could no longer grasp as truth anything but a world that was divided against 
itself. Within this divided world, Augustine offered two autonomous and mutually 
hostile kingdoms, that of light and the other of darkness, a division Buber felt placed the 
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individual simultaneously the scene and the prize of the struggle between hostile forces 
(Buber, 1965a). As for Augustine, Buber wrote that he was "[h]omeless in the world, 
solitary between the higher and the lower powers, he remain[ed] homeless and solitary 
even after he found salvation in Christianity as a redemption that had already taken 
place" (Buber, 1965a, p. 128). Responding with an accusation of man that concerned 
the wonder of man, Augustine wondered of man himself, but with the unique position 
of his own self-experience. Happy that this self-experience seemed to end the 
Aristotelian metaphysic of speculation without experience, Buber applauded a faith that 
built a new house in the cosmos for the solitary soul. Although this raised the image of 
a Christian cosmos of a self-enclosed universe, analogized as a house in which the human 
being was allowed to dwell, Buber recognized the development of the idea of finitude 
whose pattern was a cross, whose vertical beam was the finite space from heaven to hell 
which led right across the heart of the human being, and whose cross-beam was finite 
time from the creation of the world to the end of days. This made time's center, the 
death of Christ, fall redemptively on the center of space, the heart of the poor sinner 
(Buber, 1965a, p. 129) 
Aquinas drew from Augustine's finite cosmos the address by man to God in the 
third person, in a world-system in which the person was a separate species of the spirits, 
and was substantially united with the human body as the highest of physical things. Man 
took the position as the "horizon and the dividing line of spiritual and physical nature" 
but within Aquinas' thought, the individual faced no problematic similar to that in 
Augustine's self-experience. The anthropological question was once again laid to rest, 
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Buber lamented, because in man, housed and unproblematic in Aquinas' cosmos, no 
impulse stirred to questioning self-confrontation, or was it soon appeased (Buber, 1965a). 
Utilitarianism Through Rationalism 
Utilitarianism 
In the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, Epicurus' Hedonism was 
reimagined by the Utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham, James, and John Stuart Mill. In 
eighteenth century England, Bentham (1748-1832) renewed the idea that "[n]ature has 
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure" 
(Johnson, 1989, p. 210). His primary interest was legislation rather than morals and his 
writing was an attempt to infuse the spirit of justice into British institutions. As a 
legalist, Bentham approached the idea of utilitarian pleasure from an organizational 
viewpoint and divided pleasure in fourteen simple types and pain into twelve, a 
framework that has categorized Bentham's work as quantitative Utilitarianism. Bentham 
valued the scientific method and tried to apply it to ethics and resulted in his Hedonistic 
Calculus (Sahakian, 1974). 
Bentham defined the greatest happiness societally, that is, the greatest happiness 
was realized by the greatest number of people when all individuals did all in their power 
to achieve the personal maximum of genuine and enduring happiness (Marnell, 1966). 
His justification of such a definition of the "Greatest Happiness Principle" was in his 
determination of a verifiable arithmetical system to count pleasure and pain. Rooting the 
source of such happiness in the level of the divine, Bentham outlined that if an action 
produced happiness, it was good; if it were good, it conformed to the will of God. 
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When such actions produced the greatest happiness for the greatest number, those 
happinesses became the supreme good for society. 
This supreme good was envisaged on earth, but it remained to be ratified in 
heaven. Dante had written that "In God's will is our peace," but Bentham's position 
could be understood as "In our will is God's peace" (Marnell, 1966, p. 176). Bentham's 
aim of producing and realizing practical politics was the core of his work. 
The school of Utilitarianism pursued by Bentham held that morality was only 
instrumental to happiness. Visualizing happiness as a means and not as an end, Bentham 
posited that happiness was not good in itself but was good for something else. Happiness 
was the seeking of pleasure rather than pain and became instrumental in the utility 
principle. This principle approved of every action than tended to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness ... or to 
prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness to the party 
whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, 
then the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the 
happiness of that individual (Bentham, 1948, p. 126). 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill recognized only two alternatives to the utility 
principle: (1) ascetism, which always opposed it and (2) sympathy and antipathy, which 
sometimes opposed it. Bentham was adamantly opposed to ascetic tendencies in ethics 
(McGill, 1967). Insisting that pain or unpleasantness was never good but was actually 
evil, Bentham defined happiness as a favorable balance of pleasure over pain. Mill later 
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defended hedonism against ascetic criticism by insisting that pleasure had been popularly 
misdefined as primarily bodily pleasures instead of as the pleasure of pleasant feelings. 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the son of the early Utilitarian James Mill (1773-
1836), penned one of the most illustrative modern Hedonistic thoughts with "[i]t is better 
to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied 
than a fool satisfied" (Mill, 1991). Mill stated further that 
[a]ctions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. My happiness is 
intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and 
privation of pleasure. . . . Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only 
things desirable as ends; and all desirable things are desirable either for 
the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of 
pleasure and the prevention of pain (Sedgwick, 1970, pp. 14-15). 
The Mills' contribution to Utilitarianism centered on giving this thought a 
psychology by making the ancient concept of associationism form an ethical mold for 
utilitarianism, that is, a qualitative Utilitarianism. Woven into this framework was an 
implicit power of education. Asserting that all people were created mentally equal, both 
Mills agreed that environmental conditions caused differences found among individuals 
within and among societies. Morality was thus implicit in human biology and this idea 
was later taken over by Spencer in Social Darwinism. According to this psychology, 
morality was a product of sense impressions because seeking pleasure and avoiding pain 
were bound inextricably to sensory perceptions of actions that were then deemed 
pleasurable or painful. Virtue, according to James Mill, acted as a means to pleasurable 
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sensations, the primary of which were prudence, personal fortitude, and social fortitude 
evidenced in justice; and personal benevolence which manifested itself in the pleasures 
of wealth, power, and dignity (Marnell, 1966). Mill's definitive statement of morality 
was written in 1869. 
Virtue is the name of Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, and Beneficence, all 
taken together. It is also, like the name of each of the species included 
under it, at once the name of the Affection, the Motive, and the 
Disposition. The man who has the Disposition toward all the four, 
Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Beneficence, in full strength; that is, who 
has acquired, from habit, the facility of associating with those acts the 
pleasures which result from them, in other words, a habit of obeying the 
motives, is perfectly virtuous (Mill, 1869, II, pp. 288-289). 
Mill identified a test of the reality of Utilitarianism by addressing the issue of its 
applicability to others. Forcing morality into a quasi-scientific system, Mill built a new 
foundation for morality within a humanly constructed order. Morality now rested on a 
physiological basis of sensation and could be objectively verified. The good and the 
beautiful coalesced as a fusion of the subjectively aesthetic and moral. Utilitarianism was 
now comprised of both a psychology and of an ethics. 
Utilitarianism, an outgrowth of Hedonistic philosophy, regarded its proper 
historical placement within legislation rather than within morality. Although ethical in 
spirit, the writings of Bentham and Mill were classified as political science or legislation. 
Bentham's work argued that "[t]he business of government is to promote the happiness 
of society, by punishing and rewarding" (Bentham, 1948, p. 189) and, contrary to the 
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positions of both Kant and Hegel, held that all punishments were evil. Cautioning 
legislators that inflicting pain was justifiable only when it had good results, Bentham 
outlined four conditions under which punishments were absolutely out of place. These 
conditions were where such punishments were groundless, inefficacious, unprofitable, 
or needless. Recognizing the need to mete out punishment to preserve the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number, Bentham claimed as his overriding principle that 
punishment to prevent harm to society must be accomplished "at as cheap a rate as 
possible" with the smallest penalty to society (Bentham, 1948). 
Disagreements among Utilitarians regarding the road to ultimate happiness were 
four-fold. First, Spencer, a scientific and evolutionary utilitarian, disagreed with 
Bentham's empirical utilitarianism. Whereas Bentham chose to trace hedonistic 
consequences of particular acts in his legislative edicts, Spencer relied on scientific 
generalizations regarding the consequences of various kinds of acts, such as benevolence 
and theft. Second, Utilitarians argued about the question of whether people desire only 
their own pleasure, a notion that involved the consideration of psychological-egoistic 
hedonism. Bentham usually agreed with this position; however, he allowed for some 
degree for sympathy from others. Hobbes, writing in the seventeenth century, rejected 
altruistic motives altogether. The role of God, or divine inspiration for morality, 
constituted the third sphere of disagreement for Utilitarians. The main difference 
between theological and non-theological utilitarians was that the former had additional 
sanctions for moral conduct. If the theological utilitarians were correct and if God had 
intended happiness for His creatures, our pursuit of it was observance of God's will as 
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well as our own interests. In theological utilitarianism, followers were offered a manner 
in which to reconcile egoistic desire and altruistic duty. Finally, the most essential 
difference among Utilitarians was that of the constitution of happiness conceived as 
pleasure. At the core of Bentham's utilitarianism was the idea that pleasures were 
quantifiably the same. Without this framework of quantitative sameness, Bentham would 
be denied the Hedonistic Calculus and would be unable to conclude that benevolence was 
of greater utility than malice. 
John Stuart Mill's revision to traditional Utilitarianism regarding happiness 
conceived as pleasure was his theorem that it was consistent with utilitarianism to 
recognize that some kinds of pleasure were greater, more desirable, and more valuable 
than others. His ideas moved Utilitarian thinking away from complete dependence on 
quantitative thinking alone when estimating pleasures (McGill, 1967). Mill's argument 
was both Platonic and Aristotelian in that the qualitative diversity of pleasure was entirely 
consistent with Aristotelian eudaemonism. Plato assured the reader that no one would 
choose to be an oyster, , no matter what pleasures the oyster enjoyed. Aristotle insisted 
that those who knew pleasure that accompanied rational activity preferred it to pleasures 
merely of bodily activities. With this new thought, Mill stepped toward Aristotle by 
maintaining that "the ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is 
desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate" (Mill, 
1944, p. 33-34). 
Comparison of the two strands of Utilitarian thought illustrated disagreement 
between Bentham and Mill as to the definition of the greatest good. Bentham defined 
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the ultimate good as pleasure of a single quality which was calculable in quantity only, 
not in kind. Mill reasoned that pleasure must differ in kind as well as quantity, and 
Mill's summum bonum was mediated by the statement that 
[the] only true or definite rule of conduct or standard of morality is the 
greatest happiness, but there is needed first a philosophical estimate of 
happiness. Quality as well as quantity of happiness is to be considered . 
less of a higher kind is preferable to more of a lower. The test of quality 
is the preference given by those who are acquainted with both (Mill, 
1965, p. 343). 
Decisions as to which pleasures were more valuable needed to be referred to the hedonic 
expert who had both adequate experience with both types of pleasure and knew how to 
evaluate them (Sahakian, 1974). 
Rationalism 
Rationalist morality demonstrated the ultimate application of scientific method to 
ethical thinking. The systematic thought of Rene Descartes in theory of knowledge and 
in cosmology earned him the title of "the father of modern philosophy," but he wrote no 
systematic treatise of ethics (Tsanoff, 1942, p. 174). He maintained the attitude of 
critical resistance and doubt as safeguards against error and called the fundamental 
problem for humanity the conflict between seeking truth and universalist first principles 
versus the living and acting of life. Descartes devised four maxims of morals that 
included advice to his modern person: (1) submit to established laws, customs, and 
religion while following moderate respectable practices, (2) be as firm as possible in any 
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action undertaken, (3) try self-mastery rather than changing the world order, and (4) 
choose the best of human occupations, that is, the cultivation of reason in the 
perseverence of truth (Tsanoff, 1974). 
Descartes's consideration of ultimate goodness centered on his definition of 
human knowledge. Complete human knowledge involved knowledge of virtue, but really 
understanding virtue, the path to human perfection, meant beginning study of humankind, 
of their souls and thoughts, as well as of their bodies and passions. This was known 
through emphasis on the interaction of soul and body: in passion, the two were somehow 
turned into one. His solution for the scientist established a biological means to interpret 
the notions of soul, passion, reason, knowledge, and virtue. 
Descartes's position of biological interpretation of philosophical constructs gave 
primacy to reason and its power to bind or dissolve the factual as well as everything 
based on belief in or on evidence of revelation, tradition, and authority (Cassier, 1955). 
A bond emerged between the mathematical and philosophical spirits that produced a 
modernity of reason as the pinnacle of human capability. Scientific analysis was applied 
to both psychological and sociological problems. 
Cartesian methodology influenced the structure and state of society as well as the 
conception of humanity's ultimate good. Rationalism envisioned the human person as 
having been born into the world not as having created or shaped it. Prior ethicists 
regarded the general will of the state as composed of the wills of individuals; however, 
Cartesian thought held that the state came into being as a result of the union of human 
wills. Only in this collective union could Rationalists make the "body" of the state and 
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subject it methodology more fruitful in discovery of universal laws in the physical world 
(Cassier, 1955). 
Descartes's reductionist ethics paralleled those of the Stoics, although Descartes's 
intentions were hardly Stoic in nature in that he did not aspire to apathy. He accepted 
human passions as good in nature and believed that the individual would stagnate without 
passion. He considered pursuit of satisfaction essential human activity, again parallelling 
Epicurean Hedonists, and the idea of contentment achieved with serious rational 
consideration as humanity's goal. 
Discussion of contentment demanded consideration of the causes of those things 
which could contribute to human contentment. Descartes decided that our well-being 
depended upon the reasonableness of our desires. He labelled the supreme excellence 
of the soul as generosity. 
True generosity which causes a man to esteem himself as highly as he 
legitimately can, consists alone partly in the fact that he knows that there 
is nothing that truly pertains to him but this free disposition of his will, 
and that there is no reason why he should be praised or blamed unless it 
is because he uses it well or ill; and partly in the fact that he is sensible 
in himself of a firm and constant resolution to use it well, that is to say, 
never to fail of his own will to undertake and execute all the things which 
he judges to be the best-which is to follow perfectly after virtue (Tsanoff, 
1942, pp. 176-177). 
Descartes's philosophy influenced the scientific theology of Benedict De Spinoza, 
a Jewish theologian and philosopher whose work influenced Bacon's experimental school 
of thought that inspired Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Spencer, Darwin, and Huxley, 
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as well as those who followed Descartes, including Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, 
and Lotze (Spinoza, 1933). From Francis Bacon, Spinoza (1632-1677) developed the 
novum organum, a new method of learning which was applicable to the laws of human 
conduct as well as to the processes of nature. Inspired by his love of Descartes's 
mathematics, he constructed a geometrical system of knowledge of God, the universe, 
and man that led to the person's attainment of supreme goodness. Negatively stated, 
Spinoza maintained that human nature obeyed fixed laws no less than did figures of 
geometry. Regarding his ethics, Spinoza held that he would "... therefore write about 
human beings as though [he] were concerned with lines and planes and solids (Spinoza, 
1939). The Spinoza Ethics (1982) illustrated a combination of the severe positivism of 
empiricists with the deep subjectivity and enthusiasm of piety belonging to a mostly 
religious nature. 
Spinoza regarded the universe and the human being as systems of pure mechanics, 
a science that was spiritual and divine. In an heroic contest for freedom of 
philosophizing, Spinoza entered into a voluntary martyrdom in the cause of free thought 
which resulted in persecution, obloquy from his family, and excommunication from the 
synagogue when he was twenty four. He was condemned by the Christian authorities of 
the Church and State as he turned down both royal and university honors so as not to 
corrupt his freedom of teaching (Spinoza, 1939). Spinoza has been characterized as a 
pantheist with devout religious beliefs and as a Monist whose One was not nature, but 
God. 
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This philosophy of the person's access of the supreme good resulted, in part, from 
the conflict Spinoza experienced from the narrow, rigid rules of the synagogue contrasted 
with the free Latin culture around him. The monotheism of his Jewish nature led to his 
revolt against all forms of dualism and idolatry and influenced his reverence for Scripture 
and his resulting rebuke of Phariseeism. Spinoza was frustrated with the synagogue's 
formalism and directed his efforts in an open revolt against its authorities. His "crime" 
was critique of the Holy Scriptures in a devout yet exceptionally rational spirit, an action 
that placed him practically in the ranks of Christian philosophers of his time, yet his love 
of mysticism in the Talmud and Kabbalah as well as his love of the Neo-Platonism of 
Philo and Plotinus separated him from his Christian contemporaries. After his 
banishment, he lived in scholarly retirement and completed his Theological Political 
Treatise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus) (1989) in which he pleaded for freedom of 
thought in civil and religious matters because it was essential to the well-being of the 
Church as well as the State. 
Spinoza's Ethics ranged from metaphysics to theology and resulted in 
epistemology. The Ethics, the culmination of his entire system, established a clear 
demonstrable nexus between God and human conduct. This provided ontological proof 
of the existence of God from His nature or being "... of such an essence as can only 
be conceived of as existing" (Spinoza, 1939). Thus, from positing God's being and 
existence as necessary, Spinoza derived all the laws of existence, creation, nature, and 
the individual's conduct as fixed in an eternal necessity. God's nature must have been 
perfect freedom because God could not be constrained by any things except Itself. His 
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denunciation of dualism engendered his theory that there could be no "other" to the One 
absolute substance. 
After his conversion to worldly status, Spinoza concentrated on deconstructing the 
myth of evil in the world. Because man was finite and did not possess the infinite 
attributes of the perfect One, "[i]t is this lack of the perfect knowledge of the whole 
which causes these affections and passions to wear in man's temporal experience the 
appearance of what is evil" (Spinoza, 1939, p. x). The discussion of the delusion of evil 
as the bondage of passion or of affections constituted a major division in Spinoza's work 
and signified where the Ethics actually began. The highest good was composed of the 
satisfactions in relations of the limited being in alio, the extension of which was the 
completion of life. 
This "joy" was experienced with the knowledge of its source, that is, the 
completeness of life in the divine, and may be known as "love." The highest attainment 
of the human mind was conceived of as intellectual love of God, the contemplation of 
divine perfection in which all limitations and imperfections of the finite were lost in the 
harmonious unity of the infinitely many in One. Knowledge was virtue in itself, since 
knowing a thing to be good was identical with loving it. Only that could be seen to be 
good which was part of a common or universal good, and that universal good was the 
intellectual love of God. 
Intellectual love of God was the problematic that divided Spinoza from traditional 
Jewish theology. The love of knowing the good (God) was visioned by Spinoza as 
reciprocal, that is, God may love Himself in loving mankind, enabling individuals, in the 
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same love, to rejoice in virtue "... not because it enables him to govern his lusts; but 
because he does rejoice in it, therefore to govern his lusts is possible" (Spinoza, 1939) 
Spinoza's doctrine of the intellectual love of God was an expression of infinite self-love 
both on the part of the deity contemplating His own perfection with delight as well as His 
granting this contemplative joy onto those finite beings who cast themselves into the 
abyss of His infinity at the sacrifice of their own individuality. 
Buber's Perspective on the Utilitarians and Rationalists 
What distinguished Martin Buber's existential philosophy from the Utilitarians and 
Rationalists can be described within the contexts of individualism and collectivism. Even 
Buber's colleauge and mentor, Franz Rosenzweig, dismissed scientific, quantitative, and 
dualistic approaches to an anthropology or philosophy of humankind as tedious because 
he felt that no real "other" was present within the dialogues of thought presented by those 
writers. Buber equated the spokenness of speech with livingness and could not restrict 
authentic speech to the realm of scientific paradigms, dualistic thinking, or technical 
monologue. He criticized Aristotle for having lost sight of spokenness as the basic 
existential event that arose from the pointing back to reality between man and man 
(Friedman, 1969). When regarding the human spirit, Buber insisted upon consideration 
of the tension of polarity between human individuals in the concrete world. 
In his discussion of the two stages that descend eventually into the absolutely self-
affirmed person capable of radical evil, Buber characterized the second stage as that in 
which the person felt personal mastery of each situation faced in concrete reality and 
approached each with formulated techniques rather than with authentic meeting and 
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exercised a "once for all" approach that precluded real response to unique situations 
(Buber, 1952b). Those philosophical and ethical systems which relegated the individual 
to the grouped collective status denied Buber's assertion that the moment must retain true 
dialogical character of presentness and uniqueness (Buber, 1965a, p. 170). 
In a response to scientific orthodoxy as a detriment and impediment to real 
meeting, Buber posited six problematics that prevented such meeting: (1) the human 
concern with revelation of the future, (2) the attempt to get behind the problematic of 
life, (3) the desire to possess or use divine power, (4) the acceptance of tradition and law 
as "once for all" and the taking refuge in it, (5) the potential belief in science as provider 
of immortality which made death seem unreal or unserious, and (6) the symbols used by 
the individual to address God which really stood in the way of that address (Buber, 
1952b). The scientifically pure idea stood in the way between man and God and Buber 
saw the job of the philosopher to restore the lived concrete in relation to the human 
person through the destruction of images which did not do God justice. Therefore, the 
philosopher's primary act was that of abstraction, as opposed to the scientist's purpose 
of particularization for eventual generalizing. 
Civilization, Buber criticized, was intent on submerging the dialogical life by the 
once and for all of thought systems. By attaching human life to scientific absolutes, 
theorists were able to bring order and meaning into earthly existence through imitation 
of the transcendent Being, but by doing so, degenerated the holy norm into human 
convention. The resulting attachment to absolute was reduced, became symbolic ritual, 
and satisfiable only within cultic spheres (Buber, 1952a). 
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Buber held particular criticism for Descartes's refusal to accept as the beginning 
of his philosophy the position of man's immediacy, that is, from the position of the 
philosophizing man. Descartes insisted on the act of anticipating, which led to 
consideration of pure being as the beginning, from which followed that pure being was 
pure abstraction. From this, pure reason could become the proper basis for philosophy, 
as it did later for both Kant and Hegel (Buber, 1965a). The question of the relation of 
reason to non-reason in the human person was thus called into question, a question whose 
answer served to frame a designation of both "natural" and "unnatural" states of the 
human person. 
Criticism of Spinoza's attempt to "master the situation of post-copernican man," 
issued the call for an unconditional acceptance of astronomical infinity and the stripping 
of its uncanniness. By equating God with, and naming Him Infinite substance, Spinoza 
juxtaposed God's attribute of infinite substance with other attributes, such as love. This 
was not Aquinas' manifold universe, ordered as an image, in which every thing and 
every being had its place and the being "man" felt himself at home in union with them 
all. Instead Spinoza provided an aggregate of divine modes in which the kinds and 
orders of being were not really grasped and united. Spinoza attempted and failed to 
effect reconciliation from intellectual separatedness (Buber, 1965a, p. 134). 
Buber's critique of Spinoza concentrated on Spinoza's attempts to take away from 
God His being open to man's address. What Buber found unacceptable about Spinoza's 
position was that the medieval philosopher sought to purify God, that is, to make Him 
greater or more divine. "The fundamental error of Spinoza was that he imagined that 
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in the teaching of Israel only the teaching that God is a person was to be found and he 
opposed it as a diminution of divinity. But the truth of the teaching is that God is also 
a person, and this is, in contrast to all impersonal, unaddressable 'purity' of God, an 
augmentation of divinity" (Buber, 1966, p. 43). In Spinoza, Buber found the tendency 
of the Western spirit that was moving toward monological life and was causing the crisis 
of spirit in general, "since in the air of monological life it must gloriously wither" (1966, 
p. 43). 
Eastern Thought 
Bhagavad-Gita 
Ancient Eastern philosophies of Buddhism and Brahmanism have posited paths 
to clearly recognized states of enlightenment or radical goodness. Whereas Plato, 
Aristotle, Christian, and Jewish philosophers have defined the good life or well-being as 
a seeking of pleasure or happiness, and other thinkers have ascribed to the good life the 
search for power, finding one's deepest impulse and following it, doing what one thinks 
is right, being honest, devoting oneself to a cause, and the renunciation of a desire, the 
Bhagavad-Gita in contrast placed the highest value on renunciation of desires as well as 
the illumination of the human mind. 
The illumined human person has been known as the one who knew bliss, an 
Eastern designation that approaches the Western category of radical goodness. Bliss 
consisted in a state in which the person sought nothing further than the state in which he 
existed. This person renounced cravings because they tormented his heart and took no 
action or had no thought for further or more intensified happiness. Within the state of 
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bliss, one could not be shaken by adversity and was free from fear, anger, or things of 
desire. 
The process of attainment of such bliss involved more than a singular effort of 
the human mind. Particular emphasis was placed upon control of the sense because a 
person can become addicted to sense objects and become confused by them as they 
overtake human desire. Although the Bhagavad-Gita stressed the ultimacy of controlling 
one's mind in order to allow the total individual to meditate, the concomitant freeing of 
the human mind left it empty of lust and hatred. A non-legalistic philosophy, The 
Bhagavad-Gita urged 
He knows peace who has forgotten desire. 
He lives without craving: 
Free from ego, free from pride. 
This is the state of enlightenment in Brahman (Porbhavananda, 1944). 
Buddhism 
Buddhist philosophy stressed that the answer to the question, "What is 
happiness?" was perhaps the most uncompromising, obscure, and paradoxical problem 
to consider (Zimmer, 1951). Filled with mythology and poetry, the ideal for the 
attainment of enlightenment was illustrated by the story of how the Buddha became the 
"Awakened One." The great and princely yogi, Gautama Sakyamuni, arrived at the 
threshold of absolute enlightenment, although he was tempted by the god Kama-Mara 
(Death and Desire). Overcoming his tempter by remaining immovable in introversion, 
the yogi then experienced the Great Awakening. Now known as the Buddha (Awakened 
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One), he recognized that his experience was beyond all powers of human speech; 
therefore to attempt to discuss it or teach it directly would be in vain. Choosing to hide 
the possibility of this Great Awakening, Buddha was urged by the universal lord of 
fleeting processes, the Brahma, who was himself a creature, to teach the path so that 
some others would understand and become, happy. Buddha was thus moved to teach the 
path, an Order assumed shape, and the Buddhist tradition was brought into existence 
(Campbell, 1951). 
The Order of Buddhism has become antithetical to the missionary traditions of 
Christianity. Buddhism's doctrines had been meant for only those prepared to hear; they 
had never been intended for the multitudes or to interfere with the course of civilization. 
The path celebrated the individual who was ready to hear the message, and within 
Buddhism the greatest thinker was the "silent sage," unlike Zarathustra's preaching of 
religious law of Persia, Confucius's commentaries on restoring the system of early 
Chinese thought, or Jesus's announcing salvation to the world (Zimmer, 1951). 
Buddhism's enlightenment, or radical goodness, remained the symbol of something 
beyond what could be said or taught (Abelson & Friquegnon, 1987). 
Buber's Perspective: The Teaching of the Tao 
Buber had often been erroneously classified as a "mystic" by others in an attempt 
to classify his thought and philosophy (Friedman, 1960). Early in his philosophical life, 
Buber was extremely interested in Eastern mystic philosophies and had personal 
experiences that were described as mystical. In his later writers, Buber rejected the 
entire system of philosophical classification into schools and paradigms; rather, he wrote 
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"I am not concerned with finding a conceptual 'pigeonhole' for ecstasy. It is the 
unclassifiable aspect of ecstasy that interests me" (Buber, 1985, p. xxx/). What did 
interest him was the individual's experience that lay forever beyond explanation. 
Remarking that he was distressed that our time had lost sight of the old knowledge 
that the Orient formed a natural unity, Buber wrote that the peoples of the East possessed 
a common reality that sundered them in unconditional clarity from the destiny and genius 
of the West (Buber, 1957). His way of coming to know that unity was through the single 
manifestation of the teaching of the Tao. Underlying that teaching was the primal, 
magical state of the spirit. That magical state was achieved through the process of 
detaching and becoming independent. Above all, the process was characterized by a 
slowness, a willingness to endure, and a desire to achieve undifferentiated wholeness. 
To understand the teaching, Buber called upon Western civilization to bring 
together the three forces of knowing: science, law, and teaching. Science, the 
compilation of all that "is;" law, the organization of the commandments of "ought;" and 
teaching, which has only one subject, the one thing "needful" (Buber, 1957, pp. 32-33). 
Whereas the fundamental meanings of "is" and "ought" could be transformed, the 
"needful" transcended such dichotomy and remained a synthesis with neither inner or 
outer, but demanded nothing; instead, it simply proclaimed itself. 
Ecstasy was thus interpreted as the approach of the word of the I. Describing as 
illusory the standard of truth to measure knowledge or health (such as in mental health 
contrasted with experiences of mystical ecstasy), Buber preferred to experience the 
urgency of bliss in mystic thought. "I do not know what madness is; but I know that I 
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am here to listen to the voice of the human being" (Buber, 1985, p. xxxii). Out of the 
intermixture of madness, ecstasy, individual experience, and knowledge arose a religion: 
a product of the contamination in which information, command, and the necessary are 
welded into a contradictory and effective whole" (Buber, 1957, p. 34). The resulting 
religion and teaching could be considered partial forces; instead, both represented the 
wholness of life. 
Buber considered human nature to include a dimension of unity, that is, the unity 
of the simple person and the unity of the person who had become unified. When the 
"central" person appeared, the individual sought out his "poorer brothers in spirit," to 
speak to them in the language that they could hear: the parable (Buber, 1957, p. 35). 
As the twentieth century's foremost recounter of Hasidic parable in its mystical fullness, 
Buber maintained a deep, abiding, and cherished respect for the parable, which he 
considered as the insertion of the absolute into the world of events. Conversely, he 
defined the myth as the insertion of the world of things into the absolute. 
The teaching of the Tao decried the dissolution that had taken place in Western 
religion that 
consummated in the perpetuated act of violence that calls itself religion yet 
holds religiousness in chains. Ever again there awakens in the souls of 
the religious the ardour for freedom--for the teaching; ever again 
reformation—restoration—renewal of the teaching—is ventured; ever again 
this venture must miscarry, ever again the fervent movement must issue 
not in the teaching but in a mixture of science and law, the so-called 
purified religion. For the teaching cannot be restored, cannot be renewed. 
Eternally the same, still it must eternally begin anew. This is the course 
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taken by the history of the highest manifestation of the Eastern spirit 
(Buber, 1957, p. 36). 
Reformation Through Intuitionalism 
Reformation of Aroused Conscience 
Martin Luther exemplified the transformation within Christian thinking during 
Renaissance times and he sought justification only by faith. The idea of the supreme 
good was salvation and was the state of the human soul in which faith became the free 
gift of God. What separated the human being from God was found within separated 
kinds of righteousness. Although the ultimate test for good and evil was comprised in 
God's commands in scriptures, the ideal for humanity became an inner Christ-like 
personality. 
Luther's doctrine embodied the maturing critical intelligence in Europe during the 
time of Humanism which compelled a radical reconstruction of important church 
doctrines. His revolt against ecclesiasticism stemmed from a deep spiritual demand and 
a twofold conviction that churchly legalism and reliance on external observance were 
barriers to union and therefore our trust could never be in any devised instrumentality 
but only in a living faith which was a liberation of the human soul in Jesus Christ 
(Tsanoff, 1942). His emphasis shifted toward the moral factor in Christian life, but his 
development of that principle was set against papal authority in the rejection of any 
gospel that was solely of good works. Luther's emphasis was not that of outward 
conduct but of inner attunement of the soul. 
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Luther was driven by a sinner's anguish rather than by a sturdy moral conviction. 
His demands and reforms were rigorous and were marked by asceticism and by 
unrelieved conscience. He did not find peace within the Augustinian monastary; rather, 
he discovered fulfillment and salvation through union in faith with Christ and he held that 
humanity had an inalienable assurance of God's free gift of righteousness through loving 
faith in Christ (Tsanoff, 1942). It was the Church's sale of indulgences that transformed 
him into the role of reformer, and his condemnation by the Church pushed his efforts 
toward radicalism. Luther was outraged by the system of indulgences because it 
neglected the religious essential of the repentant anguish for the sin itself in exchange for 
payment. This practice, Luther believed, denegrated the ecclesiastic system of the 
masses, fasting, pilgrimages, and monastic and lay discipline of conduct by allowing for 
and encouraging false atonement by the wealthy through financial arragnements hardly 
based on true faith. 
Accepting the fact of sin as given, Luther considered that such a state rendered 
one impotent to do good. Luther wrestled with the question of how people could strive 
to righteousness in the sight of an absolutely righteous God and secure salvation from sin 
and guilt. Salvation, which depended entirely upon the will and grace of God, was a 
position in which Luther agreed with Augustine. Yet Luther carried the probability of 
salvation one onerous step forward. He wrote that by fiat of God's will, He predestined 
and elected those decreed to be saved and effectively carried out His eternal purpose in 
the individual soul (Mackinnon, 1962). Luther agreed with the Nominalist position that 
God's will expressed the highest good. 
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The concept of predestination so permeated Luther's theology that he relegated 
human attempts to achieve righteousness as negated because unless God had 
predetermined to offer salvation to a particular person, one's actions could never be in 
themselves righteous in God's sight. Thus Luther planted himself firmly in opposition 
to Aristotelian thought which conceived of righteousness as dwelling in the soul. 
According to Aristotle's Ethics (1985), righteousness followed and arose from one's acts. 
In the Lutheran view, righteousness preceded works and works arose from it. Therefore 
virtue did not flow from works and acts, but acts arose from virtue, as Christ taught 
(Mackinnon, 1962). 
Philosophy was misleading and was the pursuit of "vanity and perdition." 
Theologians, Luther complained, were often led astray by Aristotle's fallacious 
metaphysics. By moving away from both the Nominalists and the Aristotelians, Luther 
asserted that persons must be righteous in order to act righteously, but they must first 
interpret it in the true scriptural sense (Mackinnon, 1962, pp. 188-189). Only the Gospel 
revealed the great secret for the attainment of such righteousness. The individual came 
to the secret by faith which revealed the Word of God. 
One must come to God with the appropriate attitude of a condemned person, that 
is, condemned by conscience and the law which no one can fulfill. One must come to 
God in humility and mystical self-despair, having first eschewed any personal sense of 
security in one's own righteousness, the greatest enemy of essential humility. The 
person was transformed into one who was sufficiently satisfied to accept God's gift of 
salvation. Luther's asceticism asserted that individuals must be aware of their own 
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impotence to save themselves and recognize the consciousness of unrighteousness as an 
indispensable condition of justification. 
Luther thought of God as the absolute good and as ideal righteousness. His 
conviction was profound and he declared that even in our doing good, we sin, unless God 
through Christ covered our imperfections (Mackinnon, 1962). Luther's ethics were of 
piety and asserted that morality concerned the person's devotion to God expressed in the 
one's own life, thought and dealings with others. He wiped out the barrier between 
laypersons and the clergy, between secular and religious acts, and between lay and 
clerical sanctity. The whole of life was charged with spiritual possibilities (Tsanoff, 
1942). He allowed for fundamental changes within clerical life including marriage of 
priests, translating the Bible for German people, inaugurating a system of public schools 
to teach everyone to read God's Word, and preaching the freedom of the Christian man. 
Yet Luther held dogmatically to the tenet that the attainment of righteousness was 
possible only for those who believed in Christ. For the unbeliever, Christ's redemptive 
work was an act of judgment, not of redemption, and deemed the salvation of the soul 
the effective realization of God's saving purpose, since remission was only given to those 
who believed in Christ. He redefined faith as the intellectual conviction of the truth of 
God's word and promise in the Gospel. He rejected the scholastic distinction between 
incomplete and complete faith (Mackinnon, 1962). Complete faith consisted of humility 
and obedience, humble distrust of the self and all its powers and works, and readiness 
to subject oneself to God's word and will. Luther's conception of faith was intellectual 
and denoted the true understanding of the divine plan of salvation. But if faith were the 
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right apprehension of what was revealed in the Gospel, it was not determined by the 
understanding itself; rather, it was the gift of God known through experience of a moral, 
spiritual, and intellectual character. 
Imagining God as the Great Physician who healed the human condition of sin 
known as disease, Luther employed Christ within his metaphor as the Good Samaritan 
who healed the wounded, sin-stricken humanity. Only through healing was the person 
rendered righteous. Through this metaphorical construct, Luther sought to impress 
humankind that the moral regeneration of the believer was not only possible, but could 
be brought about in an instantaneous operation of God's power and grace (Mackinnon, 
1962). In this sense, God began in the individual the process of moral healing or 
regeneration. It was only in the prospective sense that He would finally and surely bring 
it to completion. Luther separated the process of justification into two stages: of always 
being in the process of justification and the waiting and preparing for complete 
justification. 
Luther rejected the Scholastic interpretation of infused righteousness or grace, or 
that of faith formed by love. He agreed with the Augustinian concept of it as a healing 
process, and he affirmed that justification required not only the works of the law, but a 
living faith which operated in its own works. He stressed that God acted directly with 
the individual, not through the sacramental medium of the Church, in giving the grace 
that reputed righteous and made righteous. The notion of merit by the person was 
denied, and justification was, from beginning to end, wholly, exclusively the work of 
God, on whom the sinner was absolutely dependent (Mackinnon, 1962). 
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Contrasting the Lutheran position were the Calvinists who through John Calvin 
(1509-1564) were legalists who ascribed to Hebrew Scriptures in deciding that morality 
was obedience to the Decalogue directly to God. In this moral code that presupposed 
Kantian ethics, Calvinists proposed that opposition to God was sin; thus, obedience to 
God led to supreme goodness. This religious and philosophical system stressed one's 
responsibility, guilt, and opportunity to achieve salvation with "every man should 
receive his due" (Widgery, 1940). 
Calvinists saw God at the center of the cosmos, and the role of humankind within 
this order as secondary, although the individual, through partaking in the rite of 
communion, could enter into the divine relationship. Entering into this relationship 
afforded the person understanding of the means to achieve supreme goodness, although 
this scholastic religion placed obedience to law and commandment as fundamental to the 
realization of other-worldly happiness. 
Calvin considered the chief end of humankind to glorify and enjoy God. To 
achieve this end, Calvin wrote that the Word of God, which was contained in the 
scriptures of the "Old" and "New" Testaments, was the only rule to direct us to glorify 
and enjoy Him (Harkness, 1958, p. 90). Calvinists believed in this ultimate good 
because they believed God so far transcended all human creatures that humanity could 
find their own joy and glory in exalting Him. Mediating this glorification was the belief 
in the primacy of Calvin's interpretation of the scriptures as the only true one, a situation 
that resulted in Calvinism being characterized as an intolerant denomination that viewed 
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heresy as abomination and was suspicious of any worship that might have appeared to 
be contradictory. 
Calvinists saw the three cardinal offenses against God as idolatry, blasphemy, and 
heresy. If the chief end of humankind could be considered largely in negative terms, 
these offenses might be the basis of Calvin's supreme good. As a legalist whose source 
of moral law was the Decalogue, Calvin argued this position with "[t]hat the law is 
divided into ten precepts, is beyond all controversy, being frequently established by the 
authority of God Himself. The question, therefore, is not concerning the number of the 
precepts, but concerning the manner of dividing them" (Harkness, 1958, p. 92). 
Calvinism developed as a discipline of life and thought. Rejecting papal primacy, 
Calvin substituted an authoritative church to dictate the lives of its adherents. People 
were to obey God's will and the office of God's ministers was to execute that will. This 
demanded both an unwavering conviction and firm will for true worship of God with the 
correct understanding of humanity's relation to God. The first principle was 
humankind's utter dependence on God and disavowal of all external observance and 
sacramental magic as causing the misunderstanding that whatever people may or may not 
do contributed to their salvation (Tsanoff, 1942). If God bestowed His grace on 
humankind they were saved by His mercy; if not, they were damned by His justice. 
Salvation was God; God was the only good; and God's will was the sole determinant of 
good. Presdestination was the ultimate fiat of God's will and the final source of all 
righteousness. What God willed was good because He willed it. 
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Morality in Calvinism was a reflection of this and demanded trust and obedience. 
Calvinism began with the tenet of human depravity and Divine predestination, but did 
not produce an image of a frail or impotent human being; rather, human frailty was by 
God's grace turned into strength. God's law was primary and was not left to be searched 
out by human reason. The result was the establishment of God's law and rule in human 
life practiced within stringent regulations of belief and conduct by a Biblical code. This 
alone was the way the person could achieve ultimate goodness. 
Erasmus, a third Reformation scholar, sought to accomplish reform within 
scholarship and satire. Along with Sir Thomas More, Erasmus (1466-1536) tried to 
bring relief into the spirit of the Christian person. To re-establish the "philosophy of 
Christ," Erasmus combined the spirit of the sermon on the mount with Greek philosphy, 
asserting that former was, above all else, something practical (Widgery, 1940). His 
Christian Aristotelianism advocated that human well-being was dominant and the 
individual a social whole. Contradicting both Calvin and Luther, he asserted that 
dispositions cultivated in the human soul were greatly significant. In his Platonic 
leanings, Erasmus believed that existence was understood best from the spirit and 
goodness was an essential characteristic of ultimate being. Espousing the rational nature 
of the human person, he diverged from strict Protestantism's emphasis on the fact of 
human will. 
The chief source of contention and disagreement between Erasmus and Luther 
concerned Luther's doctrine of Justification by Faith Alone. With Luther's rejection of 
human responsibility, Erasmus saw a harmful effect on private morals. St. Thomas 
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More commented on Lutheranism's position with "[and] this they call the liberty of the 
gospel, to be discharged of all order and all laws, and do what they list, which be it good 
or bad, be, as they say, nothing but the works of God wrought in them." In 1523, 
Erasmus learned that the whole Church expected him to fight against Luther over free­
will and justification. In response, Erasmus reluctantly wrote "I approve of those who 
ascribe something to free-will, but rely most upon grace" (Campbell, 1950, p. 230). The 
two then began a series of arguments and counter-arguments, much of which served to 
diminish Erasmus's moderate standing within the theological community, yet Erasmus 
never ceased to hold strict allegiance to Rome. 
Buber's Perspective on the Protestant Reformation 
Protestant writers of the Reformation sought to deny human responsibility and 
defer to the glorifying of God as the absolute, or supreme good for humankind. Buber 
viewed the human being as a creature who glorified the holy within the depths of bodily 
life. Whereas Calvin and Luther viewed the body as either sick, depraved, or unholy, 
Buber celebrated the dancer who, within the dance, liberated himself (Buber, 1957, p. 
20). In the celebration of the strength of the body, the dancer experienced possibility 
that surged within him. 
Nijinski, the dancer described by Buber in "Brother Body" (1914), epitomized the 
full potential of the unknown, the threatening, and the enticing occurrences. Through 
dance, the human person experienced the beast, that is, primitive forces, and the dancer's 
playing and expressing gestures became part of human existence, the body's enjoyment 
of itself and its spirituality. This play thus became the exultation of the possible. 
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In "The Teaching of the Tao" (1910), Buber expressed the nature of knowing has 
perpetually beginning anew. Coming to know did not have one content that may have 
taken different forms; rather, the opposition of content and form appeared as a dialectical 
one. He could not achieve a conception of the human person and any divinity that 
divided the two into separated strata and denied relationship between them. Such 
relationship was a product of direct address. 
The Logos of the Johannine Gospel, the symbol of primal existence taken 
significantly from the world of speech, is erected as a sign of truth against 
the encroachment of this dialectic. 'The Word' is 'in the beginning' 
because it is the unity that is dialectically dissected. Just for this reason 
the word is the mediator: because it presents to the products of 
dissection, e.g. to divinity and humanity, or otherwise regarded, to 'God 
the Father' and to 'the Holy Ghost,' the bond that unites them, the 
original unity that, divided and become flesh, once again reconciles the 
elements. 'The Word' is thereby the companion of every genuine human 
word, which also is not a content that has taken on a form, but a unity 
that has been dissected into content and form—a dissection that does not 
clarify but confuses the history of the human word and the history of each 
single human word, and whose claim, therefore, cannot reach beyond the 
province of conceptual classification (Buber, 1957, pp. 36-37). 
If the human person is sick, diseased, or in need of healing, Buber proposed that 
such healing could be accomplished only through meeting of the divine with the actual. 
In "The Altar" (1914), Buber posed the dilemma the Christian faced when confronted 
with our world, the world of colors, as the world which the believer may be forced to 
abandon. He wondered if we did not strive to turn away from the actual and to deny the 
fullness of our experience, were we destined to be dispersed in things and exiled to the 
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conditioned? Must we forever stray, he asked, from being to being and from happening 
to happening, incapable of grasping their unity (Buber, 1957, p. 18). Viewing the scene 
of the resurrection as the merging of the night and day of the world into one of color, 
imagination, and potential, Buber declared the act to be both a miracle and mystery. 
Without both, the act became teaching of object or content without the glory of things 
in the spirit of the earth. Jesus, Buber claimed, loved the world and rejected none of its 
colors, and fought for its unconditionally against all that was conditioned. "He loves 
the world towards the Unconditioned, he bears the world upward to its Self. He, the 
united one, shapes the world to unity" (Buber, 1957, pp. 18-19). Creating living unity 
out of the manifold was the human being's direction to the glorification of both oneself 
and the divine. 
This position was divergent from the the Reformation writings of Luther, Calvin, 
and Erasmus. Disavowing their disciplined, legalistic approaches, Buber wrote that true 
faith was unconditional trust in the relationship with God (Buber, 1967a). Buber's 
humanism was not a leap of faith; rather, it was faith as a witness in the cruel as well 
as the gracious situations of life. No dogma or creed could take the place of faith forged 
in trust of relationship between the individual and the Divine. 
In "Religion and God's Rule," he made the distinction between religion and the 
kingdom of God. Religion, he noted, had diverted humanity from God and the kingdom 
of god was the opposite of religion. Due to the separation forged by Reformation writers 
between the person as depraved and sinful, and God as judgmental, our "one" world had 
broken into unconnected spheres in which some people at some times could have specific 
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religious relations to the world. However, this was not Buber's conception of authentic 
religious experience. "But either religion is a reality, rather the reality, namely the 
whole existence of the real man in the real world of God, an existence that unites all that 
is partial; or it is a phantom of the covetous human soul" (Buber, 1967a, p. 111). 
Deontological Intuitionalism 
Kant's (1724-1804) Critique of Pure Reason (1956) was an investigation into the 
philosophy of human self-knowledge and constituted reason's most difficult task. This 
attack against eighteenth century Hedonist theology held that reason's fundamental 
purpose was to investigate human capabilities, that is, to make individuals aware of what 
they were, what they were able to do and know, and to make them aware of their 
limitations and avoid errors without transgressing these limitations. The empiricism of 
this epistemology stemmed from conceptions of the individual's nature, capabilities and 
limitations, and not simply on the claim that sensory deliverance was equated with 
knowledge. 
The individual's moral nature was a concern for Kant and was addressed in his 
writing. Each individual can and must know himself as a living being. This alone 
accounted for the nature of the human will as a faculty of desire, and rendered it 
determinable by reason or inclination. Each person was subject to the impulses of life 
force (Lebenskraft) which inclined one to fill one's needs as a finite being. With this 
view of a being of needs, each person's finitude gave transcendental significance to the 
sensible factors in human volition. This combination of the individual's finite and 
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sensibly-affected will gave humanity the possibility of moral life. Human sensibility 
became the grounding of the potential for moral life as well as for empirical knowledge. 
Kant disavowed that this created a dualism; rather, he posited a dialectic that 
proposed permanent problems for human existence. Kant saw the human problematic 
condition as a tension that did not result from two irreconcilable natures in man but from 
a natural conflict between man's finite limits and his rational tendencies to try to 
overcome them. This critical self-knowledge revealed human nature within the dialectic 
whose limitations of finitude were inescapable. The dialectic was one of practical rather 
than theoretical reason and resulted from man's limits in pursuit of an unconditioned, 
final moral end. 
Within Kantian philosophy, the individual was a limited being of needs who 
simultaneously possessed the capacity to think and to will, actions that pointed a person 
beyond personal limits. In this condition, the individual developed an awareness of 
human limitations and dependence and found the self unable to fulfill all one's own 
necessary and proper aspirations. Part of the inescapable dialectic that led to critical self-
knowledge was that if one were never to transgress these limits, one would never 
experience limitations. The person was rendered painfully aware of the irresolvability 
of the tension within existence. 
Within this tension, one must address the task of supplying a rational means to 
develop a meaningful inquiry and the person was empowered to undertake action within 
this state of dialectical tension. This task involved the regulative employment of 
transcendental ideas (Wood, 1970). Kant believed that to be moral, humanity must act 
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autonomously with free choice, and not unwillingly from external compulsions. This 
inward locus of obedience acknowledged a categorical imperative that introduced the idea 
of the person that regarded each individual ethically as of intrinsic worth, and not as a 
means to an end. Human beings were no longer considered morally isolated; rather they 
were now known as members of a kingdom or realm of ends (Widgery, 1940). 
Kant's moral arguments considered God, freedom, and mortality. The argument 
of moral faith was the most forceful as he developed ideas that personal and subjective 
faith in God were based on the subjective awareness of God in recognition of both the 
category and categorical imperative (Wood, 1970). These moral arguments were not 
traditional theoretical positions; rather, many critics consider them theological (Smith, 
1962). In this phase, Kant seemed to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. 
The crucial difference between knowledge and faith can be known from the way 
in which each was regarded as sufficient. "Believing" appeared as holding a judgment 
only subjectively, a way of knowing that was objectively insufficient. "Knowledge," 
conversely, was holding a thing to be sufficiently true both subjectively and objectively. 
Kant's faith as well as Kierkegaard's became a personal and subjective matter (Smith, 
1963). This is illustrated with Kant's comment that "no one, indeed, will be able to 
boast that he knows that there is a God and a future life . . . No, my conviction is not 
logical but moral certainty; I must not even say, It is certain that there is a God, etc., 
but only I am morally certain." (Kant, 1960b, p.6). 
The highest good was an a priori necessary object of will and was inseparably 
related to moral law (Kant, 1956). The relationship was so critical between this concept 
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of the highest good and moral law that one could not abandon pursuit of this highest 
good without ceasing to obey the moral law altogether. There was a second necessity 
posited regarding the conditions under which this end could be envisioned as attainable. 
In pursuit of the highest good, there could be only one set of conditions for the practical 
possibility of this end thinkable by a finite rational being and those conditions involved 
the existence of a God and a future life. Considering the antimony of practical reason, 
Kant argued that if the highest good were impossible to attain, "the moral law which 
commands that it be furthered must be fantastic, directed to empty imaginary ends, and 
consequently inherently false" (Kant, 1956). Thus moral faith became a practical 
postulate and the denial of the existence of God and a future life became absurdum 
practicum (argument leading to unwelcome inconsistencies in judgments) (Wood, 1970). 
Kant's concept of the moral law commanded us was to pursue the highest good 
and concomitant to this pursuit to will in a certain way. This commandment to will must 
be autonomous to determine our will by the legislative form of its maxim rather than by 
the end we adopted. "[T]he conception of this form as a determining ground of the will 
is distinct from all determining grounds of events in nature according to the law of 
causality" (Wood, 1970, p.36). Consequently, moral volition was possible only when 
a being's will can be determined by grounds which are not events in nature. This kind 
of will is free will. 
Kant's thought regarding the highest good and its antithesis, evil, centered around 
good and evil as objects of pure practical reason. Good, the object of desire, was 
contrasted with evil, the object of aversion. If something were to be "held absolutely 
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good or evil in all respects and without qualification" it must be "the manner of acting". 
This good was not identifiable simply with unqualified goodness of the good will, but 
"[a]ction in accordance with [the law] is in itself good; and a will whose maxims always 
accord with the law is absolutely and in every respect good and the supreme condition 
of all good" (Kant, 1963, italics added). Good and evil did not originally refer to 
objects, Kant noted, but to the category of causality. The will, motivated by the law, 
made possible the a priori determination of an object of pure practical reason "[ojnly . 
. . when the moral law has been established by itself and justified as the direct 
determining ground of the will can this object be presented to the will whose form now 
is determined a priori" (Wood, 1970, p. 68). The object meant was the highest good. 
Any object of pure practical reason was constituted in a formal legislative maxim 
and was subject to two conditions: (1) that the object must be conditioned by observance 
to moral law and (2) that the object must include the agent's own natural ends limited 
and qualified in a systematic way. Kant's concept of the highest good derived from an 
examination of the features of the object's or end's pure practical reason and from 
reason's proper fulfillment of its function in setting before itself as an end the 
unconditioned totality of such ends, as an ideal for deliberate moral labor and striving 
(Wood, 1970). Obedience to the law implied an embodiment of that form in purposive 
actions, and application of the moral law presupposed some material context of action. 
Kant claimed that a being engaged in this type of action and of this kind constituted an 
"end in itself." The humanity found in such a person "... is possessed of an 
irreplaceable value, a dignity" (Wood, 1970, p. 70). 
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Moral goods evidenced both unconditioned or unqualified ends which were 
derived from moral rationality and were capable of either free, autonomous volition; or 
limited or conditioned ends, those natural ends of people which are systematically and 
universally included in the material of a formally legislated maxim. Two kinds of good 
existed: natural good, which was aimed at clarifying the character of two components 
of the object of pure practical reason, and moral good, which was identified with virtue 
and was considered to be the good which limited and qualified the inclination to well-
being. A moral good was recognized as something to strive for and not simply a formal 
condition, but an end which was good without qualification. For Kant, that end implied 
virtue. 
Moral virtue, or goodness of character, involved one's sensibility as well as 
reason. As an end, it involved the finite rational being in moral totality. An individual's 
moral progress involved a gradual reform of sensibility. One acquired a virtuous 
character by engaging in a continuous process of virtuous action that implied a "self-
overcoming." The constant, moderate discipline of inclination presupposed a firm 
resolve to effect one's doing duty as a habit. To enhance the development of such moral 
character, Kant urged that a person accept encouragement, example, discipline, 
education, and improvement on the "power to adopt ends in accordance with his own 
concept of duty" (Wood, 1970, p. 75). 
Teaching pupils in the subject of moral education was such a high priority that 
Kant devoted much of Metaphysics of Morals (1991) to its discussion. Such education 
was a necessary precondition for moral improvement and constituted the sole ground of 
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hope for human moral progress (Kant, 1963). He described the importance of such 
education by portraying that person as the sole product of education and the attainment 
of the individual's moral destiny was impossible without the help of others (Kant, 
1960a). He regarded organized religion as a systematic means for the mutual moral 
improvement of people as well as appropriate for people within a moral community 
whose laws were expressly designed to promote the morality of actions. Religious 
community could engender the synthetic unity of the two specifically different kinds of 
good. 
The two kinds of good, the natural and the moral, cannot be mixed 
together; for then they would only neutralize each other and not even 
effect a true happiness. Rather, the inclination to well-being and virtue 
together constitute the end of the well-intentioned man, one from his 
sensible side the other from the moral-intellectual side. They do this 
through a struggle and the elimination of the principle of the first through 
that of the second (Wood, 1970, p.89). 
The highest good consisted of the synthetic unity of the moral good (my own and 
others' virtuous dispositions), as well as the natural good (happiness proportioned to 
worthiness to be happy for my self and for others). The supreme good, and the highest 
moral good, was the goal of perfect virtue, or the complete fitness of intentions to the 
moral law (Kant, 1956). Kant was careful not to equate the holiness of the will that was 
the goal of all moral progress with the divine will. Holiness, the unconditioned moral 
perfection of the finite rational being, was an ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God. 
Happiness, the third component of the highest good, was a worthiness to be happy, 
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complete, and perfect. This happiness was mediated by the holiness of the will which 
constituted the supreme condition of the highest good. 
This determination of the highest good was a philosophical concept and can not 
be confused with the ordinary duty of virtue whose end was also a duty. The highest 
good unified and conditioned all ends of pure practical reason and was not itself among 
the duties recognized by ordinary rational morality. Ordinary moral law was a rule 
according to which we must act and tended to promote the ideal of the world of morally 
perfect beings enjoying happiness in proportion to their worthiness to be happy (Wood, 
1970). Human reason, however, demanded an unconditioned totality of the object of 
pure practical reason as its end because reason always sought the unconditioned and 
unified its rules under a totality. Reason demanded that we make the highest good our 
end. With this demand, we found a single purpose for our lives, a purpose which our 
reason entitled us to regard as the ultimate meaning and goal of the entire world. 
Within Kantian ethics, reason and desire were in permanent conflict. Hegel, 
agreeing with Aristotelian ethics, wrote that human desiderative reason was in conflict 
but through learning and education, the conflict gradually weakened. Each type of desire 
incorporated its own rationale; therefore, one desired to eat because one was hungry or 
because one was healthy. These two deliberative desires produced conflicts that Hegel 
viewed as transient because one desiderative reason modified another. From this, we 
could attain both virtue and happiness. Hegel directlty opposed Kant's statement 
"[r]eason and desire are in permanent conflict. Hence, the natural outcome cannot be 
both virtue and happiness; it can be either one or the other" (McGill, 1967, p. 107). 
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Philosophically, Hegel dealt with motivation as well as thought and achieved the 
concrete union of idea and passion realized in the idea of a state (Hegel, 1914). He did 
not deem passion immoral; rather, it was an essential human activity as he wrote 
"passion is the key to character and action" (Hegel, 1914, p. 24). Although he agreed 
initially with Kant's ethics, Hegel soon became critical of their abstract, inhuman 
character. He declared the one who obeyed the moral law simply because one would 
otherwise be contradicting oneself a slave because such people had imposed this law upon 
themselves, even against their own inclinations. This abstract form of law was alien, if 
not hostile, to one side of human nature, that is, to passions, loves, desires, and sensuous 
experiences. 
In his early work, Hegel longed to reconcile the spirit of historic Christianity with 
the spirit of classical antiquity. Deeply impressed with Kant's thought, Hegel struggled 
with the Kantian notion of the primacy of practical reason which aimed philosophy 
toward the realm of value. His divergence from Kant was evidenced in the idea of 
Kant's unearthliness. Hegel demanded a really achieving duty, a morality rooted in real 
life. Hegel felt a Christian aspiration for a celestial perfection of the spirit as well as a 
classical demand for the realization of perfection in secular terms (Tsanoff, 1942). His 
response to these demands was the development of the Hegelian Dialectic. 
Fundamental to his logic was Hegel's belief that the growth of intelligence was 
a growth of organization. This organization presumed nature as a network of causally 
related processes with an indefinite ultimate ground. This system of rationality revealed 
an organic unity in which everything was finally intelligible in terms of its membership 
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in the system, and the system as a whole progressively manifested in intelligence and 
realized spiritual character. In effect, this was Hegel's absolute idealism. The 
achievement of concrete unity through the organization of differences was the essence of 
the dialectic of thought. 
Convinced that nothing was real except the idea, Hegel viewed the idea of the 
inner world of the mind, or the subjectivity of spirit. Free mind was the will acting on 
itself; it reached towards universality and was at the same time individual; it sought an 
over-individual realization of itself (Tsanoff, 1942). In the process of knowing, the 
intelligence reached out from cognition of an object to demand natural embodiment. The 
free will met not only the barrier of external conditions; it was also confronted with the 
reality of other wills. In an over-individual world of activity, freedom and self must be 
sustained objectively and must be realized in a contest and community of other free 
selves. In this objective realization, the moral ideal within the social order gradually 
developed. 
Hegel posited three stages of the ethical fruition of the character: abstract right 
or legality, morality, and the ethical order of society. These stages paralleled historical 
development in human experience. The fullest sense of humanity demanded self-
consciousness and consciousness of the self involved in relating to other selves. Hegel's 
ethics demanded a fundamental progressive social character. Criticizing Kant's final 
reconciliation of duty with happiness with the postulate of practical reason, Hegel 
asserted that Kant confessed his failure to connect morality with reality. Hegel insisted 
this connection be made because the moral actors are of this world. 
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Whereas Kant's system implied austerity, Hegel's upheld the rights of individuals 
to many forms of happiness embodied in life. 
The right of the subject's particularity, his right to be satisfied, or in other 
words the right of subjective freedom, is the pivot and center of the 
difference between antiquity and modern times. This right in its infinity 
is given expression in Christianity and it has become the universal 
effective principle of a new form of civilization (Hegel, 1942, p. 124). 
By equating the right of personal satisfaction which was the essential phase of happiness 
with the right of subjective freedom seen as the essential phase of freedom, Hegel said 
little about happiness, but much about the growth of freedom. This was his principal 
way of describing human progress toward goodness and perfection (McGill, 1967). 
Agreeing with Kant that happiness was people's natural desire, Hegel subscribed 
to happiness known as continual pleasantness or the satisfaction of desires. This was not 
a state of particulars; rather, it was a satisfaction at the realistic maximum. Closely 
aligned with Aristotle's subjective and eudaemonistic definition of happiness activity 
according to virtue accompanied by pleasure, Hegel added that virtues would not be 
virtues if they were not pleasant to us. Whereas Kant denied the natural connection 
between happiness and virtue, Hegel contended that happiness was comprised of natural 
desire, learning, comparison, choice, and a willingness to reject some and to accept other 
satisfactions. This implied a sense of self-control, prudence, or sagacity which would 
eventually purify and fuse the natural desires of the developed consciousness with duty. 
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Happy individuals were those who learned to control impulses and to give up 
some enjoyments for others. Education, Hegel wrote, gave us general knowledge needed 
to determine which enjoyments could be relinquished and which were essential. Hegel 
often interposed the terms "welfare" for "happiness" in his idea of the good. "[Wjelfare 
has no independent validity as the embodiment of a single particular will but only as a 
universal welfare and essentially as universal in principle, i.e. according with freedom. 
Welfare without right is not a good" (Hegel, 1942, p. 130). The notion of freedom was 
especially prominent in Hegel's list of ultimate goods. 
Similar to Aristotle and Plato, Hegel posed three classes of civil society: the 
agricultural or substantial class, the business or formal class, and the civil servants or 
universal class. Within these strata, the highest freedom of the individual was not 
freedom of choice, but freedom consisting in the willingness to and necessary acceptance 
of what was true and good. This was our freedom and happiness (McGill, 1967). Hegel 
regarded conscience as the self s utter conviction in its resolute will of the absolutely 
good, the will to make the absolute good its good. Without this resolution, the inner 
spirit lacked action, no matter how well it might turn out. This subjective scrupulosity 
of the conscientious will was indispensable to true goodness. Hegel warned that such a 
dutiful will would seek to make the absolute will its own and risk lapsing into moral 
fanaticism, that is, setting up one's own good as the absolute good. Therefore extreme 
conscientiousness might be on the verge of disowning the objective moral order. In this 
sense, good and evil had the same moral source: the free will might recognize the 
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universal and may loyally identify itself with it, but it also ran the hazard of perverse 
subjectivity, the willful denial of the moral order (Tsanoff, 1942). 
Buber's Perspective on Deontological Intuitionalism 
Buber's philosophy of realization began with Kant's teaching that we ourselves 
imposed the order of space and time upon experience in order that we might orient 
ourselves in it. From Kant, Buber said, he gained the idea "that being itself was beyond 
the reach alike of finitude and the infinity of space and time, since it only appeared in 
space and time but did not itself enter into this appearance." But Buber's immediate 
dilemma was that the breakup of idealism forced upon him the quandry of how to reach 
"reality" without returning to the pre-Kantian "objective" view of the universe (Buber, 
1965a, pp. 136-137). What answered this question for Buber developed into the 
philosophy of realization. 
The basis of the divergence of Kantian and Buberian thought was within the 
definition each imagined for the notion of God. Whereas Kant viewed God as an idea, 
Buber insisted that true human life was in the face of God, where God became an 
elementarily present substance, that is, the mystery of immediacy before which only the 
pious person could stand (Friedman, 1960). Although he agreed with the basic Kantian 
and Hegelian notions that God was within all things, Buber wrote that God was realized 
only when individual beings opened to one another, communicated with one another, and 
helped one another. This required the establishment of an immediacy between beings 
and it was in this between, a seemingly empty space, that the eternal substance 
manifested itself. For Buber, the true place of realization was the community. True 
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community was that in which the godly was realized between people (Friedman, 1960, 
p. 43). 
The idea of time was a point of departure within Buberian thought from Hegel's, 
as well as from Aristotle and Aquinas. Buber contended that when the human being has 
felt at home in the universe, the thoughts held about the self had been only a part of 
one's cosmological thought. However, when the person had felt shut in by a strict and 
inescapable solitude, the thinking about the self had been deep, fruitful, and independent 
of cosmology. He believed that in the philosophies of Hegel, Aristotle, and Aquinas, the 
human person realized consciousness of the self only in the third person. The person 
therefore was no longer an enigma for oneself; rather, the wonder at the person was 
simply wonder at the universe as a whole. 
Writing that Hegel's theoretical certainty was derived from his inclusion of 
cosmological rather than actual human time into the basis of his image of the universe, 
Buber disparaged cosmological time as abstract and relativized. Within cosmological 
time, the future could appear theoretically present. Buber's "anthropological time" had 
reality only in the past and since the future depended in part on the person's 
consciousness and will, that is, on decisions that had not yet taken place, and thus no 
certainty of the future was possible within the human world's limits. Marx took over 
Hegel's ideas of cosmological time to ensure the proletariat the security of an assured 
victory in the future. This security, Buber wrote, was as false as Hegel's because it 
ignored the person's powers of decisions. "It depends on the direction and force of this 
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power how far the renewing powers of life as such are able to take effect, and even 
whether they are not transformed into powers of destruction" (Buber, 1965a, p. 131). 
In What Is Man? or The Problem of the Human (1965b), Buber conducted his 
own dialogue with thinkers who exercised a decided influence on him in his youth. 
Among these thinkers were Kant, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Nietzsche. In this 
piece, he criticized Hegel's anthropological reduction of the person to "unproblematic 
man" but recognized that Hegel, at least, had granted the person at least one virtue that 
Marx did not, that is, understanding man in terms of the real relation between the truly 
different I and Thou, that "Copernican revolution of modern thought" which gave Buber 
a clear understanding in his youth that would guide his later work. Additionally, Buber 
appreciated Nietzsche's recognition of the person as "unfinished animal," a way of 
thinking that "endowed the anthropological question with an unprecedented force and 
passion." Thus the question was posed by Nietzsche and taken up by Buber of the 
problem of the edge, that perilous end of natural being where the dizzying abyss of 
nothing began. Nietzsche's contribution to Buber's thinking helped push Buber farther 
away from the collectivity of Kant and Hegel. His question, "How is it to be understood 
that such a being as man has emerged and stepped forth from the animal world?" was 
the question with which Buber was explicitly to start in The Knowledge of Man and 
which he was to attempt to answer with his concepts of distancing and relating 
(Friedman, 1983, p. 273). 
Buber traced a development of thought through Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Bergson, and Heidegger by which he characterized the thinking of our time as aiming 
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to preserve the idea of the divine as the true concern of religion while destroying the 
reality of God and of our relation to Him. "This is done in many ways, overtly and 
covertly, apodictically and hypothetically, in the language of metaphysics and 
psychology." As a result of the universality and metaphysics of Kant and Hegel, Buber 
recognized that specifically modern thought could no longer endure a God who was not 
confined to human subjectivity. Whenver the human person had to interpret encounter 
with God as self-encounter, the person's very structure was destroyed. "This is the 
portent of the present hour" (Friedman, 1983a, p. 138). 
. . . that every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of 
obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all 
helps, and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule, containeth 
the first, and fundamental law of nature; which is, to seek peace, and 
follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is, by all 
means we can, to defend ourselves (Hobbes, 1946, p. 85). 
Agreeing wholeheartedly with the doctrine of free will, Hobbes believed that in the state 
of nature, the person had complete freedom and the total right to do what he pleased in 
any way he pleased. This exercise of total right put the person into immediate and 
potentially deadly conflict with one's fellows, who also exercised their right to complete 
freedom. The price of societal survival, Hobbes thought, was compromise. Out of the 
fact of compromise emerged law. Law, the codification of compromise, was the 
structure that insured human survival. Society, the creation of people living under 
compromise, was a creation made necessary as an alternative to chaos. 
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Hobbes's ethics distinguished between law and right. Law became known as a 
command with a power of enforcement; right was known as the free and legitimate use 
of power. From this distinction developed the concept of "right reason," that is, the only 
source of justice. "Hobbes, by his concepts of man and the state of nature, [made] 
absolutism, within the realistic bounds of power, and unlimited sovereignty both 
necessary and morally justifiable" (Crocker, 1963, p. 7). Moral principles became 
legalisms or social contracts by which people bound themselves together for the common 
interest. 
Hobbes never expected people whose basic nature was egoistic to obey society's 
laws that were established by social contract because of altruistic wills, but because of 
force and under penalty of law and threat of punishment by the power of the law 
enforcement. His interpretation of the "golden rule" was stated negatively so that no 
persons should do to others what those people did not want done to them. Among the 
moral principles Hobbes viewed as fundamental to any such social contract of human 
interaction included justice, gratitude, compliance, pardon, and equity (Sahakian, 1974). 
The modern natural law doctrine emphasized the individual and the empirical 
reality of the individual's actual needs and experiences. Human will was exalted for 
human ends and no contemplative participation in divine reason was included. This was 
not a doctrine of pure will and power; rather, it was a theory of right. The right of 
humankind was the right to the means of power. Modern interpretation of Hobbes's 
ethical naturalism has assumed a state of nature that was an historical and hypothetical 
reality which made rights prior to and independent of any given society. 
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Instrumentalism as a framework for moral philosophy developed from Peirce's 
thought that an idea was a plan of action and that belief was established in our nature as 
habit. Later, William James reconceptualized belief as true if it established a worthwhile 
habit. Truth became successful experience. John Dewey (1859-1952) believed that 
thought had as its object the development of life and not the discovery of truth (Marnell, 
1966). After incorporating James's ideas into his own philosophy, Dewey called his 
form of pragmatism "instrumentalism" (Marnell, 1966). 
The difference between James and Dewey's pragmatism was that Dewey was 
more conscious of the social implications of pragmatism and felt more of a sense of 
mission than did James. The two collided within conceptual pragmatism. James, who 
followed theistic thinking and believed both in God and in some sort of divinely created 
order that were prerequisites to human happiness, would not apply the test of conceptual 
pragmatism to things that were God's. Dewey, on the other hand, believed that any sort 
of supernaturalism slowed down the rate of human progress. The test of conceptual 
pragmatism had universal application. Through Dewey, American pragmatism, now 
known as instrumentalism, began its trend toward secularism. 
In The Quest for Certainty (1929), Dewey utilized a Hobbesian thesis based on 
natural religion to describe how a person sought ultimate happiness. 
Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security. 
He has sought to attain it in two ways. One of them began with an 
attempt to propitiate the powers which environ him and determine his 
destiny. It expressed itself in supplication, sacrifice, ceremonial rite and 
magical cult. . . . The other course is to invent arts and by their means 
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turn the powers of nature to account; man constructs a fortress out of the 
very conditions and forces which threaten him. He builds shelters, 
weaves garments, makes flame his friend instead of his enemy, and grows 
into the complicated arts of associated living. This is the method of 
changing the world through action, the other is the method of changing the 
self in emotion and idea (Dewey, 1929, p. 3). 
Dewey drew Hobbes's idea that people's central preoccupation was security. From 
Comte's writings, Dewey wrote that all people believed themselves subject to 
supernatural, malevolent powers which must be placated by sacrifice and rite. From 
Hume, Dewey believed that advanced religions grew out of this belief. From a 
combination of Hobbes, Comte, and Hume's writings, Dewey concluded the nature of 
reality as being a natural order which individuals in their most advanced states 
manipulated in the interest of their own security. What Dewey added to create ethical 
instrumentalism was the objective of thought and the special way in which it was 
considered rationalistic. The objective of thought was not the discovery of truth; rather, 
it was the development of life. 
Furthering human life involved the very problematic of "[h]ow is science to be 
accepted and yet the realm of values to be conserved?" (Dewey, 1929, pp. 40-41). 
Resolving this dilemma, Dewey analyzed the process of knowing in terms of: (1) what 
do we know? and (2) how do we know? Determining that knowledge was the product 
of both thought and investigation which Dewey took to mean scientific investigation, he 
discussed the practical application of this concept of knowledge to be that experience was 
regulated by the process of scientific investigation. 
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The implications of scientific investigation into the realm of ethics was the 
question that if, in the realm of science, experience could develop its own regulative 
ideas and standards, then why should this same condition not be true in the realm of 
higher values? Matters which were considered ethical could be redefined and elevated 
by the scientific method. 
The conclusion is a good omen for the possibility of achieving in larger, 
more humane and liberal fields a similar transformation, so that a 
philosophy of experience may be empirical without either being false to 
actual experience or being compelled to explain away the values dearest 
to the heart of man (Dewey, 1929, p. 107). 
Dewey's ethics concluded that conduct was specifically performed under specific 
circumstances for a specific end (Marnell, 1966). "Moral conceptions and processes 
[grew] out of the very conditions of human life" (Dewey, 1948, p. 169). Somewhat 
more utilitarian than natural, Dewey asserted that we did not know good and evil in 
terms of the Decalogue nor did we learn it by experience with pain and pleasure. Rather 
we learn good or evil and right or wrong by experience. "Action is always specific, 
concrete, individualized, unique. And consequently judgments as to acts to be performed 
must be similarly specific" (Dewey, 1948, p. 167). This pragmatic approach explained 
that conduct must have both motive and end. 
Through experience with specific motives and ends of specific instances of 
conduct, Dewey believed one could be given the experimental material on which to 
exercise thought and reach moral judgments. This constituted an application of the 
191 
scientific method to conduct, the true method of developing life since it was the one 
method of determining truth. Truth, by definition, was the development of life and the 
greatest end to which human beings could strive. 
Dewey moved the moral focus into human intelligence and things intellectual 
could be moralized. The conflict between naturalism and humanism was terminated. 
"The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to 
deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally 
unworthy he has been is moving to become better" (Dewey, 1948, p. 176). This 
indicated Dewey's moral characterizing of the concept of truth as the development of life 
and became the foundation of his philosophy that life was not being, but becoming 
(Marnell, 1966). 
Buber's Perspective on Ethical Naturalism 
Dewey's philosophy that we come to know through experience and Hobbes's 
contention that we self-label good and evil were issues addressed directly by Buber in his 
writings. Hobbes's naturalism presupposed the individual's naturally chaotic state, a 
state of being similar to the "first stage of evil" in Buber's description of the descent into 
evil (Buber, 1952b). Yet Hobbes took his argument beyond the individual and concluded 
that the collective social order could be secure only when the final resting place of power 
was secure and universally acknowledged (Marnell, 1966). It was within the context of 
this conclusion that Buber diverged from Hobbes's theorizing. 
Buber refused to accept that an exclusive dualism must exist between the life of 
the spirit and the life of the world. Any such dualism, he argued, developed most 
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significantly after Christianity because of that religion's surrendering of the idea of "holy 
people" for that of personal holiness (Friedman, 1960, p. 117). Believers in Christ 
developed as two-fold beings. First, they were individuals in the realm of the person, 
and second, they were participants in the public life of their nations. Therefore, the 
norm that Buber held closely of realizing religion in all aspects of social existence was 
no longer central to individuals after the spread of Christianity. "In our time," he wrote, 
"the public sphere encroaches disastrously on the personal and leads to a disparity 
between sanctification of the individual and the accepted unholiness of his community is 
transferred to an inner contradiction in the redeemed soul" (Buber, 1952b, p. 138). 
Buber attributed the dualism of the modern age between secular life and religious 
experience as caused by the apocalyptic element in religion. 
In partial agreement with Hobbes's premise that the natural state of individuals 
was chaotic and human fear underlaid the social order, Buber described within his 
discussion of dualism that human beings, when their expectations were lowered through 
disillusionment of modern life, attempted to restrict the role of God to the sphere of 
religion. Due to this modern tendency, Buber concluded that a rift ran through the whole 
of the human world and received its sanction in part from the dualism posed by Paul's 
especially gnostic view of the world. This dualism, left to its societal conclusions, 
resulted in the human person's understanding that creation had been consummated and 
both abrogated and superceded by another and different world. "The prophetic allows 
'the evil' to find the direction that leads toward God, and to enter into the good; the 
apocalyptic sees good and evil severed forever at the end of days, the good redeemed, 
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the evil unredeemable for all eternity; the prophetic believes that the earth shall be 
hallowed, the apocalyptic despairs of an earth which it considers to be hopelessly 
doomed. ..." (Buber, 1946, p. 188). 
As Hobbes moved toward positing that the differentiation and definitions of good 
and evil were of human origin, Buber diverged even more from the position of ethical 
naturalism. The dualism in the soul of the modern person, Buber warned, sought to 
overrun reality. The human person embodied this dualism in the form of a division of 
spirit and impulse. "The divorce between spirit and instincts was here, as often, the 
consequence of the divorce between man and man" (Buber, 1965a, p. 185). Tthis has 
led to the sickness of our age, that is, a vital dissociation within the person resulting 
from the forcing of people into centralized states and collectivities. This, Buber decried, 
was the price the modern world had paid for the French Revolution and had led to the 
decay of those organic forms of life which enabled people to live in direct relation with 
one another and which gave them security, connection, and a feeling of being at home 
in the world (Friedman, 1960). 
As a result of this vital dissocation, Buber indicated that humankind has had to 
interpret their encounters with God as self-encounters and humanity's very structure was 
destroyed (Buber, 1952b). He labelled these encounters as I-It relations and warned that 
[in] our age the 1-lt relation, gigantically swollen, has usurped, practically 
uncontested, the mastery and the rule. The I of this relation, an / that 
possesses all, makes all, succeeds with all, this 7 that is unable to say 
Thou, unable to meet a being essentially, is the lord of the hour. This 
selfhood that has become omnipotent, with all the It around it, can 
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naturally acknowledge neither God nor any genuine absolute which 
manifests itself to men as of non-human origin. It steps in between and 
shuts off from us the light of heaven (Buber, 1952b, p. 165). 
The decision by the person from within the natural state of chaos to self-define good and 
evil and to assert the individual as the absolute contributed to the eclipse of the light of 
heaven. The person who refused to submit himself to the effective reality of 
transcendence contributed to human responsibility for the eclipse. 
The most terrible consequence of this eclipse was the silence of God and the loss 
of God's nearness which presented a situation to the modern world in which it seemed 
senseless to turn to God. Therefore, the world seemed irretrievably abandoned to the 
forces of tyranny. Hobbes embraced the doctrine of free will and granted the individual 
the right to exercise complete freedom; yet, he described the essential nature of legal 
compromise to maintain societal order and human survival. This compromise would 
serve only to drive the person farther and farther into self- and mutual affirmation, thus 
contributing to the eclipse and abandonment. Once the collectivities of society codified 
their compromises according to Hobbes's natural might made right philosophy, they 
would evolve from the state described as Buber as the "sinner" into that known as 
"wicked" in which the person exhibited a persistent disposition to oppose God's way. 
"The sinner does evil, the wicked man is evil. That is why it is said only of the wicked, 
and not of the sinners, that their way vanishes" (Buber, 1952b, p. 108). 
Dewey denigrated the role of the supernatural within his ethical instrumentalism 
which was at odds with the foundation of Buberian anthropological philosophy. When 
Dewey diverged from James's theistic pragmatism and adopted the thesis that any sort 
of supernaturalism slowed down the rate of human progress, he virtually denied the 
absolute transcendence of God, His conditioned immanence, and the existence of the 
divine spark in every thing and being that was fundamental to the Hasidic piety that 
Buber espoused (Buber, 1950). Dewey acknowledged his secular intention as basic to 
democratic principles (Dewey, 1967). 
In the search for ultimate happiness, Dewey wrote from a Hobbesian point of 
view that stressed security and denigrated magic, ceremony, and rites (Dewey, 1929). 
Buber countered that certainty was unavailable to the human person, except that certainty 
inherent in the 1-Eternal Thou relationship. Without such certainty of God's 
absoluteness, the person could extract no certainty from I-It encounters. Ultimately for 
the Dewey, the natural order was paramount for humankind as true reality. Rather than 
consider this concept of man-made morals his ultimate reality, Buber posed that the "way 
of man" began within heart searching that led to one's "particular way" (Buber, 1950). 
If the person enmeshed the self within artificially constructed morals, he would find that 
"[m]an cannot escape the eye of God, but in trying to hide from Him, he is hiding from 
himself (Buber, 1950, p. 12). 
The scientific method was Dewey's answer to the ethical questions faced by 
people in a modern society. Determined to answer the question "how do we know?" 
Dewey defined the means as scientific investigation. He was concerned primarily with 
the practical application of knowledge. Buber did not seek the answers; rather, he 
posited as primary whether or not the person faced the questions of existence. Unless 
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the person faced the ultimate questions squarely, Buber believed that one's life would 
become "way-less." Approaching ultimate questions by means of scientific investigation 
would yield, in Buber's opinion, sterile heart searching which would lead only to self-
torture, despair, and estrangment (Buber, 1950). 
Dewey assigned truth leading to the development of life as the ultimate goodness 
of humanity. In doing so, he terminated the relationship between naturalism and 
humanism, a dualism Buber could not tolerate. Implicit in Dewey's description of truth 
were the roles of development and growth. Describing the "bad man" as the one who 
had begun to grow "less good," Dewey imposed an external conception of good that 
could be applied to individuals and groups. Buber rejected this quantitative definition 
and envisaged the person as a whole, and not within quantitative parameters. The nature 
of Hasidic beliefs was such that the person could never be treated as an object of 
examination. Rather than develop oneself according to external goals or definitions, for 
the Hasidic man, the essential thing was to begin with himself. Any other attitude would 
distract him from what he had to begin, would weaken his initiative, and would frsutrate 
the entire undertaking. "Our sages say: 'Seek peace in your own place.' When a man 
has made peace within himself, he will be able to make peace in the whole world" 
(Buber, 1950, p. 29). 
Dewey did believe that the concept of truth, as development of life implied that 
life was not being, but becoming (Marnell, 1966). Within this single statement, Dewey 
approached Buber's fundamental thesis, that within every person was the opportunity for 
genuine meeting and relationship. However, Dewey's thrust was collective, that is, 
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pragmatic within American democratic society. Buber's aim was existential and 
individual and thus created a dichotomy within essential frameworks that could not be 
resolved between the two philosophers in the statements of ultimate goodness. 
Ethical Evolutionism 
Philosophers of evolutionary naturalism envisoned a higher person of greater 
development and moral significance. Nietzsche termed his elevated person "superman," 
and Bergson regarded the world as a "machine for the making of gods" (Sahakian, 1974, 
p. 143). Ethical evolutionists determined the highest good of humankind as a person who 
was physically and morally superior. Two noted ethical evolutionists were Charles 
Darwin (1809-1882) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). 
Historically, Darwin was of the age in which scientists established that the world 
was created epochs before the biblical year 4004 B.C.E. He was forced to rationalize 
a Victorian world with one punctuated by the scientific discoveries of Dalton and 
Faraday, Owen, Hooker, Simpson and Lister, and Lyell. Sciences provided a new belief 
in progress by careful evolution of ideas and the inevitable progress to higher forms. 
Darwin stated, "Hence we may look with some confidence to a secure future of equally 
inappreciable length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each 
being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress toward perfection" 
(Darwin, 1964, p. 489). 
Darwin's ethical theory was a derivative of his evolutionism which viewed moral 
sense as a product of social instincts. Biological in construct, Darwin's theory explained 
moral principles and consciousness on the basis of the person's physical nature, explained 
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in terms of mechanistic laws. Human beings' behaviors were explained according to 
animal ancestry in which they differed only in degree, not kind. Adaptation to the 
natural world was juxtaposed with moral adaptation and the moral standard became the 
general welfare, or the greatest happiness. Darwin defined the greatest good as "the 
rearing of the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health, with all their 
faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are subjected" (Darwin, 1874, p. 
136). 
This paralleled Utilitarianism in its goal, yet repudiated the their contention 
because Darwin believed that human beings did not seek pleasure. Rather they sought 
deeply implanted social instincts of impulsive power and instinctive behavior. These 
instincts were refined by natural selection, and social instincts were developed for the 
general good rather than for the general happiness of the species (Darwin, 1874). The 
virtues which prompted people to noble actions were acquired through natural selection. 
The more enduring social instincts dominated the less persistent ones, and it was for this 
reason that people sensed an obligation to obey one instinctive desire rather than another, 
or sensed bitter regret at yielding to the temptation of self-preservation by not risking 
their own lives to save others, or even felt regret for having stolen food to prevent 
starvation (Sahakian, 1974). "Man in this respect differs profoundly from the lower 
animals" (Darwin, 1874). 
Accordingly, natural selection via power made for progress and the fittest would 
survive. His optimistic account of human development, good virtues, and altruistic 
instincts characterized Darwin's biological ethical evolutionism. Humanity's higher 
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moral principles, founded on social instincts related to the welfare of others, were 
enhanced by social approbation and reason, which regarded them as more desirable 
courses of action. These moral tendencies were relayed by heredity to offspring by the 
principle of transmission of moral tendencies (Darwin, 1874). He believed in the 
Lamarckian theory of inherited acquired characteristics and applied it to moral 
inheritance. Virtue and virtuous tendencies were practiced until embeddedas habit, were 
transmitted across generations, and emerged as innate virtues in subsequent generations 
(Sahakian, 1974). 
Herbert Spencer, an ethical evolutionist, held markedly different concepts of 
happiness. Self-preservation was the ultimate good. Happiness was both the correlate 
of the most perfect adaptation and the culmination of biological and social evolution 
(McGill, 1967). There existed "a primordial connection between pleasure-giving acts and 
continuance or increase of life, and, by implication, between pain-giving acts and 
decrease or loss of life" (Spencer, 1901, p. 97). First, by pursuing the agreeable and 
avoiding the disagreeable, individuals and species were able to maintain their daily lives. 
Second, pleasure accompanied vital functions in their normal degree, whereas pain 
attended their excess and defect. Finally, "every pleasure increase[d] vitality, every pain 
decreasefd] vitality. Every pleasure raise[d] the tide of life. ..." (Spencer, 1901, p. 
231). Spencer viewed the ideal society as one in which the perfect person could be 
found and in which there would be no virtuous activity in the usual sense. This ideal 
society differed markedly from the Platonic or Aristotelian in that in Spencer's the 
populace would do automatically what was virtuous, as opposed to that described in the 
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Republic in which people would constantly learn and move toward such virtue. In 
Spencer's there were no duties because there were no temptations. Lack of sanctions or 
penalties contrasted Spencer's ideal society from Hegel, Kant, or Bentham's. 
An optimist, Spencer protested the grounds of Bentham's Utilitarianism and 
argued that the greatest happiness could not be calculated in advance with precision. 
Bentham wrote that, according to the hedonistic calculus, every person knew what 
happiness was, but justice became a matter of contention. Therefore justice must be 
defined in terms of happiness of pleasure. Spencer disagreed and declared that justice 
was more easily determined than the quantity of pleasure. Happiness was concerned with 
both quantity and quality under conditions not specifically stated. Further, Spencer 
followed Aristotle's eudaemonistic tradition by adding that justice was not ascertainable 
practically by balancing pleasures and pains involved (Spencer, 1901). The greatest 
happiness could not be found in the pleasure principle; in fact, Spencer stipulated that 
the pleasure/pain principle was something over and above the utility principle and needed 
spearate justification. 
Finding nature more aristocratic than democratic, Spencer united egoism and 
altruism into a synthesis in which people sought their pleasure and preserved their lives, 
yet they accomplished this often by assisting others, even at the jeopardy of personal 
welfare. His ethical system of compromise allowed for the fact that these two positions 
were not contradictory; rather, we must live for others as well as for ourselves. General 
happiness was promoted by furthering self-happiness. "Our conclusion must be that 
general happiness is to be achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of their own 
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happiness by individuals; while, reciprocally, the happiness of individuals is to be 
achieved in part by their pursuit of the general happiness" (Spencer, 1901, Ch. 13, Sect. 
91). 
Correct conduct could be exercised by everyone and "good conduct . . . always 
proves, when analyzed, to be the conception of a conduct which produces a surplus of 
pleasure." Conversely, bad conduct resulted in a surplus of pain. It followed that the 
"absolutely good, the absolutely right, in conduct, can be that only which produces pure 
pleasure-pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere" (Spencer, 1901, Ch. 15 Sect. 101). 
Pain as well as evil was totally absent in the presence of absolute good (Sahakian, 1974). 
Both Spencer and Darwin, brought relative ethics to the concept of absolute good. 
Relative ethics, the difference between the ideal and the actual, implied that when the 
perfectly or absolutely right could not be realized, then one committed the lesser of the 
evils, that is, the relatively right. Relative right became normative in American ethical 
history and engendered a pattern of human thought so common that it approached a law 
of nature (Marnell, 1966). 
Buber's Perspective on Ethical Evolutionism 
The modern age was the most difficult in human history for people to reconcile 
existential trust in God with the difficulties and horrors that modern society faced. Buber 
wrote that people experienced a "double pull" that resulted in our inability to have free 
creation of values when people felt empty of meaning (Friedman, 1986). Above all, 
modern people have felt a sort of homelessness in the world that resulted from the 
Copernican invasion of the infinite that humanity had experienced in moments of dialogue 
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between the / and the Eternal Thou. Buber depicted the modern age as a time of crisis, 
and with each new crisis, the original contract between the universe and the human being 
was dissolved and people found themselves strangers and solitary in the world. 
At the very basis of philosophy, Buber wrote, were the 1-Thou and 1-Eternal Thou 
relationships. When the dualism of the modern age invaded the possibility of these 
relationships, people sought to overcome their feelings of dispossession by attempting to 
conquer the elemental forces of the world. In their effort to control the world instead 
of feeling controlled by ever-present forces of evil, people assumed four patterns of 
reducing the immediacy of the moment and thereby distanced themselves from authentic 
relationship. Both Darwin and Spencer's ethical evolutionism, in their attempts to 
investigate scientifically the nature of absolute goodness, brought about two of these 
patterns into modern ethical thought. 
Scientists who followed ethical evolutionism encouraged human beings to 
technicize the moment, that is, they treated moments of decision purely as means to 
goals. These goals existed for such scientists only in the future. Therefore, ethical 
evolutionism attempted to provide scientific techniques to people who sought to predict 
and control that which Buber believed should have been met in authentic, genuine 
meeting. Second, such scientific thinking abstracted the moment from its reality by 
psychologizing such moments so that their total 
content must be reflected upon, reduced to a process, and treated as comprising an 
experience external to the human soul (Buber, 1952b). 
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What modern scientific investigation and process had done to humanity, Buber 
wrote, was to divide life into levels and aspects that were independent of one another. 
Thus religion became only one aspect of life rather than its totality. The protagonists of 
the bible sinned, Buber wrote, like us, but did not commit the "arch sin" of professing 
God in the synagogue and denying Him in the spheres of economics, politics, and "self 
assertion" of the group (Buber, 1952b, p. 334). 
The ethical evolutionists' relative ethics entered into our world of work and 
destroyed and precluded the entry of the Absolute into this sphere of our existence. 
Therefore people could no longer see meaning in work. In times like ours when life 
became divided into separate spheres, people experienced work as an inescapable 
compulsion that was perverted by the divorce of technical means from value ends, that 
is, the 1-lt from the I-Thou. The result was the inhuman utlization of human power 
without regard to the worthiness of the work performed. Because "man [was] in a 
growing measure sociologically determined," he was caught in the grip of 
incomprehensible powers in the technical, economic, and political spheres of existence 
and was trampled "again and again in all [his] human purposes" (Friedman, 1960). 
What Spencer, Darwin, and the other ethical evolutionists took away from modern 
society was its purpose. The purposelessness of modern life, Buber believed, was 
evidenced in the worship of freedom for its own sake. Education, brought to the masses 
by the democratic ethical naturalism of Dewey, had freed children's creative impulses 
without their having acquired a sense of personal responsibility to accompany it. "This 
sickness of modern man is manifested most clearly of all, however, in the individualism 
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and nationalism which make power an end in itself" (Friedman, 1960, p. 119). "Power 
without faithfulness is life without meaning" (Buber, 1965a, p. 39). 
Therefore Buber believed that scientific investigation into the relationship between 
the person and the Absolute that was brought about most significantly by the ethical 
evolutionists promoted a "sick understanding" of this age that taught that our human goal 
could be reached through the ways of the world because "the use of unrighteousness as 
a.means to a righteous end makes the end itself unrighteous" (Friedman, 1960). The 
result of a person or of a community using evil for the sake of good was the destruction 
of the soul in the process. Only when possibility became more powerful than reality 
could the person combine creative personal power with responsibility (Buber, 1948c, p. 
39). 
Ethical Pessimism 
As modern society drifted deeper into the dualism that Buber claimed was 
destroying the possibility of authentic meeting, pessimism permeated human thinking. 
Among the ethical pessimists were Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), the most 
systematic pessimist and sympathetic ethicist; Seren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the 
ideational founder of qualitative dialectical ethics; and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), 
the parent of the nihilist dissolution. 
According to Schopenhauer, ultimate reality created the external physical world 
order, termed phenomenon or idea. Through idea, the phenomenal world was 
intelligible; the ultimately real world, whose essence was irrational will, was not. 
Whereas Hegel's philosophical world was based on reason as the ultimate ground of 
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• reality that led to optimism, Schopenhauer's will as the ultimate ground for reality led 
to philosophical pessimism. The irrational forces of the human will appeared as 
instinctual urges, impulses, or strivings and were negative and they produced life's 
miseries. Salvation from them was achieved through either annihilation of the will or 
complete ascetic denial. For Schopenhauer, ultimate goodness was found temporarily 
by quieting these urges through taking refuge in art or in Platonic ideals. Under these 
conditions of misery, the only ethical course of action was the expression of pity, a 
feeling of compassion or sympathy arising out of our kinship as human beings in pain 
to each other (Sahakian, 1974). 
Schopenhauer's view of the human situation was that life was a continuous 
striving between deep driving desire and its incomplete satisfaction. He evaluated this 
craving for satisfaction as quite painful and evil. "Suffering is simply unfulfilled and 
crossed volition" (Schopenhauer, 1896, 4, 65). Recognizing life as an unrelenting state 
of desires craving satisfaction, pain was both the essence of life and a real aspect of 
human nature, while the moments of satisfaction were fleeting, transitory and ultimately 
negative aspects. Pleasure was conceived as the elimination of pain through the 
elimination of desire (Sahakian, 1974). Life became a preponderance of pain with 
transitory moments of pleasure and rendered it not worth living. "The greatest crime of 
man is that he ever was born" (Schopenhauer, 1896, Bk. 4, 63) and concluded, "[h]uman 
life must be some kind of mistake" (Schopenhauer, 1902 , p. 23). 
Human misery became intensified by self-consciousness and intelligence. The 
more the person became aware of misery, the greater it became. Schopenhauer believed 
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that the more intelligent the person was, the more pain the person had. Although he did 
not believe in suicide and termed it a "clumsy experiment," Schopenhauer wrote that 
people undertook endless pursuits of happiness even knowing their indestructible wills 
prevented its attainment. The person seemed destined to vacillate between two miserable 
human conditions: need and boredom. Either people strived miserably to find 
permanent satisfaction in life or, having satisfied their needs, were completely bored. 
"No attained object of desire can give lasting satisfaction, but merely a fleeting 
gratification; it is like the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive today that his 
misery may be prolonged till the morrow" (Schopenhauer, 1896, 3, 38). 
Believing that human beings were inextricably bound to one another in pain, 
Schopenhauer wrote that there was only one ultimate human will permeating everywhere 
and penetrating everything. Both desire and pain in another person was in each of us 
as well and the most any person could do was be sympathetic and pity one another. 
Only sympathy was grounded in altruistic motivation. Pity was the proper attitude even 
for the sinner to assume because the sin was ours as sin in the other was the same as that 
found in us. The sinner's anguish was ours as well. Ethical salvation was in complete 
denial, asceticism, repudiation of life and pleasure, that is, total denial of the will to 
live. This yielded a concept of holiness that achieved the knowledge that the nature of 
one's finite existence was nothingness (Sahakian, 1974). 
Seren Kierkegaard developed a qualitative dialectic or an irreconcilable antithesis 
within existential philosophy that regarded life as a disjunctive conjunction, or an 
either/or choice, and no amount of logic was capable of uniting it into synthesis. His 
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philosophy of irrationalism was not based on the idea of an irrational will as was 
Schopenhauer's; rather, it rested on a qualitative dialectical predicament where the nature 
of thought was regarded as lacking agreement with reality, resulting in the paradoxical 
nature of truth (Sahakian, 1974). Proposing that "life must be lived forward, but 
understood backwards," Kierkegaard doubted whether reason could explain or understand 
life (Kierkegaard, 1958, p. 23). People's choices were decisions of free will and lay 
beyond rational explanation. They were leaps of logic across logical gaps and constituted 
a breach of scientific continuity. 
The highest good of the humanity was becoming subjective and the most decisive 
acts were found in choice itself. "Man is granted a choice. . . . Man not merely can 
choose ... he must choose" (Kierkegaard, 1948, p. 228). This choice necessitated a 
teleological suspension of the ethical, the suspension of universal maxims of morality and 
their rationale for the leap of faith to the revelation of God (Sahakian, 1974). Whereas 
objectivity sought rational explanations, "subjectivity [was] the truth" (Kierkegaard, 
1941, p. 191). The truth was absurd. Kierkegaard illustrated this by referring to 
Christian salvation. Believing that eternal truth had come into being in time and that God 
had come into being, the Christian believer must suspend teleological thinking by the leap 
of faith in which the definitions of truth and faith became equivalent. "When 
subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, the truth becomes objectively a paradox" 
(Kierkegaard, 1941, p. 183). 
Kierkegaard considered life as three stages: aesthetic, ethical, and religious. In 
each, a person sought to find personal salvation on earth. Aestheticists sought pleasure, 
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but found that the pleasure pursued did not exist. This induced despair, and led to the 
ethical, stage. Within this stage, one found authentic selfhood by choosing oneself, that 
is, by truly knowing the self in the Socratic sense. A person in this stage acted with 
inner commitment rather than from indecision. By choosing the self, one made one's 
authentic personality. 
In the religious, or third stage, the person commited to God, not through duty, 
but through obedience. Only when people acknowledged personal sin could they 
complete such a commitment to God, and in the moment of decision when an individual 
so committed oneself could the person's life be altered conclusively. The distinctive 
existential features of the three stages are: enjoyment-perdition; action-victory; and 
suffering (Sahakian, 1974). Whereas the aesthetic hero was great in the fact he 
conquered, the religious hero was great because he suffered (Kierkegaard, 1940). 
Suffering became the highest, most intense, and complete expression of inwardness for 
the person and must be accomplished individually because the subjective individual was 
true and real. Reason became the opposite of faith and faith was understood as 
inwardness, subjectivity, and a state of risk. Faith's opposite was sin and it was the lack 
of faith in human beings and lack of confidence for this faith that led to sin. Goodness, 
the ultimate pursuit of humankind, was the inwardness of subjectivity that enabled the 
ultimate faith that could survive teleological suspension. 
Friedrich Nietzsche's nihilism condemned the eternal phenomenon of the human 
person's insatiated will which served to detain creatures in life and compelled them to 
live on. He pointed to three planes of delusion within which the person dwelled: (1) the 
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delusion that the Socratic love of knowledge enabled people to heal the eternal wound 
of existence, (2) the delusion of the world of art as the seductive veil of beauty which 
concealed pain, and (3) the delusion afforded by the metaphysical comfort that 
persuadeed us that eternal life flowed on indestructibly (Nietzsche, 1927). Our culture 
was composed of these delusional stimulants which combined to convince people that 
theoretical man was equipped with great forces of knowledge and was doing holy work 
while laboring in the service of science. People were dissatisfied with their ability to 
understand through their own faculties and developed a magical element that believed 
only the scholar could exercise the ability to understand the human situation. 
A cultured and magical class of scholars necessitated the construction of a 
barbaric slave class who came to regard their existence as an acceptable necessity. 
Positioned into a class constrained in part by religion, Nietzsche wondered how anyone 
could find appeal in learned religions. He condemned the hierarchy of science which he 
felt compounded this class distinction and attempted to force others to see these 
consequences. 
Great, universally gifted natures have contrived, with an incredible 
amount of thought, to make use of the paraphenalia of science itself, in 
order to point out the limits and the realtivity of knowledge generally, and 
thus definitely to deny the claim of science to universal validity and 
universal aims: with which demonstration the illusory notion was for the 
first time recognized as such, which pretends, with the aid of causality, 
to be able to fathom the innermost essence of things (Nietzsche, 1927, pp. 
406-407). 
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Nihilism revolted against the metaphysical universe and the person's place in it. 
Using the principle of disorder, Nietzsche asserted the ego as law in the absence of law 
and declared that the universe had no meaning. All things and human acts were reduced 
to one level of indifference and within this indifference, no significant moral actions were 
possible (Crocker, 1963). One source of nihilism was the irrationality and mystery of 
the universe which longed for explanation and clarity but to which the universe refused 
to supply answers. 
Sources of Nietzsche's nihilism included Pascal's assertion that the self made itself 
the center of everything and strived to be the tyrant of others and Spinoza's emphasis on 
vengenace, cruelty, and the satisfaction of hurting others within the concept that the 
highest right of nature was individual judgement of good and evil. Eventually, Sadian 
nihilism would find its way beyond literature and into ethics which stated that egoistic 
pleasure, the ultimate expression of Utilitarianism, was an irrefutable value. These ethics 
declared that murder could be viewed as allowing nature to create new life and bring to 
humanity the idea that creation itself must be murdered by the person who was superior 
to nature. Nietzsche juxtaposed Socratic optimism, which he termed a delusion of 
limitless power, with the result of the placement of society at the very lowest strata of 
concern. Society trembled because its members believed that happiness for all was a real 
possibility. Desire for universal happiness was transformed into a threatening demand. 
Yet the Alexandrian culture's response, which included its own desire to survive 
permanently, demanded a slave class yet maintained an optimistic view of life that denied 
the necessity of such a class. This contradiction was resolved through the adoption of 
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the delusions of the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of labor," the myth that he 
believed eventually would paralyze and master society. 
Although he described himself as having "a more severe morality than anybody" 
(Johnson, 1989, p. 291), Nietzsche advocated the transvaluation of values, which brought 
him the designation of amoralist. He rejected the morality of the modern world, yet he 
was not without his own moral standards. The two greatest threats to modern society 
were Christianity and democracy, both of which Nietzsche believed were expressions of 
a slave morality in that democracy advocated the equality of all people and Christianity 
preached pity for sufferers. Nietzsche proposed his "master-morality" to replace these 
institutions and called for the emergence of a race of men in Europe to practice it. The 
human race would become divided into this slave class and "supermen," a term that has 
caused him to be described as an architect of Nazism (Johnson, 1989). 
By addressing the question of truth, the ultimate good for humanity, as a personal 
question, Nietzsche distanced himself from other philosophers. He was not convinced 
that individuals would recognize the truth when it was found; rather, he deplored as 
unfounded one's confidence in recognizing. Disgusted with dogmatism that dichotomized 
ethical questions of good and evil, Nietzsche proposed that we have injured our ability 
to know good and evil with a language of continual falsification of the world by numbers 
(Nietzsche, 1973). The ultimacy of quantitative and scientific knowing was such that we 
supported the notion that to renounce those false judgments was to deny life. "To 
recognize untruth as a condition of life: that, to be sure, means to resist customary 
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value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy which ventures to do so places 
itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil" (Nietzsche, 1973, p. 12). 
In his diatribe against philosphers for positing the attainability of ultimate good 
as a noble trick, Nietzsche castigated the Stoics for their over-simplification. He 
declared that living was the very act of valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, 
and wanting to be different (Nietzsche, 1973). The Stoic goal of submitting to nature 
was dishonest because the Stoics denied that nature was in a state of ceaseless combat 
and submitting to it rather than fighting it was boastful nonsense. Nietzsche disavowed 
any idea of acceptance of life. Urging that human beings created values, his ontology 
was that morality was not forced upon us by the nature of things and that they did not 
exist in the fabric of the world, waiting to be discovered by us. 
Denying the existence of facts and affirming interpretations, Nietzsche urged that 
we should realize how our drives and desires colored all our dealings with what we liked 
to think of as a reality existing entirely independent of us which we could neutrally 
investigate. Here Nietzsche was original: value was not something that we discovered, 
but something that we invented. Insofar as the individual valuers derived their values 
from the culture of which each of them was a member, it was the world in general that 
did the imposing, and not the group of which they were members. 
Nietzsche's overriding concern was the typology of cultures. Only the masters 
within a culture of master-morality were aware of their position. 
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The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values, he 
does not need to be approved of, he judges 'what harms me is harmful in 
itself,' he knows himself to be that which in general first accords honor 
to things, he creates values. Everything he knows to be part of himself, 
he honors: such a morality is self-glorification (Nietzsche, 1973, p. 22). 
His hostility to such a stratum of masters was obvious; yet, he called for the formulation 
of conditions under which we might hope to recover greatness associated with creativity. 
Without a return to such greatness, humanity was destined to remain within confused 
hopelessness and despair. 
Buber's Perspective on Ethical Pessimism 
Buber's response to Ethical Pessimism could be found in the lengthy writing he 
did regarding Kierkegaard's position in "The Question to the Single One" (Buber, 1965a) 
and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's thought in "What is Man?" (Buber, 1965a). In each 
case, Buber's point of departure centered on the nature of adderss and response between 
the person and God, creation, and his consideration of Kant's four questions: (1) what 
can I know? (2) what ought I do? (3) what may I hope? and (4) what is man? His 
responses revolved around metaphysics, ethics, religion, and anthropology respectively 
(Buber, 1965a, p. 119). 
The ethical pessimists described above concluded that the totality of humankind 
could be reduced to the ideas of absurdity, despair, and nothingness. Buber's concern 
with the "wholeness of man" led to his conclusion regarding philosophical anthropology 
as the study of 
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man's special place in the cosmos, his connextion with destiny, his 
relation to the world of things, his understanding of his fellowmen, his 
existence as a being that knows it must die, his attitude in the ordinary 
and extraordinary encounters with the mystery with which his life is shot 
through (Buber, 1965a, p. 120). 
Buber's overriding interest with the human being's wholeness precluded any investigation 
into the question of "what man is" in terms of any particular set of terminology or 
philosophical discipline. This included the language and investigation of scientific 
inquiry when Buber disagreed with Heidegger in his belief that philosophical 
anthropology could provide a foundation for metaphysics or for the individual sciences. 
That, Buber concluded, would produce a false unity instead of genuine wholeness of the 
subject, that is, the human person. 
Understanding "real man" was Buber's goal. Within the human pattern and 
constant flux of individuals and cultures, Buber defined the "narrow ridge" as the means 
to avoid the abyss of abstract unity or meaninglessness of relativity in such an 
understanding. In addition, Buber identified a further complication in the understanding, 
that man's existence was constituted by his participation, at the same time and in the 
same actions, in finitude and infinity. In his response to Kierkegaard, Buber elaborated 
that man was the only creature with potentiality. Even though this potentiality was 
confined within narrow limits, man's action was unforeseeable in its nature and extent 
(Buber, 1965a). It was because of this potentiality that Buber was able to speak of the 
freedom of man and the reality of evil (Friedman, 1960). 
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Rejecting the traditional idea that the human person was human because of reason, 
Buber emphasized his philosophy of the wholeness of the individual. Further, 
[h]e can be understood only when one knows, on the one hand, that there 
is something in all that is human, including thought, which belongs to the 
general nature of living creatures, and is to be grasped from this nature, 
while knowing, on the other hand, that there is no human quality which 
belongs fully to the general nature of living creatures and is to be grasped 
exclusively from it . . . Human reason is to be understood only in 
connextion with human non-reason. The problem of philosophical 
anthropology is the problem of a specific totality and of its specific 
structure (Buber, 1965a, p. 160). 
The contrast of the individual person with the rest of nature was constituted in Buber's 
concepts of distancing, or "the primal setting at a distance," and "entering into relation." 
Only the human being could perform the first act of setting at a distance because only 
people had worlds, that is, unbroken continuums which included not only that they know 
and experience but all that was knowable now and in the future. Although an animal's 
actions were concerned with its future and that of its young, only human beings imagined 
the future. Using nature as his analogy, Buber pointed to the planted tree which was 
rooted in the world of time, but the person who planted the first tree was the one who 
expected the Messiah (Friedman, 1960). 
Ethical pessimism was discounted by Buber through the concept of relation of one 
to another within the twofold principle of human life. Rather than despair into nihilism 
and ethics of nausea and incomprehensibility, Buber affirmed that in human societies, 
persons confirmed each other in practical ways in their personal qualities and capacities. 
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He defined society in part as human to the degree to which this mutual confirmation took 
place. Aside from their development of tools and weapons, it was this mutual individual 
completion and recognition of function which had enabled human beings to achieve 
dominion over the earth. Only human beings could see their companions apart from their 
common lives and could ascribe to the enemy any existence beyond this immediate 
hostility. The person was therefore able to enter into relation, in individual status, with 
those like oneself (Friedman, 1960). Mutual confirmation was best illustrated by the 
power of human speech. 
Buber reserved considerable space in his writings to repudiate Kierkegaard's 
forcing of people into either/or choices that demanded choosing within suspension of the 
ethical and the concomitant conclusion that the fate of humanity was best represented as 
one of pessimism. Buber never denied that Kierkegaard's God was the true God; rather, 
he opposed Kierkegaard's conception of our relationship to God by writing "[w]ho is 
there who confesses the God whom Kierkegaard and I confess, who could suppose in 
decisive insight that God wants Thou to be truly said only to him, and to all others only 
an unessential and fundamentally invalid word?" (Friedman, 1983, p. 195). The 
loneliness of lived life in which Kierkegaard as well as Buber's solitary person took 
refuge, could become either a constructive or destructive fortress, depending on the 
person's resultant participation in Being. Kierkegaard's was an image of the human 
condition for us, for he was, like us, isolated and exposed, and this became for him the 
fate of man as man. 
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Buber's complaint was that Kierkegaard's was not an image of the human 
condition that could give us meaningful direction for personal or social existence. We 
know, Buber commented, an organic continuance and grace of preservation of the 1-Thou 
relation from which Kierkegaard wanted to win us into his private world as if it were the 
true one. Buber's narrow ridge was not at the fringe of life; rather, it was at the very 
center of this idea. Whereas Buber's definition of the individual put the person on this 
narrow ridge, Kierkegaard's individual was set upon a rock, alone with the mercy of the 
Merciful (Friedman, 1983, p. 195). Kierkegaard's acosmic view denied creation, but 
Buber's Creator not only hovered over His creation; rather, He embraced it. Buber's 
conception of God was as the One who made every It into His Thou, and humanity's task 
was to imitate God when in their human way they embraced the piece of the world 
offered to each by saying Thou with their beings to the beings who surrounded them, 
thereby loving God's creation in His creatures. 
Buber, not Kierkegaard, experienced the horrors of Nazi Germany and had 
perhaps more a reason to retreat into pessimistic tones. Through his study of Hasidic 
writings, Buber confessed himself to be ineluctably destined to love the world and wrote 
"[t]he person who has not ceased to love the human world in all its degradation is able 
even today to envision genuine social form" (Buber, 1967a, p. 205). The metaphor 
intended by Buber was the one which Kierkegaard had shunned, that is, marriage, and 
he carried over as a metaphor to the Single One who lived with the body politic, wed to 
it and suffering its destiny with it. Even if the Single One did not achieve much, he met 
God by putting his arms around creation and facing the biographical and historical hour 
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which approached him in its "apparently senseless contradiction, without weakening the 
impact of otherness in it" (Buber, 1965a, p. 40). 
The situation in which Buber stood and made this pronouncement, the situation 
in which Hitler was, in Heidegger's words, "the lord of the hour," Buber recognized as 
"God's question" to him, "whether it sound with angels' or with devils' tongues," 
although he also took care to add, "of course, without the devils thereby being turned 
into angels," a mistake which the "pious" often made. No one must interfere with out 
hearing this claim and responding to it from the depths where hearing passed into being. 
Human truth was bound up with responsibility of the person. It became existentially true 
only when we stood the test in hearing and responding. "True community and true 
commonwealth will be realized only to the extent to which the Single Ones become real 
out of whose responsible life the body politic is renewed" (Friedman, 1983, p. 197). 
Modern Philosophy 
Pragmatism 
American pragmatism's ethics developed at Harvard University as a result of the 
writings and political activism of Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Conceiving of things in terms of what they did, rather than in 
terms of externally imposed conceptions of absoluteness characterized Peirce's 
philosophy. The body of truth changed, Peirce wrote, and one's belief about the 
meaning of a thing worked only if it were adjusted to the idea which prevailed where one 
observed it. Belief was good and true only if it was brought into coherence with another 
belief, and the more complicated the matter, belief worked only if it were coherent with 
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many related beliefs. Therefore, the body of truth continually changed and only the 
pragmatic test revealed the truth (Marnell, 1966). Peirce wrote 
that 
[p]ragmatism is an experience or psychological meaning theory. It does 
not rest its criterion of meaning on logical or formal grounds—a 
proposition is not meaningful simply because it has certain syntactical 
structure-but on psychological grounds. Pragmatism undertakes to 
explicate the psychological or cognitive content of a sentence in terms of 
volitions and sense-experiences, so that to say that a proposition (or a 
concept) is meaningless for a pragmatist is to say that it cannot be 
expressed in terms of psychological experiences (Moore, 1961, p. 96). 
Embedded within American pragmatism was a positivism that maintained the 
ethical neutrality of science as well as Utilitarian beliefs. Proposing that the test of 
consequences could be applied to moral judgments, pragmatists believed such judgments 
could be corrected and improved. The ethical dictates of such guidance could come from 
the teachings of the church or from the moral dictates of individual consciences. This 
caused the development of pragmatism in which moral concepts could be improved on 
the basis of experience. 
William James considered the scientific approach and bias toward the 
experimental approach to morals as valid and he believed that there were specific patterns 
and laws that could be experientially determined. He disavowed any all-embracing laws 
within the comprehension of the human being. "For such persons the physical order of 
nature, taken simply as science knows it, cannot be held to reveal any one harmonious 
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spiritual intent. It is mere weather, as Chauncey Wright called it, doing and undoing 
without end." Yet James maintained a profound belief in God and claimed "... we 
have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust, if 
only thereby life may seem to us better worth living again" (James, 1897, p. 52). Any 
approach to the questions of ultimate happiness or goodness for humanity according to 
James's pragmatism must have included a religious faith as well as development of a 
pattern of belief to which he could give unqualified intellectual assent and a pattern which 
might have been valid for others as well (Marnell, 1966). James could not tolerate the 
immanence of God in the unity of humankind. 
James's conception of God was popularly theistic, that is, limited by the fact of 
the existence of evil in the world. Believing that evil could exist because God was not 
in complete control or because God was partially ignorant of what was happening were 
cornerstones of his philosophical system. What James added to the American pragmatic 
debate was the idea that God was both ignorant and partially powerless regarding the 
world's evil (Ford, 1982). He wrote "[t]he line of least resistance, then, as it seems to 
me, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman 
consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words, that 
there is a God, but that He is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or both at once" 
(James, 1977, p. 141). 
The reality of ultimate goodness fit only with difficulty within James's pragmatism 
that described the universe as a tight cosmos from which people must accept the 
irreducible whole of it just as it was offered. The only alternative to such acceptance, 
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James implied, was the confession that the world was non-rational. Rather than accept 
such fatalism, James countered that humanity was endowed with a profound sense of 
freedom that contradicted such fatalistic monism. This freedom enabled people to believe 
that at least some things were decided in the here and now, and that every passing 
moment might have contained some novelty. If people believed that they were original 
starting points of events and not merely transmitters of a push from elsewhere, they 
could be happy and make good decisions. 
The faith ladder proposed by James was the context of the human push toward 
goodness. Consisting of seven rungs, he wrote that 
1. There was nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being true, there 
was nothing self contradictory. 
2. It might have been true under certain circumstances. 
3. It may be true, even now. 
4. It is Jit to be true. 
5. It ought to be true. 
6. It must be true. 
7. It shall be true, at any rate true for me (James, 1968). 
This ladder connoted the slope of good will on which people habitually live regarding the 
larger questions of life. Therefore, what was ultimately good could now be thought of 
as good, "at any rate, good for me." 
Faith in the possibility of goodness was an inalienable birthright of the human 
mind and must remain a practical, yet not dogmatic, attitude. Human beings could 
experience and determine goodness so long as they tolerated other faiths and other 
decisions while they searched for the most probable determination for themselves with 
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full consciousness of the inherent responsibilities and risks (James, 1968). Thus 
pragmatism, for James as well as for Peirce, culminated in the principle which has come 
to dominate twentieth-century philosophy regarding radical goodness. The abstract 
conception was only meaningful so far as it might be reduced to the concrete experience 
(Moore, 1961). 
These beliefs included that the person had the power and the duty, within one's 
limitations, to make the world better. The experiences of religion which made for 
increased righteousness were essential to the process and people had the free will without 
which their ideas could become neither plans of actions nor truth. Hume's skepticism 
was rejected and the constructive thought which conceived of ideas as plans of action as 
possible replaced it. The only meaningful conception of the good was that of the 
reduction to experience as attainable. Such beliefs were now pluralistic, believed in 
individual efforts, in democracy, and in direct, personal relationships with a Deity 
(Marnell, 1966). 
The pragmatism of Peirce and James molded American thought regarding radical 
goodness. Life now required the belief in certain values, modes of action, and 
objectives. The belief in them was good if they proved to have genuine worth, if the 
modes of action established effectiveness, and if their objectives produced a stable 
validity. These beliefs were true because they were good and they were good because 
they made for a better life. Those things were true that made for the better life, and that 
is true which stood the test of practice. Pragmatism applied to truth the test of goodness 
in the form of experience, not the test of goodness in terms of conformity to some a 
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priori standard of goodness. And pragmatism suggested the difficulty of achieving an 
a priori standard of goodness as well as a certain agnosticism that difficulty invited which 
could be avoided by making the test of goodness the test of experience. 
John Dewey's contribution to American pragmatism's definition of supreme 
goodness consisted in his ideas of egalitarianism. Dewey's conception of happiness was 
thoroughly social and was largely independent of circumstances. Although Peirce and 
James added an individual component to the knowing of supreme goodness, Dewey 
appended the idea that the ultimate goodness was the common good and that happiness 
in society required the full realization of all capacities of individuals in all their 
uniqueness. He demanded that people be judged by their potential, not by what they had 
been able to achieve under limiting conditions at a given time (McGill, 1967). His 
underlying theme was the democracy was the political form that best assured free 
individual development. "For democracy signifies, on the one side, that every individual 
is to share in the duties and rights belonging to control of social affairs and, on the other 
side, that social arrangements are to eliminate those external arrangement of status, birth, 
wealth, sex, etc., which restrict the opportunity of each individual for full development 
of himself (Dewey, 1932, p. 387). 
Rejecting a priori standards of goodness, Dewey aligned himself with American 
pragmatism. The confusion faced by people aiming at self-development, Dewey's 
definition of happiness, was that of "ends-in-view" and "standards." The ends people 
had in view were generally concrete and appropriate to the special circumstances in 
which they found themselves. Standards, however, were criteria subject to separate 
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approval by which acceptable desires were distinguished from unacceptable ones. Self-
realization was thought of by Dewey as a form of happiness that fell under the external 
standard of judgment and was not a human end-in-view and was therefore not the unique 
happiness he conceived of as cut to the pattern of each individual's desire and judgment 
as to what was important. Although social and cultural projects were necessary to and 
provided the essentials of the happiness we shared, Dewey believed that ultimate 
happiness included the individual's maximum fulfillment of personal desire. Recognizing 
happiness as an activity and not as a felling, state, or condition, Dewey considered this 
activity as the highest good for all people. Following the traditions of Peirce and 
James's American pragmatism, Dewey distinguished between individual goodness 
through happiness, and the social, democratic, and cultural shared goodness necessary 
for society. 
Buber's Perspective on Pragmatism 
Individualism and collectivism were topics Buber addressed at length in his 
writings. Whereas American pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey postulated 
supreme happiness in individual terms and the relativity of God, Buber both agreed with 
the personal, individual nature of the relationship between the person and God, yet 
disagreed significantly with any limitations of God inherent in their conception of 
relativity. The role of the individual was the narrow ridge along which Buber trod. Too 
great an emphasis on individualism was the failure of community, Buber wrote, and 
pointed to the danger of seclusion in which the spirit was expelled from consideration 
only of singular purposes (Buber, 1967a). More important, questions related to bringing 
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humanity to their greatest productivity were meaningless because they engendered only 
little questions, rather than the most serious issues. 
The serious issues between Buberian thought and American pragmatism related 
to the locus of the individual person as the determiner of what was good and 
concomitantly what was evil, as well as James's popular theism that attempted to limit 
divine omniscience or omnipotence in an effort to account for the contradiction of the 
existence of evil in what should have been a perfect or radically good world. What the 
pragmatists wanted was a form of certainty that was palatable to the masses, a certainty 
Buber concluded was impossible from the human side of the I-Eternal Thou relationship. 
Whereas the pragmatists denigrated the role of the philosopher in the process of 
determining people's ultimate goodness and rejected a priori standards as externally 
imposed, Buber advised that the job of the philosopher was to restore the lived concrete 
to the religious person by destroying images that did not do justice to God, that is, the 
pure idea or a priori standard which stood in the way between the person and God 
(Buber, 1952b). Civilization, however, was the expression of the attachment of human 
life to the Absolute. Therefore, deterinations of goodness must be made within the 
anthropological time of the civilization and not through any elitist conception of 
individuality proposed by Peirce and James. Although Buber diverged less from Dewey 
than from Peirce and James, Buber's ideal society was non-democratic; rather, he 
proposed Utopian socialism with a rebirth, rather than a restoration, of community. 
James's introduction of popular theism to American philosophical thought brought 
relief into the discussion of the existence of evil in what an omnipotent and omniscient 
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Divinity should have created as an absolutely or radically good world. Buber was 
uncompromising in his objection. "The original evil of all 'religion' is the separation of 
'living in God' from 'living in the world'" (Buber, 1952b). By limiting God in any way, 
James accomplished the detaching of the soul from life in relation to God. This misled 
the faithful into feeling secure with objective consummation without personal 
participation and within such relationships the real partner of communion was no longer 
present. In such a conception, God was displaced by the figment of the soul itself and 
the dialogue which the soul thought it was carrying on "is only a monologue with divided 
roles" (Buber, 1948c, p. 104). 
The chief disagreement between Buber and the American pragamtists in this 
question was the accomplishment in American of splitting the actual and ideal worlds, 
between life as it was lived and life as it should be lived (Buber, 1948a). Through the 
idea of popular theism and the resulting splitting of life into dichotomized poles, 
humankind did not achieve relief; rather, they became expropriated and dispossessed 
from the world in four ways. Rather than experiencing moments of communion with the 
Eternal Thou, people could: (a) historicize those moments and regard them as pure 
products of the past, (b) technicize those moments and treat them as purely means to 
goals which existed only in the future, (c) psychologize those moments so their total 
content was reflected upon and reduced to processes or experiences of the soul, and (d) 
philosophize those moments and abstract them from their reality (Friedman, 1960). In 
these ways, modern humanity divided their lives into levels and aspects in which people 
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enjoyed experiences independently of one another, relegated religious experiences and 
religion to only one aspect of life, rather than in its totality. 
American Christianity aligned itself along James's popular theism and desanctified 
the elemental forces of the world and created a world alien to the spirit and a spirit alien 
to the world. Using the metaphor of marriage, Buber wrote that although marriage was 
sanctified within such Christianity, the body was not, and was merely made subservient 
to holiness (Buber, 1952b). The modern unsanctified individual became enmeshed within 
the grip of incomprehensible powers and was trampled again and again in all human 
purposes. This purposelessness of modern life was evidenced in the worship of freedom 
for its own sake, and not for the sake of relating to an absolute or divine power, that is, 
the Eternal Thou. Even Dewey's democratic ideals in education served only to free 
children's creative impulses, but did not help them acquire the personal responsibility to 
accompany those impulses. "The sickness of modern man is manifested most clearly of 
all, however, in the individualism and nationalism which make power an end in itself" 
and "power without faithfulness is life without meaning" (Buber, 1965a, p. 119). 
People who were products of such thinking attempted to overrun reality and 
experienced a profound dualism within their souls. "In this man the sphere of the spirit 
and the sphere of impulse have fallen apart more markedly than ever before. He 
perceives with apprehension that an unfruitful and powerless remoteness from life is 
threatening the separated spirit, and he perceives with horror that the repressed and 
banished impulses are threatening to destroy his soul" (Buber, 1965a, p. 187). The 
division of spirit and impulse were basic to human nature only in the modern person and 
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this rendered modern people sick in their souls. Because American pragmatism brought 
to modern society a heightened sense of individual power and decision, organic 
community began to decay and real togetherness disappeared. "The divorce between 
spirit and instincts is here, as often, the consequence of the divorce between man and 
man" (Buber, 1965a, p. 185). Although new community forms had arisen, such as the 
labor union and public schools, they were unable to re-establish the security which had 
been destroyed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IV. MODERN RADICAL PHILOSOPHY: THE I AND THOU 
This fourth section is an examination of Buber's coming to write the I and Thou 
(1958) and of his consideration of socialized humanity during and after World War I, 
World War II, the Nazi era, the post-Holocaust period, and the War in Palestine. While 
this investigation centers on Buber's expression of good, evil, and radical evil, it may 
be impossible to know Buber without critical inquiry into his step-child, the I and Thou. 
Radical in its elevation of the individual to the status of the divine and insistent on the 
ultimate redeemability of humankind, the 1 and Thou opened a new way for modern 
existentialists to consider humanity in relationship rather than in solitary existence. I 
believe Buber enjoyed the struggle with which this book was birthed, the trouble it met 
with traditional Judaic interpretation, and the growing pains it endured when the world 
attempted to make rational the irrationality of the Holocaust. Consideration of the I and 
Thou, its presuppositions, the philosophical anthropology that sired it, and its 
implications for thought regarding the states of being known as good and evil comprise 
the substance of this chapter. 
The I and Thou 
The Threshold of Meeting and Dialogue 
Before the publication of the German edition of the I and Thou in 1922, Ludwig 
Feuerbach had been the primary influence on Buber's philosophy of meeting and 
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dialogue. Unlike Kant's emphasis on rational thought, Feuerbach thought of the whole 
person rather than reason as the fundamental point of philosophizing. Buber insisted that 
Feuerbach's person was not one as an individual; when Buber described wholeness, he 
meant person with person, the connection of 1 and Thou. 
'The individual man for himself,' runs his [Feuerbach's] manifesto, 'does 
not have man's being in himself, either as a moral being or a thinking 
being. Man's being is contained only in community, in the unity of man 
with man—a unity which rests, however, only on the reality of the 
difference between I and Thou' (Buber, 1965a, p. 136). 
Georg Simmer was another influence on Buber's thought and was concerned with 
relation between person and God, person and person, and person and nature (Friedman, 
1960). Simmel discovered the real relationships between people within the divine. He 
elaborated on the relations between person and God as well as between persons in a 
fashion that paralleled Buber's 1 and Thou. He demanded more than rational belief in 
God; rather, he upheld the positive inner relation between the person and God which 
required surrendering one's feeling and direction of life. Similarly, one must have a 
trust relation with another to believe fully in the other. This relationship demanded 
mutuality. 
The history of Buber's writing revealed a pattern that brought the I and Thou into 
focus in 1922. His essay on Jacob Boehme (1900) reinterpreted unity Kabbalistically and 
posited the human person as a microcosm of the cosmos. In 1909 in Ecstasy and 
Confession, Buber addressed the oneness in ecstasy of the 1 and the world (Friedman, 
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1960). Daniel (1913) illustrated unity which could be created in the physical world. The 
1 and Thou brought these developing topics together through / and Thou relation, "an 
event which takes place between two beings which none the less remain separate" 
(Friedman, 1960, p. 49). 
The I and Thou was replete with images drawn from Buber's previous writings. 
In the essay on Boehme, Buber illustrated concepts with images of kinship with a tree 
and looking into the eyes of a mute animal. These were incorporated into the 1 and Thou 
to portray the I-Thou relation rather than unity. The emotional impact of the events, 
although written more than twenty years apart, were almost identical in power. 
In the 1917 publication of Events and Meetings, Buber linked his philosophy of 
realization in Daniel with that of dialogue. This publication repudiated rational learning 
as the sole means of coming to know and affirmed the humble and faithful beholding of 
any thing (Buber, 1917). He perceived that every thing and being had a twofold nature: 
the passive, appropriable, and comparable and the active, unappropriable, and 
incomparable (Friedman, 1960). Buber affirmed the contact between inexpressible things 
and our sensate powers as the incarnate spirit. Granting humanity a twofold reality, 
Buber described a common reality sufficient for our ordering and comparing things, and 
another greater reality we can make our own only if we surrender ourselves to allow 
relationship with those things which leaped up to embrace us. The world could never 
be known through things but with an active sense-spirit of a loving person. 
Loving people affirmed each thing unrelated to other things and did not demand 
order or comparability among them. Each hour or moment brought potentially holy 
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encounters to loving persons who did not seek to rationalize world experiences. The 
'loving man' of Events and Meetings was similar to the 'realizing man' of Daniel, but 
Buber indicated that the twofold nature of life no longer applied solely to human beings 
but was inherent in things themselves. 
Buber's emphases on location and direction developed in these writings. He 
accentuated the meeting between persons and what was "over against" the person, a 
meeting that never became an identity. The encounter was not a perfect unity but was 
between a person and an active self of things. Humankind was limited in its ability to 
shape the world and to overcome the evil in both themselves and the world. 
Buber believed he would labelled a mystic, a title he earned through his Hasidic 
reconstructions and mystical experiences in his youth. He declared his non-mystical 
intention in three of his early essays, Brother Body (1914), The Altar (1914), and The 
Demon in the Dream (1914) in Pointing the Way (1957). His need to renounce 
mysticism stemmed from a mis-meeting in 1914 between Buber and a young man who 
later committed suicide. Buber answered the questions that the young man asked, but 
not the ones he did not ask. This event of judgment convinced him to cede reliance on 
mysticism in his writings. 
Since then I have given up the 'religious' which is nothing but the 
exception, extraction, exaltation, ecstasy; or it has given me up. I possess 
nothing but the everyday out of which I am never taken. The mystery is 
no longer disclosed, it has escaped or it has made its dwelling here where 
everything happens as it happens. I know no fulness but each mortal 
hour's fulness of claim and responsibility (Buber, 1965a, p. 13). 
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When the I and Thou was ready for American publication in 1958, Buber refused to 
change even one word of the text citing that the original had been written in a type of 
creative ecstasy from which even the author had no right to tamper (Friedman, 1991). 
Mysticism remained a force in Buber's work and infused the land Thou with its spiritual 
essence. 
Through his personal experience of mis-meeting when his parents separated, 
Buber defined effective action between persons as simple togetherness. Relationship was 
more powerful than writing and was productive in that it took root in the immediacy of 
lived life. Buber objected to the modern idea that defined production as the criterion of 
human worth, calling it illegitimate production without immediacy, without validity as 
a criterion, and its overvaluation a delusion. Genuinely lived life disavowed one's 
intention of utilizing another in relationship; rather, it invited fellowship with a single 
glance. 
Buber did not consider the I and Thou decisive until 1919. Understanding that 
true communication between person and person was possible only when each was 
directly present, Buber frequently reinterpreted his earlier work. Those reinterpretations 
considered religious reality as not taking place in inwardness but in a space between 
person and God in the reality of relation; realization as misapplied when a person spoke 
of making God out of truth into reality, an idea that promoted God as an 'idea' through 
which people became 'reality'; and that our human existence was not a series of events 
to overcome the duality of being and reality in order to aspire to the divine. This final 
point, that we cannot subscribe to the concept of a reality which was relative and far 
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from God, led Buber to disavow duality of functions (thinking and feeling) within a 
duality of spheres (being and reality). 
The shift in emphasis to the two-directional meeting of God and person left no 
space for an impersonal god-figure that the human soul brought into existence through 
thought. God became the Eternal Thou, whom we met inside and outside the human 
soul, yet who was never impersonal or removed. Some believed this shift moved Buber 
away from Kabbalistic interpretations of the Shekhinah, or exiled spirit of God; indeed, 
it was difficult to reconcile with his earlier mystical writings. He addressed the question 
in Hasidism and the Modern Man (1988), declaring that this internal and external 
meeting with God did not imply division within God or limitation on transcendence. He 
wrote, "[w]hat turgid and presumptuous talk that is about the 'God who becomes;' but 
we know unshakably in our hearts that there is a becoming of the God that is" (Buber, 
1988, p. 215; 1958a, p. 82). 
The reinterpretation of God fundamental to the I and Thou did not exclude a 
becoming of God in the world but only the concept of God as pure ideal which was not 
yet reality. If creation were not divine, if God were not immanent as well as 
transcendent, then we would have had a gnostic division between God and the world 
which would leave the world cut off from God and forever unredeemable (Friedman, 
1960). God's immanence and transcendence, the divinity of creation, the world as 
redeemable, and God as the Eternal Thou, brought Buber to finish the book that 
challenged the philosophizing world as he laid on the world's doorstep the orphaned child 
of dialogue, the I and Thou. 
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Buber and Dialogue 
Buber developed the philosophy of the "word," that was spoken, of speech as 
event and event as speech, of the world as word and human existence as address and 
response (Friedman, 1991). The discovery of the 1 and Thou was that spoken was 
primary, not written speech. This rediscovery was the life of dialogue. The spoken 
word was uttered in mutuality of relationship and took meaning from its being said by 
one person, heard by another, and related by the second from an entirely different 
ground. The Thou achieved reality in knowing and being known and analogized the 
relation of person with God. "Its true address receives true response; except that in 
God's response everything, the universe, is made manifest as language" (Friedman, 
1981, p. 315). Real speaking took place within tension although real speech was not 
community but was multiplicity. Born of a living dynamic, this essential tension was 
expressed through speech and served as a catalyst for people to come toward each other. 
"The Shehkinah," Buber wrote, "is between the beings." 
Dialogue of pure speech brought the person to experience the absolute as the 
Thou. God did not change but only the theophany did, until no symbol was sufficient 
and life between person and person itself became a symbol, "until God is truly present 
when one person clasps the hand of another" (Friedman, 1991, p. 127). Each individual 
was responsible for preserving the sanctity of such moments. Every person must shelter 
those moments and not psychologize them into mere experiences. Buber denied the 
reality of experience because it 
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belongs to the exclusive, individualized psychic sphere; "meeting" . . . 
transcends this sphere from its origins on. The psychological reduction 
of being, its psychologizing, had a destructive effect on me in my youth 
because it removed from me the foundation of human realization, the "to-
one-another." Only much later, in the revolution of my thinking that 
taught me to fight and to gain ground, did I win reality that cannot be lost 
(Friedman, 1991, p. 127). 
By disavowing experience as the "great foolishness of our time," Buber disagreed that 
the divine was a becoming God who needed to be brought forth by the human spirit 
(Friedman, 1991, p. 127). During the final drafts of the I and Thou, Buber studied 
philosophical Judaism with Franz Rosenzweig, translated the Hebrew Bible into German, 
and contemplated Hasidic spiritual issues. One purpose of the 1 and Thou was the 
universality of his philosophy of dialogue. He described the insight that led him to the 
study of Bible and Hasidism, as well as to independent questions such as: Are the /-
Thou relation to God and the I-Thou relation to one's fellow man related to each other 
(Friedman, 1991)? 
The philosophy of dialogue of the I and Thou relationship could overcome mis-
meetings and maintain cosmic connections lost by children. Such connections joined 
ever-renewed distancing and relating of the I-Thou by allowing individuals to exchange 
spiritual relations for natural ones with worlds lost by children as they grew into 
adulthood. This exchange was from the glowing darkness of chaos into the cool light of 
creation. 
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Meeting 
Creation's cool light was not a gift to possess; rather, it was a condition until the 
child made it into him own reality. This implied anthropology, not a theory of 
knowledge. The anthropological consideration centered on what "man was as man," and 
offered an ontology of what was "really real." When a person truly met another, 
meeting existed within existential trust, as that trust within which Buber himself accepted 
his separation from his mother and was willing to go out in the world again both to meet 
and to be met (Friedman, 1991, p. 131). 
If Buber's mother failure to return when he was four years old was the crucial 
mis-meeting of his life, then his marriage to Paula was the critical meeting. The partners 
possessed an otherness that provided Buber an ability to trust and to go into the world 
to meet persons or situations as his Thou. The existential trust undergirding the I and 
Thou may have been unthinkable without this relationship. As Buber reconstructed the 
idea of radical evil after his lived experience with Nazi destruction, he emerged not from 
his individual being but from the between, which he knew foremost in his marriage 
(Friedman, 1991). 
The meeting of person with person was analogous to the meeting of person with 
the Eternal Thou. This meeting was representative of Daniel" s (1913) "kingdom of holy 
insecurity" not only of danger and openness but of personal involvement and mutual 
giving. Meeting necessitated trusting that every Thou would eventually become an It, 
no matter how exclusively present the other was in direct relation. The eventual 
transformation of every Thou into an It educated the individual regarding meeting. 
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. . .  i t  t e a c h e s  y o u  t o  m e e t  o t h e r s ,  a n d  t o  h o l d  y o u r  g r o u n d  w h e n  y o u  
meet them. Through the graciousness of its comings and the solemn 
sadness of its goings it leads you away to the Thou in which the parallel 
lines of relations meet. It does not help to sustain you in life, it only 
helps you to glimpse eternity (Buber, in Friedman, 1991, p. 131). 
Traditional epistemology rested on the exclusive reality of the subject-object 
relationship but the 1-Thou philosophy was an entirely other way of knowing. Yet it 
birthed the 1-lt, or subject-object relationship. Buber avoided ways of knowing that 
removed reality into a knowing subject. He found epistemological foundation within the 
concreteness of meeting with the other. 
The meeting of the I with the Thou was a social relationship, clearer than 
Heidegger's "existence is togetherness," or Marcel's understanding knowledge as the 
third-personal object of the dialogue between a first and second person. Confusion of 
the social nature of the 1-Thou with the social nature of the 1-lt, between reality of true 
dialogue and indirect togetherness of ordinary social relations, ignored meeting that took 
place between beings or between beings and things. The fertile meeting between two 
people was a breakthrough from image to being. The silent or spoken dialogue between 
the / and the Thou took place within meeting and through meeting both personality and 
knowledge came into being. The two stages of Buber's insight into the human person 
can be known through meeting. First, the person must be understood in terms of one's 
relationships rather than taken in oneself; second, one was to be understood in terms of 
the direct relation that made persons human. 
239 
The Sphere of It 
The sphere of the It was the other dimension of the gift Buber gave to the world 
through the / and Thou. Modern culture ceded its being to this world resulting in an 
evilness of personal existence in which institutions and feelings were separate localities 
and in which governments and economies were cut off from the spirit and the will to 
enter into relation (Friedman, 1960). The 1-lt was not evil; rather, evil was its mastery 
over the human soul. 
The development of 1-lt as the sphere that regarded others as objects without 
potential for relationship raised an inability within people to live life within spirit. The 
development of the 1-lt was "through the decrease of man's power to enter into relation" 
(Buber, 1958a, p. 37). Because spirit was not within the / but was between the I and the 
Thou, one wishing to enter into relation had to emerge from the between and resist the 
inclination to "bind up the Thou" and leave it free and unmanifest, that is, not to banish 
it to become an object (Buber, 1958a, p. 39). True response before a Thou was silence. 
The person found it easier to respond to the domain of the It. Knowledge, work, 
image, and symbol developed through the response that bound the Thou to the It. Thous 
were reduced to Its, although they maintained the potential to be changed again into 
presentness or Thouness. This fundamental nature was precluded by those who accepted 
the sphere of It by observing rather than looking, by suppressing rather than freeing, and 
by accounting for rather than accepting (Buber, 1958a). 
In knowledge the thing which was seen existed in itself and was exclusively 
present. Only after it was related to other events was it turned into an It and could enter 
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knowledge. It could be left as It, experienced, used, and appropriated to 'find one's 
bearings' in the world (Friedman, 1960, p. 63). 
So too in art; form is disclosed to the artist as he looks at what is over against him. He 
banishes it to a "structure." The nature of this 'structure' is to be freed for a timeless 
moment by the meeting with the man who lifts the ban and clasps the form. But a man 
may simply experience art: see it as qualities, analyse how it is made, and place it in 
the scheme of things. Scientific and aesthetic understanding are not necessary in 
themselves. They are necessary in order that man 'piay do his work with precision and 
plunge it in the truth of relation, which is above the understanding and gathers it up in 
itself (Buber, 1958a, p. 40). 
In addition to silence, the other appropriate response to the Thou was with one's 
life. Because Buber viewed life as teaching, a person's life taught how life could be 
lived in spirit, face to face with the Thou (Friedman, 1960). When an invitation to 
respond with one's life was declined, the result was an attempt to "instead pin the life 
down with information as an It, an object among objects" (Buber, 1958a, p. 42). 
Modern persons learned to suppress life's feelings and concern themselves only with their 
own feelings, with despair that the meaning of feelings would not serve to lead persons 
to more fulfilled lives. 
The sphere of It did not yield life free from feelings; rather, it afforded modern 
people a lack of real public and personal life. This sphere repressed the development of 
true community of people taking their stand in living mutual relation with a living Center 
and only then through being in living mutual relation with each other (Friedman, 1960). 
Buber knew true marriage as the honest revelation of each's Thou to the other's and he 
reiterated that true community must parallel mutual honesty and disclosure. In 
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community as in the individual life, evil did not stem from the I-lt; rather, it developed 
from its superiority. In both communal and individual life the 1-lt was requisite for 
existence. 
Man's will to profit and to be powerful have their natural and proper 
effect so long as they are linked with, and upheld by, his will to enter into 
relation. There is no evil impulse till the impulse has been separated from 
the being; the impulse which is bound up with, and defined by, the being 
is the living stuff of communal life, that which is detached is its 
disintegration. Economics, the abode of the will to profit, and State, the 
abode of the will to be powerful, share in life as long as they share in the 
spirit (Buber, 1958a, p. 48). 
Balanced with the sphere of the 1-lt was the 1-Thou and only "he who knows relation and 
knows about the presence of the Thou is capable of decision. He who decides is free, 
for he has approached the Face. . . . Two alternatives are set side by side ..." (Buber, 
1958a, p. 51). 
The mediating influence was balance that a person exerted over the redemption 
of evil through using the evil impulse to serve good. One's life alternated between Thou 
and It and one could accomplish redemption by knowing both spheres. One recognized 
the spirit's response as re-kindled over and over by raising the divine spark within 
another. One's freedom to do evil through the sphere of the It enabled each to redeem 
evil as a free and creative being. 
Individuality was the I of the I-lt and enabled the person to become conscious of 
oneself as the subject of experiencing and using (Friedman, 1960). It was concerned 
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with its analogous "my," as in my kind, my race, my creation, and my genius. Because 
it had no sharing and it appropriated unto itself, it had no reality. "Person," 
alternatively, was the I of the 1-Thou and made its appearance by entering into relation. 
A person shared in a reality through relation which was neither within one's possession 
nor existed externally. Reality could be shared and was immune from appropriation. 
The more direct communication with the Thou, the fuller was the potential for sharing; 
and the fuller the sharing, the more real one's I (Buber, 1958a, p. 62). The Thou struck 
inward when it was not expressed outwardly in relation and the person confronted what 
was over against the self. This experience was not one of relation but was one of self-
contradiction. A person sought to comprehend the world and to eliminate the dread 
associated with the meeting one wished to avoid. "And because he dares not meet the 
Thou in the casual moments of his daily life, he builds for himself a cataclysmic reversal, 
a way of dread and despair. It is through this way at last that he must go to confront the 
Eternal Thou" (Friedman, 1960, p. 69). 
The Eternal Thou 
Real relation was not an exclusive phenomenon; rather, while such relation lasted, 
the "Thou stepped forth free and single and confronted one" (Friedman, 1991, p. 137). 
Only the relationship with the Eternal Thou was both exclusive and inclusive; it was also 
elusive. The Eternal Thou was met with each particular Thou, but it could not be 
"found" within any one of them because the Eternal Thou was the sole aspect of 
relationship that could never become an It, not because of some universal or all-
encompassing essential nature of a Thou but because it could not become an It as it was 
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the present reality, eternally Thou, the ever-renewed presentness of meeting. Because 
it was the bond of the absolute with the concrete, the Eternal Thou was never universal 
in its address. To discover the Eternal Thou, the person faced the dilemma that 
[i]f you explore the life of things and of conditioned being you come to 
the unfathomable, if you deny the life of things and of conditioned being 
you stand before nothingness, if you hallow this life you meet the living 
God (Buber, in Friedman, 1991, p. 137). 
Karl Barth described God as the "wholly Other," but for Buber, God was the 
wholly Same as well as the wholly Present. Rudolf Otto coined the term mysterium 
tremendum that appeared and overthrew, but for Buber, God was also the mystery of the 
self-evident, nearer to me than my /. Buber's was an all-embracing relation in which 
potential was still actual being, the only Thou that by its nature never ceased to be Thou 
for us (Friedman, 1991). 
One's ability to stand free of dialogical will limited the person's ability to enter 
into relationship with the Eternal Thou. Acknowledging that there was meaning in the 
world, such a free person engaged in summoning and sending that was revelation. No 
one who was concerned with God could enter into relationship; rather, meeting God 
enabled one to confirm that there was meaning in the world. Kierkegaard believed 
relationship with God took place only when the person was freed from relationship with 
fellow beings. Buber responded that 
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[w]e can dedicate to God not merely our persons but also our relations to 
one another. The person who turns to him therefore need not turn away 
from any other l-Thou relation; but he properly brings them to him, and 
lets them be fulfilled 'in the face of God' (Friedman, 1991, p. 138). 
Buber warned that God could neither be located in the transcendence beyond things nor 
in the immanence within things and then sought and found. Seeking God was "foolish" 
because "there is nothing in which He could not be found" (Buber, 1958a, p. 80). 
Buber compared meeting the Eternal Thou to Tao philosophy. Similar to the Tao, 
God could not be inferred in anything, but unlike the Tao, God could be met and 
addressed. "God is the Being that is directly, most nearly, and lastingly over against us, 
that may properly only be addressed, not expressed" (Buber, 1958a, p. 80). Discovery 
of God was similar to discovery of primal origin. 
Buber agreed with Heschel that God needed people as people needed God. 
Because the person co-created with God, the 1-Eternal Thou relationship expressed the 
meaning of life. If humanity were merely dependent, there would be no meaning to life 
or to the world (Friedman, 1960). Buber commented 
[y]ou know in your heart that you need God more than everything; but do 
you not know too that God needs you-in the fullness of His eternity needs 
you? . . . You need God, in order to be—and God needs you, for the very 
meaning of your life (Buber, 1958a, p. 82). 
There was no condition Buber could imagine that would separate a person from 
God forever. Although the world was not entirely represented in microcosm in an 
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individual, neither was a person entirely included within the extrapolation of the world. 
What mattered was how any person affected one's bearing of soul to grow to a real and 
actualized life that could, in turn, open one to act upon the world. This was not a 
mysterious encounter that united the mystic with God. The nature of the 1-Eternal Thou 
relationship was that it did not relieve either party of responsibility. Buber criticized 
mystic as a valueless attempt to abandon one's responsibility to the sphere of It as the 
world of conscious aims and purposes supported by a collection of means, such as 
spiritual exercises, abstinence, and recollection (Friedman, 1960). He hallowed the 
"phenomenon of the brink," the central reality of the almost-magical yet repetitive 
everyday hour on earth," with a streak of sun on a maple twig and the glimpse of the 
Eternal Thou" (Buber, 1958a, p. 87). A sacred aspect of the spirit of the I-Thou was the 
Refusal to allow the mundane to slip into It-ness. 
Explaining how the human person could experience loneliness with the ever-
presence of the Eternal Thou was not attributed to God's absence; rather, it stemmed 
from "it is we who are not always there" (Buber, 1958a, p. 98). This theme was re­
written after the Holocaust to account for the radical evil within a cosmos inhabited by 
the Eternal Thou. Human nature relied so heavily upon visual images that we were 
compelled to bring the Eternal Thou into speakable language and draw It into the world 
of being. True relationship recognized the Eternal Thou as a privilege in which the spirit 
penetrated and transformed the sphere of It. Without the ever-present spirit, there was 
no Thou. 
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Buber was fascinated with the spirit behind the representations of God from the 
world's many religions. He hallowed the name of Christ as address, not as a theological 
proposition that only in this form can one meet God. Inclusive rather than exclusive, 
Buber refused to sanctify any name for God or spirit that eliminated any person or 
community from relationship. He believed that Jesus the man and Jesus the Jew stood 
in unmediated relationship with God; however, he did not believe that Jesus was any 
longer identical with the Christ of the Christian faith who people worshipped as the 
Savior (Friedman, 1991). He recognized Jesus's singular relationship with God, yet 
positioned Jesus on the side of humanity within this relationship, not on the side of God 
(Buber, 1961). 
Buber chose Jesus as his illustration for the individual person's relation to the 
Eternal Thou. 
How powerful, even to being overpowering, and how legitimate, even to 
being self-evident, is the saying of I by Jesus! For it is the I of 
unconditional relation in which the man calls his Thou Father in such a 
way that he himself is simply son, and nothing else but Son (Friedman, 
1991, p. 140). 
He did not recognize Jesus as God but as man, and positioned Jesus on humanity's side 
of the dialogue. Jesus's uniqueness was not found within his being inseparable from 
God; rather, it was in immediacy that Jesus, even within this separation, used to foster 
a soundness of relation. The locus of Jesus's uniqueness was a power within him that 
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Buber recognized as a strength, an immediacy, an unconditionality of the between 
(Friedman, 1991). 
Although Buber recognized Jesus as a unique facet of the 1-Eternal Thou 
relationship and regarded Jesus as a man and as a Jew, he viewed organized Christianity 
as a distortion of the hallowed between and as an uncreative response of what was not 
Judaism. This mixture of "rites and dogmas" was not a religion with which we "as 
Jews and and as human beings" wished to establish a rapprochement (Friedman, 1991, 
p. 141). 
Facing Jesus squarely and reconstructing his role as a divine partner on 
humanity's side marked Buber's interpretation of the appropriate response to the multi­
dimensional position of the Eternal Thou that could transcend organized religion. Buber 
placed the Eternal Thou within an unbroken world that assured humankind that no 
relation could ever fall into complete Manichaean duality. Buber maintained the human 
soul's inability to lapse into duality and held that evil could never become radically real 
and absolute. Friedman warned that 
without this limit to the reality of evil we would have no assurance that 
1-It can become 1-Thou, that men and cultures can turn back to God in the 
fundamental act of reversal, the teshuvah. Without this limit, the world 
of It would be evil in itself and incapable of being redeemed (Friedman, 
1960, p. 73). 
We learned from the radical evil inflicted upon the world during the nazi terror 
in Europe that the reality of evil overtook the ever-present potential for dialogue and 
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meeting between the human soul and the Eternal Thou in real relation. We know that 
the Holocaust precluded a means for even the most repentent Jew incarcerated in a death 
camp in full teshuvah to return to God. We heard the silence of the Eternal Thou on the 
gallows of Auschwitz when limitless evil appeared and the sphere of the It eclipsed all 
potential for Thou-ness. The omnipresent Thou was limited by radical evil's permeation 
of humanity's world. 
Anticipating questions of evil, Buber wrote that the world, when it was immersed 
in situations that made it appear not to be a world, was a 
double movement, of estrangement from the primal Source, in virtue of 
which the universe is sustained in the process of becoming, and of turning 
toward the primal Source, in virtue of which the universe is released in 
being. . . . Both parts of this movement develop, fraught with destiny, in 
time, and are compassed by grace in the timeless creation that is, 
incomprehensibly, at once emancipation and preservation, release and 
binding. Our knowledge of twofold nature is silent before the paradox of 
the primal mystery (Buber, 1958a, p. 100). 
Twofold movement was Buber's symbol for his tripartite 1-Thou philosophy. The first 
aspect was the alternation between human states of 1-Thou and 1-lt. Second, it expressed 
the alternation between the summons from signs or ciphers, or approaching meeting with 
the Eternal Thou, and the sending, or taking responsibility and going forth from that holy 
meeting to the world and making that world sacred. 
The third alternation was between revelation, in which relation took place ever 
anew and flowed into cultural and religious forms, and the turning {teshuvah), in which 
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people turned from the dogmatic forms of organized religion to direct, personal, and holy 
meeting with the Eternal Thou (Friedman, 1960). 
Describing evil as the temporary primacy of the 1-It over the I-Thou, Buber 
decried humanity's estrangement from the primal Source and the good. He warned that 
if the estrangement became too great, the world was destined to permanent alienation 
from the Thou when the sphere of It overtook and entered the world of Thou. The evil 
urge which existed by nature within every human soul and should have been used to 
redeem the good, would lack Godly direction. 
Should this penetration take too strong a hold on the individual soul, it would 
cause the dissolution of the relational act with the three spheres it could address: our 
lives with nature, our lives with other people, and our lives with "intelligible essences," 
our dialogue with the Eternal Thou. Without relation with the Eternal Thou, no one 
could enter into relation with the Thous of this world. 
Does the temporary primacy of the It and its absolute permeation into the world 
of people suffice to explain the evil of the Holocaust? How did the evil inflicted by one 
group onto others step so firmly in between the oppressed and their relationship with the 
Eternal Thoul 
Dimensions of Evil 
What Is Man? 
Understanding Buber's response to "What is man?" necessitates knowing the 
multi-dimensional nature of his anthropology. Buber was interested in Hasidism, 
Judaism, Zionism, religious socialism, education, community, sociology, psychology, 
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art, philsophical anthropology, and Eastern religions. This wide knowledge generated 
consideration of the person's nature that transcended single-dimensional thought. Buber 
wrote that he considered his early work merely a stepping stone to his later thought and 
it was always in process. Man must be regarded in wholeness. Buber rejected singular 
philosophical answers to the primary question in a philosophical-anthropological 
consideration of what he considered to be the human dilemma. He believed that 
philosophy often objectified or dehumanized the individual and disregarded the soul's 
potential. Utimately he rejected it as the answer to the primary question. Buber believed 
that this would reach a conclusion of false unity rather than produce a genuine wholeness 
with essential consideration of its manifold nature. 
Philosophical anthropology is the "narrow ridge" concept synonymous with 
Buber's work. The narrow ridge enabled finding one essence of man within the 
constantly moving flux of individuals and cultures by avoiding abstract notions of unity 
and its opposite, meaningless relativity. Man traversed the narrow ridge through 
participation in both finitude and infinity. As a being who trod the tightrope, man was 
the only creature with possibility. Through self-reflection on freedom of choice, man's 
actions were unforeseeable in character and magnitude. Man's potentiality was the 
feature Buber recognized as enabling discussion of the freedom of man and the reality 
of evil. 
Man could not be regarded uni-dimensionally. Buber wrote that 
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[t]he depth of the anthropological question is first touched when we also 
recognize as specifically human that which is not reason. Man is not a 
centaur, he is man through and through. He can be understood only when 
one knows, on the one hand, that there is something in all that is human, 
including thought, which belongs to the general nature of living creatures, 
and is to be grasped from this nature, while knowing, on the other hand, 
that there is no human quality which belongs fully to the general nature 
of living creatures and is to be grasped exclusively from it. Even man's 
hunger is not an animal's hunger. Human reason is to be understood only 
in connexion with human non-reason. The problem of philosophical 
anthropology is the problem of a specific totality and of its specific 
structure (Buber, 1965a, p. 160). 
Buber understood man not only through philosophical anthropology but also 
through the concepts of distance and relation. 
Distance and Relation 
Buber regarded human life as adhering to the on-going and interactive twofold 
principle of distance and relation. Primal human movement was the spiritual setting at 
a distance which presupposed the second movement of entering into I-Thou relation. We 
can enter into relation only with that which had been set at a distance from ourselves. 
Distancing caused the object to assume the role of becoming an independent opposite 
from ourselves. Only man could perform the act of setting at a distance because only 
man had a world that was an unbroken continuum which included both what man knew 
and experienced and what was knowable now and in the future. Buber compared this 
possibility with the natural and animal world when he described a beaver's dam as 
existing and extending within a time-realm, a planted tree within the world of time, and 
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the one who planted the first tree as the man who expected the Messiah (Friedman, 
1960). 
Entering into relation was a synthesizing and apperception of a being as a whole 
and as a unity. Responding to "What is Man?" within wholeness required man's 
regarding others within the parameter of unity and was achieveable only when one 
regarded the world as whole world. Only then could man grasp being as wholeness and 
unity. One could not accomplish this by setting another at a distance but by entering into 
relation. Buber wrote that 
[o]nly the view of what is over against me in the world in its full 
presence, with which I have set myself, present in my whole person, in 
relation—only this view gives me the world truly as whole and one. . . . 
The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man (Buber, 1965a, 
p. 203). 
Distance and relation did not cause each other. Distance made room for relation, but 
relation did not necessarily follow. Direction enabled entering into relation. Direction 
was an on-going theme in Buber's writings and he struggled with its meaning. He was 
concerned with direction in the first dialogue of Daniel, and considered it as containing 
passion. Combining passion and direction enabled man's turning toward God with the 
evil urge's strength, and it influenced Buber's existential idea of direction as one's 
"unique path to God, through which one fulfills the task to which one is called in one's 
creation" (Friedman, 1991, p. 69). Although direction was neither destiny nor 
predestination, it was discovered through one's openness to the ever-changing situation 
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that we encountered. Consequently, once one set another at a primal distance, one's 
ability to enter into relation was related to both the holy insecurity of the present concrete 
experience and to inclusion. Direction was not a goal to exclude portions of a lived life; 
rather, it was individual pointing. Buber wrote, "[i]t does not know where north is; 
rather its north is there where it points" (Friedman, 1991, p. 69). 
Mutual interaction and cooperation of distance and relation underlaid the spirit's 
struggle in which personal acts of distance vied with personal acts of relation to show 
how man was possible and how he was to be realized. Distance provided the human 
situation and relation provided one's becoming in that situation (Buber, 1965a). Because 
man was the one animal for whom it was not enough simply to use and possess things, 
he had the power to enter into relation with things in order to ascertain his relation to 
them. The origin of art could be found within the sphere of man's relation to things. 
Art could no longer be recognized as an impression of natural objectivity nor could it be 
only the expression of spiritual subjectivity. Within distance and relation and the space 
of the between, art became the witness of the relation between the human substance and 
the substance of things (Buber, 1965a). 
A r t  . . .  i s  t h e  r e a l m  o f  ' b e t w e e n '  w h i c h  h a s  b e c o m e  a  f o r m .  C o n s i d e r  
great nude sculptures of the ages: none of them is to be understood 
properly either from the givenness of the human body or from the will to 
expression of an inner state, but solely from the relational event which 
takes place between two entities which have gone apart from one another, 
the withdrawn 'body' and the withdrawing 'soul' (Buber, 1965a, pp. 9-
10). 
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Human societies illustrated the twofold nature of life expressed as distance and 
relation. Unlike the animal world, human societies confirmed each other and were 
defined as human to the extent mutual confirmation took place (Friedman, 1960). 
Individuals completed each others' functions throughout humanity's dominion over the 
earth. By ascribing to others an existence beyond one's own reality, one was able to 
enter into relation individually with those like oneself. Buber discussed Marx's reliance 
on collectivism rather than on individualism in the question "what is man?" "Modern 
collectivism is the last barrier raised by man against a meeting with himself" (Buber, 
1965a, p. 201). Man's face was masked in collectivism and the real person was taken 
over by illusion. Man cannot relate to an image; rather, his inability to relate suppresses 
relationship. Suppression intensified solitude and rose secretly within man to a cruel 
level which forced illusion to scatter and man to retreat from meeting. We were unable 
to address each other when the other took on the group's illusion. 
Man confirmed the other through speech. Although animals may have called to 
one another, only man spoke to others as independent objects which he had set at a 
distance. One chose to set the other in independence so that the other might come to life 
and engage the one in conversation. Unless the conversation developed into true 
dialogue, the process of speaking was perverted. Genuine conversation necessitated 
one's acceptance of otherness, confirmation, affirmation, and negation of influencing the 
other through imposition of one's will. Sharing relationship with another's individuality 
was an objective of relationship and could be enjoyed only when one ceased one's desire 
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to move over and beyond the other in an effort to rob the other of him distance or to 
convert him into an object, an It and manipulate her. 
Entering into relation with another and enjoying his particularity meant that one 
had to make the other wholly present which required that one had to imagine the real for 
the other, "to imagine quite concretely what another man is wishing, feeling, perceiving, 
and thinking" (Friedman, 1960, p. 82). One could wish what other wished, feel what 
the other felt, and think what the other thought. By making another present, one 
occupied the real space of the between without trying to rob the other's distance or 
particularity. 
Ontological completion of imagining the real for the other and making the other 
wholly present did not take place until the other knew oneself to be made wholly present 
and caused the process of one's own self-becoming. Man, unlike other animals, needed 
to have his own presence in the being of the other. 
Sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of the 
solitary category, surrounded by the air of a chaos which came into being 
with him, secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him 
to be and which can come to him only from one human person to another 
(Buber, 1951, p. 8). 
The failure of man to enter into relation due to a thickening or objectification of the 
primal distance corresponded to an I-lt relation. 
Distance presupposed both 1-Thou and 1-lt relationships. Entering into relation 
was an act requiring one's physical and spiritual being and it became Buber's recognition 
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of the act by which we constituted ourselves as human. Relating was never static; rather, 
it must be repeated over and over again in new concrete situations that confront people 
during their lives. Distance was not an act and neither was failure to enter into relation. 
Both distance and relation were states of a human's being. Failure to assume the state 
of being that presupposed an ability to enter into relation set humanity on the course 
sliding into evil. 
The Nature of Evil 
The philosophy of dialogue was Buber's response to the questions of the nature 
of man and the problem of evil. If entering into relation was the state of being that 
defined man as man, then failure to enter into relation was man's becoming evil. Failure 
to enter into relation was non-existence and Buber offered the eternal hope that the re-
establishment of relation would redeem evil and re-create authentic human existence. 
The problems of evil and of man merged into one within relation as the fundamental 
reality of man's life (Friedman, 1960). 
Buber could not imagine a person without the power of both the evil and good 
urges and believed that together they formed the body of the world. People required the 
energy that only an evil urge could supply in their re-creation of the world in partnership 
with God. Making the broken world whole was accomplished only with both of the 
creative urges that empowered people to make decisions and break through solitude so 
that they may "time and again participate in the redemption of the world" (Kohn, 1930, 
p. 308). The point of attack against evil could not be an external struggle; rather, it must 
257 
stem from what the individual knows from self-reflection into his unique personal 
experience. 
Evil had an external character in addition to its origins within the human being's 
innermost person. This external character was not an ontology of evil. 
What we call 'evil' is not merely in man; it is in the world as the bad; it 
is the uncleanness of creation. But this uncleanness is not a nature, not 
an existent property of things. It is only its not standing firm, not finding 
direction, not deciding (Buber, 1966, p. 134). 
He denied those who claimed evil emanated from a divine power and he disavowed the 
view of history as a struggle between the powers of good and evil in which man's 
security came from the idea that the power of good would finally overcome and redeem 
evil. He quoted the prophet who said "like light and darkness, so good and evil have 
been created by God Himself. No uncreated power stands in opposition to Him" (Buber, 
1966, p. 134). 
Finding evil required recognizing that it began within the one's innermost being. 
Buber repudiated the impression that one met evil when one met another person. He 
held that "I experience it [evil] when I meet myself" (Buber, 1945, p. 57). When the 
person met evil within one's self through self-reflection begun in solitude and cosmic 
alienation, the person recognized his condition as spiritually lacking in that such a person 
was devoid of possibility and was rendered incapable of entering into relation. 
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The frustration was that a person was temporarily denied regaining what had been 
lost. Compounding this frustration was the admonition that only through creative 
composition of the good and evil urges could one reaffirm what had been lost. This 
opposition was peculiar to humankind because it could be perceived only introspectively 
(Friedman, 1960). 
Only the most aware individuals knew what evil was insofar as they knew 
themselves. When people labelled others as evil, they engaged in mirrored illusion and 
in intensifying the self-contained evil they could not yet recognize (Buber, 1952c). Buber 
offered an important condition of evil in that although evil was rebellion against God 
with the very power He had given humanity to serve Him, good was the turning back 
toward God with this same power (Buber, 1952c). People could redeem evil with their 
powers of both good and evil that were granted them by the Eternal Thou from whom 
they had temporarily strayed. 
Because evil was the state of being in which the 1-lt predominated, good was the 
meeting of person with the Thou, and good was realized when the 1-lt was fully 
penetrated by the 1-Thou. Good and evil were eternally bound together. Good and evil 
could not be opposites; rather, good was the movement with the direction of home and 
evil was the aimless "whirl of human potentialities without which nothing can be 
achieved and by which, if they take no direction but remain trapped in themselves, 
everything goes awry" (Buber, 1965a, p. 78). 
Good and evil were no longer ethical abstractions. They achieved ontology within 
the philosophy of dialogue. 
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Conscience and Guilt 
Buber studied psychology, conscience, psychotherapy, and ethics and wrote of 
conscience as the existential voice which called a person to fulfill the personal intention 
for which one was created (Friedman, 1960). Conscience implied both dialogue and 
direction; dialogue with an 'other' than the person was now and which gave the person 
a hint of what that person was meant to be, and direction emanating from the dialogue 
and sending the person on the path the person was meant to take. The problematic for 
humankind was that people learned to suppress the consciousness that allowed this 
individual purpose to be known. When unrepressed, the inner voice expressed itsel and, 
one realized what one was specifically called to become. Now the person could 
distinguish between right and wrong and through comparison of them, one knew guilt. 
Each one who knows himself ... as called to a work which he has not 
done, each one who has not fulfilled a task which he knows to be his own, 
each who did not remain faithful to his vocation which he had become 
certain of —each such person knows what it means to say that 'his 
conscience smites him' (Buber, 1952b, p. 115). 
Guilt overwhelmed people when they recognized through conscience that they had 
not taken the direction toward God. Taking the divine direction involved entering into 
relation with the Thous of this world and then with the Eternal Thou. Original guilt was 
not a fall within a state of paradise; rather, it consisted of remaining in oneself and 
denying the opportunity to enter into the relations of the world. "If the being before 
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whom this hour places one is not met with the truth of one's whole life, then one is 
guilty" (Friedman, 1960, p. 104). 
Buber's guilt was not the same as Heidegger's in that Heidegger defined guilt as 
expressed "in the fact that the existence itself its guilty. Existence is 'guilty in the 
ground of its being'" (Buber, 1965a, p. 165). Buber agreed so far as he believed a 
primal guilt could be discovered, but he would not isolate a part of life from the spiritual 
whole in order to discern primal guilt. Instead, he argued that discovery of this primal 
guilt involved "becoming aware of the whole life without reduction, the life in which the 
individual, in fact, [was] essentially related to something other than himself (Buber, 
1965a, p. 165). Although one discovered evil first in the meeting with oneself, one 
perceived guilt only in relation with something or someone other than oneself. 
Psychology of inhibitions, repressions, and moral censorship could not explain 
evil within a person. Buber dismissed these attempts as social conventions or as 
responses to psychotherapists who sought to reduce what was behind experience in order 
to explain evil. He responded to the question of evil with philosophical anthropology that 
demanded participation in human experience and gaining distance necessary for objective 
knowledge. His "business [was] to call to mind an occurrence as reliably, concretely and 
completely remembered as possible, which [was] entirely unreduced and undissected" 
(Buber, 1952c, p. 63). Believing that the human state of evil could be differentiated 
from every other spiritual state of the soul, Buber inquired of evil's existence as 
ontological reality through investigations of the Bible, mystical interpretation, and 
mythology. 
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Mythology and the First Stage of Evil 
Buber was troubled and fascinated by Berdyaeff's challenge of the impossibility 
of solving the problem of evil in a world created by a good God. Buber investigated the 
Hebrew Bible and Avestic mythology to develop a response that transcended 
anthropological considerations. Based on Plato's description that truths could be 
communicated adequately to the generality of mankind only in myth, Buber illustrated 
the way in which myths repeatedly materialized Conceptual descriptions were bridges 
between myth and reality and Buber believed that construction of bridges was 
indispensable. 
Man knows of chaos and creation in the cosmogonic myth and he learns 
that chaos and creation take place in himself, but he does not see the 
former and the latter together; he listens to the myth . . . and hushes it up 
in his own life. He needs the bridge (Buber, 1952c, p. 66). 
Mythology of evil was embedded in Hebrew and Avestic myths without having 
been significantly altered by conceptual form. Their strength was in interpretation which 
told of the human constitution, the nature of evil's movement, and evil's relation to good. 
We achieved correct interpretation only if we attributed personal experiences of evil to 
such acts and Buber warned that only the conjunction of the primordial mythic intuition 
and directly experienced reality could render legitimate concepts. These concepts were 
illustrations of the indispensible bridge with which he introduced his discussion of evil. 
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The Western interpretation of evil centered on Biblical events surrounding the 
'fall' from paradise in Genesis 3:2-24. Combining a new Hebrew interpretation with 
Christian re-interpretation of the Greek and Latin translations of scripture, Buber 
recognized "the story that has been written down and preserved for us has acquired a 
very different meaning." He discovered the biblical account of the "so-called" fall of 
man might have been founded on a "primeval myth of the envy and vengeance of gods" 
(Buber, 1953, p. 67). Especially significant was Buber's insight that the name used to 
address God at this Biblical point was alien to the remainder of the scriptures and was 
therefore an appellation which did not serve as authentic address. 
Buber was concerned with the transgression committed by Adam and Eve. Both 
beings were created after God prohibited the eating of the miraculous fruit; however, 
God never imposed His will upon them. Instead, God treated His creations without 
compulsion but with commandments. Both man and woman were granted by God the 
power to refuse. Buber tied their disobedience to the commandment not as a decision 
between good and evil, but as "pre-evil," as something other, and its otherness was 
significant to his later discussion of evil. 
The second pont in Buber's interpretation of Biblical mythology was the dialogue 
between Adam, Eve, and the serpent. The serpent appeared to be more aware than it 
alluded to, and Eve, recognizing the importance of the conversation, added new 
prohibitions that God had not originally included. When the serpent added more 
restrictions and specified the consequence of "... you shall not eat of it or touch it or 
else you must die ..." (Tanakh, 1985, p. 6, italics added), Buber interpreted that the 
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serpent knew the two human beings would plunge into human mortality and would 
achieve knowledge that death would eventually come. Bubcr concluded that knowledge 
was not a punishment; rather, knowledge that death will eventually come was not 
retribution but was a reward in that humanity recognized their own deaths would 
inevitably free them from the boundaries of the physical world. People could open 
themselves to their participation in eternal redemption. Knowledge of impending death 
served to soothe man's spirit, reduce metaphysical alienation, and reaffirm cosmic 
security. 
Buber believed that the scene in Eden took place within a mythical, dreamlike 
contemplation. Eve plucked the fruit, ate it, and shared it with Adam while within this 
state. Her actions took place within "dream-lassitude" and her movements were caused 
by "dream-longing," indicating that the entire incident was "spun out of play and dream; 
it is irony, a mysterious irony of the narrator, that spins it," The finality of the episode 
was "apparent: the two do know not what they do, more than this, they can only do it, 
they cannot know it" (Buber, 1953, p. 69). The mythology was similar to the choices 
* made in Avestic Iranian myth that set the course for subsequent choices made by 
humankind. 
Eating the miraculous fruit gave people knowledge. This kind of knowledge 
indicated a qualitative difference between the way God knew and the way people knew. 
Eating the fruit was not Eve and Adam's attempt to gain worldly knowledge; rather, they 
tried to become-like-God. The knowledge of good and evil endowed humanity with 
moral consciousness, the god-like attribute preceeding immortality. This was more than 
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cognition-in-the-world because it could have propelled man and woman to a higher plane 
than that of other beings. Their expulsion from paradise was the divine response to the 
human quest for immortal life. Although humanity was granted moral consciousness, 
they could not achieve immortality because, not being divine themselves, human beings 
would perceive immortality within an imperfect world as punishment rather than as 
reward. Knowing that death approached offered solace to those who re-created the world 
with God. "For man as a 'living soul' known death is the threatening boundary; for him 
as the being driven round amidst opposites it may become a haven, the knowledge of 
which brings comfort" (Buber, 1953, p. 79). 
Buber wrote that knowledge of good and evil maintained another dimension of the 
cognizance of opposites (Buber, 1952c). The dualism of good and evil encompassed all 
the fortune and misfortune or order and disorder which people experienced, as well as 
that which they caused. Similar to Avestic texts, the Biblical description of 
theknowledge of good and evil produced an "adequate awareness of the opposites 
inherent in all being within the world, and that, from the viewpoint of the Biblical 
creation-belief, means: adequate awareness of the opposites latent in creation" (Buber, 
1953, p. 74). 
Underlying Buber's interpretation of creation and expulsion mythology was the 
peculiar ancient Hebrew theology and anthropology. These beliefs were of an immutable 
difference and distance between God and people, even though the person was created in 
the image of God or experienced a particular nearness to Him. God's knowledge was 
primordial whereas humanity's was a magical attainment. God encompassed humanity 
yet remained untouched by them. Both familiar and superior to humanity, God was 
capable of dialogue. Humanity's function in this relationship was to become the opposite 
pole of the world's being. God was above all opposites, including good and evil, and 
granted humanity only some of that knowledge by virtue of their share in the work of 
creation. 
People's knowledge was of an essentially different kind than God's. Humankind 
was denied the "superior-familiar encompassing of opposites" (Buber, 1953, p. 75) even 
though they were created in God's likeness because they were capable of begetting and 
giving birth but not of Godly creating. The nature of Hebrew mythological evil consisted 
in its tangibility within the dualism of the yes-position and the no-position of existence. 
The dualism could enter into a person's cognizance; however, within the person's 
boundaries the two positions could never coexist in time. Humankind knew evil as the 
opposite of good only within their situation in it, one they recognized when they found 
themselves transgressing God's commands. Humanity continued the eternal struggle 
because they recognized what had been lost, its temporary inaccessibility, and their 
potential to reclaim it. The process of the human soul's reclamation was in the world 
through recognition of oppositeness, "the opposites which [were] always latently present 
in creation [broke] out into actual reality, they [became] existent (Buber, 1953, p. 76). 
Buber interpreted Biblical myths, the story of Cain, and the Flood in his 
development of the nature of evil. In comparison to Zoroastrian mythology, he formed 
"two fundamentally different kinds and stages of evil" (Buber, 1952c, pp. 11-12). In 
murdering Abel, Cain acted in similar dream-like trance to Adam and Eve's eating the 
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prohibited fruit and did not decide to kill Abel. There was no knowledge of death or 
killing at that point in creation. Within omnipossibility, Cain found himself not in a 
situation in which he recognized that the good was temporarily inaccessible to him; 
rather, his indecision intensified. "In the vortex of indecision ... at the point of the 
greatest provocation and least resistance" Cain stuck out in order to overcome the tension 
of omnipossibility. ... He does not murder, he has murdered" (Buber, 1953, pp. 89). 
Cain's was an attempt to make incarnate a reality that was "no longer divine, but 
his, his capriciously constructed, indestinate reality" (Buber, 1953, p. 89). There were 
two temptations that were not withstood: Adam and Eve's encounter with the Tree of 
Knowledge, and God's disregard of Cain's offering which became the impetus for his 
brother's murder. The "uncanny" Biblical commandment was God's ordering Abraham 
to sacrifice his son, Isaac. In each instance God entered into direct conversation with 
men who were at those moments inflamed with wrath, whose "countenances had fallen" 
or "sunken," or who were "corrupt" (Buber, 1953, pp. 85-86). These were examples 
of a divine being's direct appeal for His creatures to decide for the good themselves and 
to set out individually with responsibility in divine direction. 
Choosing the direction of good revealed the two stages of evil. The first stage 
existed within the human soul as static opposition reminiscent of the Avestic opposition 
of "goodness of mind" and "badness of mind," a distinction between a state of the soul 
in which it purposed good and one in which it did not, "not between a good and an 
ungood 'disposition,' but between a disposition to good and its absence." The second 
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stage was less a struggle and more a lack of Godly direction and was known as the 
"chamber of the soul at whose entrance we encounter the demon" (Buber, 1953, p. 87). 
The flood myth illustrated human movement toward the second stage of evil. 
Within myth, wickedness was not derived from the soul's corruption; rather, it stemmed 
from the intervention of evil 'imagery.' "This imagery [was] a play with possibility, a 
self-temptation, from which ever and again violence springs" (Buber, 1952c, p. 36). 
Imagery encouraged beings to recognize what could be rather than what was, and through 
its intervention people embarked on a fabricated reality of what could be and made it into 
actual reality. 
Imagination was not evil. Although it was one's greatest danger, it remained 
one's greatest possibility. The decision of imagination's power was in its direction and 
its power which could be left either undirected or directed toward the good. Buber 
described the two urges of humanity in imagery as the yetzer rah [evil urge] as analogous 
to the nature of imagery of the human heart that corresponded to passion, a power 
peculiar to people, "without which he can neither beget nor bring forth, but which, left 
to itself, remains without direction and leads astray" (Buber, 1952c, p. 39). 
Anthopological man recognized possibility during a time of his evolution 
corresponding to puberty. Similar to an adolescent caught in the grip of whirling 
potentiality, anthropological man's recognition of possibility took the form of viable 
actions which threatened to "submerge him in their swirling chaos" (Friedman, 1960, p. 
106). Human path demanded escape from its torment and the soul set out on the arduous 
task of forcing itself toward unity or, if could not, it clutched at any object past which 
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one's vortex happened to carry it, and wrapped all one's passions upon its safety. In the 
second case, "it exchanges an undirected possibility for an undirected reality, in which 
it does what it wills not to do what is preposterous to it, the alien, the 'evil'" (Buber, 
1953, pp. 67-68). 
Lack of direction was characteristic of the vortex revolving about a tortured soul. 
The soul, having perceived no ready or easy means of escape, strived toward unity. The 
first stage of evil offered two choices: it could cast its passions upon any object that 
appeared, or it could set about the work of self-unification. In the first case, the soul 
exchanged undirected possibility for undirected reality. If it were successful, the soul 
recognized direction, "or rather the direction ... for in this strict sense there is only 
one" (Buber, 1953, p. 68). When the soul achieved unification, it became aware of its 
direction in the service of good. 
The process renewed itself as the person experienced temptations which threatened 
to overcome the soul's tenuous power. "Again and again innate grace arises from out 
of its depths and promises the utterly incredible: you can become whole and one" 
(Buber, 1953, pp. 68-69). The vortex of chaos eternally reappeared and the soul had to 
choose its meticulous path through recognition of primal direction. If the soul were 
incapable of choosing and suppressed true direction, one set out upon "no path, pseudo-
decision which is indecision, flight into delusion and ultimately into mania ..." (Buber, 
1953, p. 69). 
The nature of evil within the first stage was defined by direction and unification. 
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Evil cannot be done with the whole soul; good can only be done with the 
whole soul. It is done when the soul's rapture, proceeding from its 
highest forces, seizes upon all the forces and plunges them into the 
purging and transmuting fire, as into the mightiness of decision. Evil is 
lack of direction and that which is done in it and out of it as the grasping, 
seizing, devouring, compelling, seducing, exploiting, humiliating, 
torturing and destroying of what offers itself. Good is direction and what 
is done in it; that which is done in it is done with the whole soul, so that 
in fact all the vigour and passion with which evil might have been done 
is included in it (Buber, 1953, pp. 71-72). 
Mythology of the Second Stage of Evil 
Zoroastrian mythology of the Avesta and post-Avestic literature were the basis 
for evil's second stage. The hymns of Zoroaster termed the deity's primal act as one of 
decision within himself which allowed humanity's ability to self-choose good and evil. 
Similar to how humanity was confronted by the need to choose between deception and 
truth and deciding between them, the primal spirits stood between the god-head and 
people and had to choose between good and evil. The evil spirit, Ahriman, was forced 
choose in pure paradox since in choosing, he acknowledged himself precisely as the evil 
(Friedman, 1960). 
The figure of the primeval king Yima was in the Avesta and the poetry of Firdusi 
and was a god whose origins could be traced from the Indo-Aryan tradition through the 
Indian texts and to Iranian stories. Yima was born immortal and became mortal through 
transgression. The highest god, Ahura Mazdah, required him to protect religion and 
requested that Yima and his people flourish, multiply, and guard the world. Yima 
assumed dominion over the world in which destructive powers of cold or hot wind, 
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sickness, or death had no part. He ruled over Utopian existence and watched cattle grow 
and fields flourish. He was called to service again by Ahura Mazdah who granted 
Yima's wishes to increase the size of the pleasant world. Ahura Mazdah ceded only the 
material world to Yima, although he inflicted the first great winter, an illustration to 
Yima of what the world could be without spirit. He required Yima to build a citadel and 
to secure in it the best of the earth and the most beautiful of living and growing things. 
Yima rekindled a relationship with evil demons by "taking the lie into his mind 
by lauding and blessing himself." Quickly, Yima was reduced to the body of a raven as 
punishment for Yima's self-glorification. Forced to wander without peace, Yima joined 
the demons and coupled with a witch, a union that produced several monsters. When 
his sister disguised herself as the witch with whom he had sexual relations, the demons 
rejected him and cut him into thousands of pieces. He was the first creature to die. As 
king of the dead, Yima was rejected by gods, earth-dwellers, and by the denizens of the 
lower world (Buber, 1953). 
The point of this myth was that Yima's consequences were brought about by his 
telling a special lie of self-glorification of his creation of earth's fortune. The power of 
the lie assumed the character of primal life, of one's setting oneself over humanity which 
ascribed the conquest of the powers of nature to its own superpower. This was not a 
verbal lie that confronted a verbal truth; rather, the liar saw himself as a self-creator and 
through himself saw both the immortal and his own ability to immortalize. Believing 
oneself to wield power over even the demon spirits, this person committed the lie against 
being, or the "inner untruth against God and himself" (Buber, 1953, p. 110). 
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The lie and the truth accounted for the oppositeness of good and evil. The lie was 
recognized in the Vedas to designate "the uncanny game of hide-and-seek in the obscurity 
of the soul," in which the human soul evaded and hid from itself (Buber, 1953, p. 111). 
This confused state of the soul allowed the lie to own the being and in seeking worldly 
reality, broke out of the relationship to other souls in order to fulfill its self-proclaimed 
purpose and unite with the divine. 
The lie manifested itself in the Avesta as a breach of faith, then intensified as it 
falsified a situation by the attitude of the person placed in it. This attitude stemmed from 
the choice betrween truth and lie which presented itself over and over and insisted upon 
decision made by the essence of the person both at the beginning of the way and during 
the decisive hours. This existential choice was between being-true and being-false. 
Whereas being-true entailed strengthening and confirming being at the point of 
one's own existence, being-false ultimately caused weakening, desecrating, and disposing 
of being at the same point (Buber, 1952c). When a person gave the self over to the 
being-lie and to non-being passing itself off as being, the person fell victim to it. Yima, 
as lord of the demons, fell into their power and crossed over the line from being-true 
to being-false. Existing first as their compatriot, he became their victim. "He effects 
factually a downfall of being: at precisely that point which is called Yima" (Buber, 
1953, p. 112). 
Buber wrote that truth and lie did not allude to truth and falsehood of things 
themselves; rather, they indicated pronouncements in which human souls pledged to the 
truth or to the lie. Human truth was a verification by the person's being true. The 
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person's inability to withstand the vortex of omnipossibility and to be true to oneself first 
led one directly into the second stage of evil. 
The Second Stage of Evil 
Yima's decision to utter the lie against being was illustration of decision 
determining movement toward evil's second stage. In the first stage of evil the person 
experienced repeated moments of indecision. The movement toward the second stage 
was characterized by consistent indecisions merging into fixation in a pattern of 
indecision. Self-knowledge was repressed when one's will to basic self-preservation 
dominated one's ability to affirm oneself. When the person was confronted with the 
desire and will to affirm oneself firmly, one called oneself into question and plunged 
into crisis. 
Philosophical anthropology was essential to Buber's development of the second 
stage of evil. The anthropological person was one of possibility who needed 
confirmation by others and by oneself to fulfill the intended direction and become the 
particular person one was supposed to become and that one was. This confirmation by 
others and by oneself freed one from the dread of abandonment that people faced in their 
insecure world. Even when the person was capable of existing without external 
confirmation, no one could exist without self-confirmation. The person moving toward 
the second stage of evil found oneself demanding inner rejection based on the primal lie 
against being. This inner rejection caused one to spiral into a pathologically fragile 
relationship to oneself that required readjustment of self-knowledge through a supreme 
individual effort toward unification, an effort Buber termed 'conversion' (Buber, 1952c). 
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If one did not succeed at conversion, one displaced self-knowledge with absolute 
self-affirmation. The image of what the person's particular direction was became 
extinguished and in its place one willed oneself just as one was at that moment. The 
person became one that the person resolved to intend himself, thus experiencing 
crystallized inner division. Self-affirmation was spiritual and physical and was 
"recognizable, those who dominate their own self-knowledge, by the spastic pressure of 
the lips, the spastic tension of the muscles of the hand and the spastic tread of the foot" 
(Buber, 1953, p. 137). 
Resembling Yima who proclaimed himself his own creator, the one who affirmed 
himself personified the wicked spirit which chose evil precisely as evil. This process 
moved the person into the open state of being and within this state chose evil as 
affirmation of the self or as affirmation of the order which continued to establish good 
and evil. The anthropological person was faced with the dilemma between choosing the 
affirmation of the order and thereby choosing the direction to good, or denying it, and 
overcoming one's present state of being. 
If one chose oneself, the person also chose to deny the order and suppress the 
yes-position that good had once occupied. This person brought about self-affirmation and 
nothing else remained worthy of affirmation other than that which he affirmed. His 
'Yes' to himself determined the reason and right of affirmation (Buber, 1952c). One's 
definition of good was now what one was and in the second stage of evil, the person 
chose oneself, and "nothing, no quality and no destiny, can any longer be signed with 
a 'No' if it is his" (Buber, 1953, p. 138). Yima's lie against being caused people to rule 
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over being and designate as ruth not as what one experienced as truth, but what the one 
ordained truth to be. 
Coming to Radical Evil 
Background 
Buber's essay, "Imitatio Dei," (1948a) described Adam's fall caused by his desire 
to become more than the likeness of God. Adam strived to be the imitation of the 
unknown God. Approaching self-deification, Adam paralleled Yima's desire to be like 
God rather than his own desire for becoming-like-God (Buber, 1948a). When Yima 
proclaimed himself his own creator, he declared himself also creator of existence, as well 
as of the values that appraised existence. 
Buber described humanity's desire to be the imitation of God as the central 
paradox of Judaism that involved how far a person should be able to imitate God, on 
what that imitation should be based, and in which actions God's works were considered 
revealed. He discussed this in interpretation of Psalm 1 in making a distinction between 
a "wicked" person and a "sinner." The sinner missed God's direction again and again 
while the wicked person opposed it. 
'Sinner' describes a condition which from time to time overcomes a man 
without adhering to him, whereas 'wicked' describes a kind of man, a 
persistent disposition. The sinner does evil, the wicked man is evil. That 
is why it is said only of the wicked, and not of the sinners, that their way 
vanishes . . . (Buber, 1952e, p. 51). 
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Although the sinner chose to suppress entering into relationship, this person could still 
stand before God. Maintaining the possibility for relationship with the Eternal Thou 
enabled the sinner to join in human relationships if the sinner could complete 
conversion. The wicked person was not capable of standing before God because he could 
not accept divine judgment. As the person whose way was his judgment, the wicked 
person negated personal existence and ended in nothing. Closing the way was the 
difference between the sinner and the wicked person. God's was was never closed to the 
wicked person from God's side; rather, it was closed from the side of the wicked 
themselves. "For in distinction to the sinners they do not wish to be able to return" 
(Buber, 1953, p. 58). 
Buber's early writings termed evil as stemming from the freedom God granted 
humanity in creation. He wrote essays on Sabbatai Zevi (1940) and Jacob Frank (1943) 
illustrating this position in which we witnesssed the birth of Buber's differentiation 
between evil as decisionlessness and evil as self-affirmation (Friedman, 1960). Zevi, a 
false messiah, believed in something absolute and considered himself in relation to it. 
When threatened with execution, he repudiated his beliefs to avoid martyrdom and Buber 
wrote that "it is not the belief as such but his belief in himself that does not stand firm" 
(Buber, 1948c, p. 10). Frank believed in nothing, not even himself, and assumed the 
position, not as a liar, but as a fundamental lie. Buber wrote that "he can only believe 
in himself after the manner of the lie by filling the space of the nothing with himself" 
(Buber, 1948c, p. 25). A person who believed only in himself could not exercise inner 
restraint and developed a magical freedom that enabled those such as Frank to inspire 
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followers. Although personal self-reflection demanded that Frank confront his nihilism, 
Buber cautioned that Frank opened the historical present's abyss that suggested the real 
present as well. "It is no more allowed to any man to live as if evil did not exist. One 
cannot serve God by merely avoiding evil; one must grapple with it" (Buber, 1948c, p. 
29). 
Buber's later writings were affected by the events of the nazi terror and the 
Holocaust. His formulated his work on evil from discussions of Adam's fall, Sabbatai 
Zevi, and Jacob Frank, but his thought was altered by experiences of nazi terror. His 
witnessing and survivng the radical evil in Europe during Hitler's reign of horror 
provoked his serious consideration of the nature, ontology, and redemption of radical 
evil. 
Radical Evil 
Philosophical anthropology placed Buber in the realm of religious and ethical 
thinking of the "middle position which regards evil as real but redeemable, thus refusing 
to ascribe to it an absolute and independent reality" (Friedman, 1960, p. 111). He 
witnessed men and women as victims of radical evil during the nazi hatred, murder, and 
executions. Could a religious philosopher regard the actors in this arena of ultimate evil 
and purport that people were not actually evil in their very nature? 
It was unthinkable to the philosophy of dialogue that any person could be 
unredeemably evil. Human nature was not evil, only people's misuse of that nature was 
evil. Some people were wicked and sought cosmic non-existence, but there were no 
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people that were cut off as unredeemably evil and hostile to divine purposes by God from 
God's side of the relationship. 
His first mature response to evil, Images of Good and Evil (1952c), was Buber's 
explanation of the nature of evil in the world. His second, Eclipse of God (1952b), 
discussed the nature of the Holocaust's evil. Although his responses were radically 
original, they did not endear him to the philosophizing world who experienced the 
Holocaust's evils (Cohen, 1988). 
Rabbi Richard Rubenstein (1975) retreated into nihilism regarding the possibility 
of a good God after tortured examination of the Holocaust. Arthur Cohen (1988) 
responded with mysterium tremendum, an event paralleled in importance but not in kind 
only four times in Jewish history. Each author took exception to Buber's idea of radical 
evil's redeemability and Buber's firm belief and actions in accordance with such 
redeemability ostracized him from the post-Holocaust Jewish philosophical world. 
Buber acknowledged that people could bring evil to a radical stage in which it 
possessed substantial quality, yet he asserted that did not mean evil in the world was real 
and absolute. It meant that evil had crystallized into a "settled opposition by the 
individual to becoming what he is meant to become" (Friedman, 1960, p. 111). He 
wrote that "good . . . retains the character of direction at both stages [of evil]," and 
indicated that there was good even in the second stage, just as there was for the first 
(Buber, 1953, p. 140). Recognizing that good existed within second stage of evil put 
Buber again precariously on the narrow ridge. 
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Buber cemented his position on the wobbling narrow ridge. He reaffirmed his 
narrow ridge attitude toward evil through Biblical interpretation of the idea that God's 
will hardened on occasion against a person or people's consistent losing of their way 
(Buber, 1951). Citing that there were only three references to the term 'hardening' in 
the Bible, he noticed that God's heart was caused to harden by a people's consistent 
turning away from human direction toward His way. Hardening was God's response to 
people's severe situation. The first instance of hardening of God's heart occured with 
Pharoah's refusal to allow the Jews to exit Egypt; the second referred to the war in 
Canaan in which the Amorites engaged in perverted behavior (Genesis 15:16); and the 
third took place in the Isaiah when the prophet considered hardening God's ears as His 
refusing to hear the prayers of His people a prerequisite for hardening His heart. 
This idea was seized by the Apostle Paul who used it to explain God's hardening 
toward and ultimate replacement of the Jewish people by the Christians for future 
revelation and redemption. Paul's taking Biblical phrasing and using it to proselytize to 
disaffected masses helped pave the way for what I believe has been a two-millenia 
Christian-inspired worldwide persecution of Jews, a systematic persecution that evidenced 
a "red thread" of continuity that was realized in the Holocaust. His unintentional support 
of Christian dogma has been an historical source of conflict between Buber and 
traditional Jewish theologians. 
Buber took three cases of God's hardened heart as evidence that only the most 
perilous situations could cause God not to respond temporarily to a people who struggled 
to maintain their direction to God's way. The extremity of these situations was 
279 
paramount. "Sin is not an undertaking which man can break off when the situation 
becomes critical, but a process started by him, the control of which is withdrawn from 
him at a fixed moment" (Buber, 1951, p. 90). 
God granted the sinner special strength to continue in sin during the time God's 
own heart was hardened. This position helped us come to know absolute self-affirmation 
with which the wicked person shut himself off from God. No matter how great the 
person's sin, no matter how absolutely one hardened one's own heart, and no matter how 
tightly one closed the door between the self and God, God would never abridge the 
freedom He gave people in creation. He allowed the closing to happen from the human 
side. God's 'hardening' was not a position taken prior to the individual's shutting 
oneself off; rather, it was a response by God to humanity's repeated decisions against 
Him. 
At this point, God confirmed the wicked in their non-existence and exercised His 
'severe grace' with which He pointed out the one road back to real existence (Friedman, 
1960). 
Even in the dark hour after he has become guilty against his brother, man 
is not abandoned to the forces of chaos. God Himself seeks him out, and 
even when he comes to call him to account, His coming is salvation 
(Buber, 1952a, p. 56). 
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People's evil natures were redeemable and God remained open to humanity's turning, 
although for the 'wicked' whose way had vanished only the force of conversion with the 
whole being could suffice. 
Buber was not a dualist when interpreting radical evil. Constantly affirming God 
and the ultimate oneness of God and the world, Buber pointed to the paradoxical quality 
of evil in the world. 
The great significance ... of that second stage of evil which is the newest 
development in Buber's thought is its concrete base in human existence 
which makes understandable such extreme phenomena as Hitler and the 
Nazis without resorting to the dogma of original sin or agreeing with 
Sartre's assertion that the events of recent years make it necessary to 
recognize evil as absolute and unredeemable (Friedman, 1960, p. 112). 
The Eclipse of God 
Buber's response to radical evil in a world created by a good God was a unique 
postulate of the presuppositions necessary for an unhearing God of Israel. Instead of 
answering Elie Wiesel's question, "Where was God in Auschwitz?" Buber responded to 
the "Job of the gas chamber" in a way that concretized the distance between them but 
later served to bring them to dialogue. His answer, the eclipse of God and the hiding 
of heaven, angered Holocaust survivors because it appeared to blame the victims rather 
than the persecutors. 
When the person shut off the possibility of making one's relationship to God real 
within the lived concrete, that person denied the existence of lived concreteness through 
denial of the dialogical character of presentness and uniqueness of the moment (Buber, 
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1965a). Because Buber's Eternal Thou was a God who could not be systematized, God 
had to be met by the hearing person in the lived concrete. Once dogma or absolute self-
affirmation shut the door between the person and the Eternal Thou, relationship was 
impossible. Repudiating relationship to the Eternal Thou took several forms. 
Concern with revelation of the future, the attempt to get behind the 
problematic of life, the desire to possess or use divine power, the 
acceptance of tradition and law as a 'once for all' in which one can take 
refuge all these prevent the meeting with God in the lived concrete 
(Friedman, 1960, pp. 114-115). 
He also believed that human immortality was a threat to the relation of faith (Buber, 
1945). 
Although God could be addressed but not expressed, human inability to address 
God was complicated by the symbols people used in their attempts in that very address. 
Buber declared that God neither required nor wanted conventional symbols or 
"necessarily untrue images." Rather, God "suffers that one look at Him through them" 
(Buber, 1952b, p. 62). Philosophers' attempts to restore the lived concrete to the 
religious person through destruction of images culminated in other symbols being thrust 
in their places. Buber believed that even the "pure idea" stood in the way of the person's 
address to God. Definitions of God that rendered Him an abstract god-of-the-
philosophers placed God as an object of thought in a sphere that was no longer a means 
of apprehending reality; rather, it created a God who was a thought-being freed from the 
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limitations of the actual. Although "God of the philosophers" was a comprehensible 
thing, it was not the living Eternal Thou. 
When humanity felt estranged from the Eternal Thou, neither philosophy nor 
religious systems achieved renewed relationship. When people felt unthreatened within 
the universe, they considered themselves as a part of more universal, cosmological 
thought. When humankind has felt constricted by solitude, consideration of their position 
has been "deep and fruitful and independent of cosmology" (Friedman, 1960, p. 116). 
Complicating alienated humanity were those thought systems of Aristotle, Aquinas, and 
Hegel that forced people to achieve consciousness of themselves only in removed third-
person language. People no longer considered themselves problematic; rather, their 
wonder at the human situation became simple wonder at the universe as a whole. 
Abandoning Hegel's "cosmological time" as abstract and relativized, Buber 
considered "anthropological time" as having reality only in the past and providing no 
future certainty. He refused to grant humanity temporal security and disagreed with 
Marx's interpretation of Hegel's cosmological time in which Marx assured the proletariat 
security of victory in the future. This security was false since it ignored man's powers 
of decisions (Buber, 1965a). 
Modern humanity embarked on a treacherous path solidifying the sacred space 
between themselves and God. Buber pointed to the history of Western civilization as 
building individual and isolated spheres that separated people from each other in groups 
who established their own order. Holy norms degenerated into human conventions and 
were reduced to symbols and rituals which satisfied the particular culture (Buber, 1952a). 
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When spheres of independent existence took hold, religion lost its meaning 
because the whole of existence in relation to the Absolute became only a special domain 
of dogma and cult. "The original sin of all 'religion' is separation of 'living in God' 
from 'living in the world'" (Buber, 1948c, p. 104). As a separated religion, it became 
humanity's greatest danger. 
The great danger was that the dialogue the soul believed it was carrying out 
between itself and God was actually a monologue with divided roles. This set up a 
dualism between the life of the spirit and that of the world. Dualistic thinking was 
enhanced by apocalytic religions which set up dichotomies between secular and religious. 
The eschatological expectation of God's imminent rule slackened instead of doing away 
with law in the name of divine freedom. God's rule was restricted to a religious sphere 
and Buber found seeds of this within Paul's Gnostic view of the world as well as within 
Iranian dualisms. He also discovered fragments of this dualism within Judaism. 
The prophetic allows 'the evil' to find the direction that leads toward God, 
and to enter into the good; the apocalyptic sees good and evil severed 
forever at the end of days, the good redeemed, the evil unredeemable for 
all eternity; the prophetic believes that the earth shall be hallowed, the 
apocalyptic despairs of an earth which it considers to be hopelessly 
doomed. . . . (Buber, 1946, p. 188). 
Religious forces have produced a modern world in which the moments of meeting 
have been expropriated and dispossessed in four ways. 
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Through historicizing of the moment it is regarded as a pure product of 
the past. Through the technicizing of the moment it is treated as purely 
a means to a goal and hence as existing only in the future. Through the 
psychologizing of the moment its total content is reflected upon and 
reduced to a process or experience of the soul. Through the 
philosophizing of the moment it is abstracted from its reality (Friedman, 
1960, pp. 118-119). 
Modern life was divided into categories and aspects and humankind enjoyed experiences 
only independently of one another. Sociologically, our modern age has become 
increasingly dualistic. 
Buber illustrated his claim that humankind was sociologically determined in work. 
The nature of work in the modern world became perverted through the separation of 
people's lives by the divorce of technical means from value ends, that is, the 1-lt from 
the 1-Thou (Friedman, 1960). Utilizing human power without attention to human 
freedom places people "in the grip of incomprehensible powers" which trample and 
pulverize human purposes through purposelessness. People have become sick and society 
has become unhealthy. 
"This sickness of modern man is manifested most clearly of all ... in the 
individualism and nationalism which make power an end in itself (Friedman, 1960, p. 
119). Buber condemned power exercised without faithfulness and predicted that it could 
never know fruitfulness or renewal (Buber, 1965a). Compounding this sickness was 
society's dualism of ends and means, especially the belief that ends justified means. In 
his Zionism essays, Buber wrote that 
285 
no way leads to any other goal but to that which is like it. . . . It is only 
the sick understanding of this age that teaches that the goal can be reached 
through all the ways of the world . . . The person or community which 
seeks to use evil for the sake of good destroys its own soul in the process 
(Buber, 1945). 
Evil used for the sake of good served to produce inner division and dishonesty, and also 
caused modern society's elevation of evil into something holy in itself. 
The quasi-holiness of evil stemmed from an inner crisis of temptation, freedom, 
and dishonesty in people's souls (Friedman, 1960). Possibility became more powerful 
than reality and produced a divorce between spirit and instincts. This was equivalent to 
the divorce between man and man (Buber, 1965a). 
The sickness of the modern age was a vital dissociation that could be resolved 
only through renewed real living together in states and collectivities. People's isolation 
was a price modern society continued to pay for the liberation brought by the French 
Revolution and was illustrated by decay of organic forms that enabled people to live 
together in relation. The irreplaceability of those forms contributed to despair, 
intensified solitude, and alienated us from access to production and consumption, the 
foundations of our society (Buber, 1965a). 
This alienation, isolation, and despair has reduced our ability for real dialogue 
between people with fundamentally different convictions. "Direct, open dialogue is 
becoming ever more difficult and more rare; the abysses between man and man threaten 
ever more pitilessly to become unbridgeable" (Buber, 1965a, p. 157). Monologue has 
replaced dialogue and technical language has taken over speech. A greater cause for 
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despair has been the radical dissolution of mystery. People no longer question each 
other's simple honesty; rather, they call into question the inner agreement of existence 
itself. This mistrust has destroyed the immediacy of togetherness of people in general 
(Buber, 1957). 
Because we no longer had genuine dialogue, we lost confirmation of ourselves. 
Feeling abandoned, we destroyed the dialogue between ourselves and God and the 
communion between man and man. Now solitary in the world, we questioned the 
universe and our relation to it, and we question ourselves. Homeless in both the universe 
and community, modern humanity experienced a crisis of existential mistrust with 
destruction of confidence in existence in general. Having lost confidence in human 
existence, we have lost faith in God. 
Unable to enter into relation with others through our loss of relationship with the 
Eternal Thou, we interpret our encounters with God as self-encounters and "man's very 
structure is destroyed. . . . This is the portent of the present hour" (Buber, 1952b, p. 
21). The self became an omnipotent independent reality totally enmeshed within It, and 
can no longer acknowledge God or any absolute which manifested itself to humankind 
as of non-human origin. It stepped in between and shut us off from the light of heaven 
(Buber, 1952b). 
"Eclipse of the light of heaven, eclipse of God" is "the character of the historical 
hour through which the world is passing." The eclipse did not take place within human 
subjectivity "but in Being itself." This constituted the human side of "the silence of 
God," and of "God's hiding His face" (Buber, 1952b, p. 34, p. 89). Responsibility for 
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the eclipse was placed on one who "refuse[d] to submit himself to the effective reality 
of the transcendence" but it did not mean the death of God (Buber, 1952b, p. 34). The 
imaging power of the human soul declined when the I-It relation came in between the 
person and God. The glance was no longer conceivable and the protection of the 
potential for entering into relation with the Eternal Thou no longer existed. 
During the eclipse, false absolutes reigned over human souls because they could 
no longer image true and good. "In the realm of Moloch honest men lie and 
compassionate men torture. . . . There appears to be no escape from the most evil of all 
idolatry" (Buber, 1952b, p. 156). The most terrible consequence of the eclipse was the 
silence of God. As people became estranged, they could not understand themselves 
addressed by God. Abandoned to the forces of tyranny, the world seemed given over 
to unjust judges and God seemed to have lifted up the faces of the wicked. Buber 
summed up the eclipse of God by saying that God is, but He is not present (Buber, 1945, 
p. 116). During the Holocaust, the world seemed irretrievably abandoned and the silence 
of God terrified us as millions were exterminated in concentration camps. Systematic 
and scientific executions of eleven million caused the world to appear forsaken and 
engulfed in an utter and silent darkness. 
Modern Responses to Radical Evil 
Considering the modern world's evils has been voiced by post-modern critics and 
has challenged traditional Christian responses toward the existence of evil in a Godly 
world (Griffin, 1991). Traditional free-will theodicies have not been able to account for 
the existence of evil or successful in proposing alternative justifications for its existence. 
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The post-modern spiritual person has faced the dilemma of reconciling human imposition 
of radical evil on others within a cosmos created by a good God. 
Included in this vision of inspired evil are the twentieth century Holocaust 
committed during the Nazi destruction of European Jews, the potential for global 
annihilation by the stockpiling, development, and design of weapons intended for mass 
destruction, and the gradual threat of ecocide. A spiritual person's questions may be: 
Does belief in a good God imply that destructive forces cannot fulfill their purposes? If 
nuclear or ecological annihilation does occur, does it indicate there is no God? 
Buber suggested that humanity's inability to enter into relation with the Eternal 
Thou rendered people unable to relate to the Thous of this world. A reason for the 
rejection of God may be that overwhelming and insurmountable evils exist. The world 
offers this type of religious person a choice between things worthy of worship. They 
could hold to perfect goodness while rejecting omniscience and omnipotence or they 
could hold to omniscience, omnipotence, and creation ex nihilo. They could also hold 
to omniscience, omnipotence, and creation ex nihilo while rejecting perfect goodness 
(Griffin, 1991, p. 10). Whatever the choice, religious people are forced to choose. 
We have lost the Eternal Thou and replaced God with simplified and useable 
definitions. By limiting God to those things which are not imperfect, we have put limits 
on God's Thou-ntss and have relegated God to the status of a nonderivative, supreme, 
or effective power. We allow God to be the world's Holy Power or its purposive 
creator, yet we apply to God the source of our moral norms, not necessarily as the locus 
of good and evil; rather, as the right and wrong uses of power by human beings. We 
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wish Him to be the ultimate guarantee for the meaningfulness of human life, a rebuttal 
to nihilism, and a trustworthy ground for the ultimate and assured victory of good over 
evil (Griffin, 1991). Through our redefinition of God, we oppose Buber's cosmic 
relationship to the Eternal Thou. 
Traditional philosophical and religious histories offered us little flexibility in the 
dualism that there was no power that primordially belonged to any other being than God. 
If beings such as a devil or Satan figure had power, that power was granted to them 
voluntarily by God. Because power was derivative or illusionary, it was not unilateral. 
We concluded that there was nothing that could happen outside God's power. Faced with 
tragedy, humanity was forced to accept that God allowed cruelty, suffering, and disaster 
to befall His creations. Consequently, people questioned both the reality and goodness 
of this concept of God and sought other explanations for natural, cosmic, and physical 
evil. 
We could find solace in religion, yet the doctrines of Augustine, Thomas, Calvin, 
Luther, and Barth were traditionally theistic. Traditional theism dichotomized God's 
control over events and posed human actions as instrinsically sinful. Theologians 
developed a popular Satan figure with religious literature whose purpose was to absorb 
blame for naturally occuring evil. When spiritual people questioned God's allowing evil 
to co-exist with humanity in the world, their conclusions denied Satan the status of God's 
cosmic adversary; rather, they affirmed that God knew of and allowed Satan's. 
Traditional free-will theists added to the explanation of radical evil in the world. 
Salvaging belief in God in a radically evil world, theologians suggested that although God 
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had all the power, He voluntarily delegated some to human beings. Through their 
misuse of power, humanity brought radical evil into their lives. Guilt was assigned to 
the sufferers' shoulders. Setting humanity's actions in direct opposition to God's purpose 
enabled theologians and philosophers to force blame or guilt upon people for that part 
of creation which was in jeopardy. 
These answers to fundamental questions of radical evil in an inherently good 
world were shaky solutions to the questioning of belief in God within radically evil 
times. People who believed along with Will James that nothing was real until it was 
realized, required plausible answers to questions of faith and needed solutions to their 
problems. Pragmatic humankind required a new vocabulary with complete answers to 
eternal questions. The vocabulary that developed to answer those questions concentrated 
in bringing about mistrust and disregard of "others." 
Reification of others brought about a concretizing of the "between," the space 
between Thou and I. Unable to recognize the other as unique with potential for 
Thouness, persons became estranged not simply from others, but from the ability to 
imagine I-Thou relationship as possible. Others grew apart from the reality of Thouness 
and with the concomitant reduction of God's omnipotent power in people's minds, 
absolute estrangement took over modernity. 
Language has played a part in this degeneration. With the rapid rise in 
conversation as opposed to dialogue and with labelling and categorizing for 
governmental, financial, and remedial assistance, people ceased to exist as persons; 
rather, they became objects for classification, grants, and studies. With quantification 
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of humankind for analysis and generalizability, we have achieved our own eclipse, one 
that reduced the individual soul to a number or correlation to which meaning cannot be 
attributed. By languaging others, we constructed a culture that relegates belief in 
humanity to "otherness" reinforced by media. Our language overtook our regard for 
people and our public space narrowed. 
The reduction of public space achieved the unthinkable to pre-modern people in 
its development of a stratified society that repulsed attempts at conversation, the 
prerequisite for dialogue. Limiting access to be heard engendered a peculiar human 
being who regarded his personal message of affirmation and confirmation as unimportant. 
Spiritual people have been relegated to the fringes of life and heir messages have been 
squelched. 
People are no longer believed in; rather, our confirmation has been removed to 
institutions, parties, groups, leagues, teams, and Superbowls. Our post-modern 
responses to the submersion of our otherness appear to glorify our sameness, rather than 
celebrate our differences. Questions of "What are you?" that were responded to with 
cultural, religious, or ethnic answers are crushed with benign responses whose genesis 
is fear. Choices of response used to include, "I'm Italian; I'm Jewish; I'm an Indian," 
have changed as our sub-group mentality shifted from personal celebration to group 
oppression, with rejoinders that point to oppressed women, oppressed racial groups, 
oppressed native peoples, and oppressed victims of handicap. 
Fear of being perceived as politically incorrect has supplanted innocent questions 
and answers, the process of conversation that could, when sanctified, evolve into 
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dialogue. Fear of unintentional exclusion prompted universality to overtake our language 
and print, a situation that accomplished the concretizing of the space of the spirit between 
people. Fear of offending others stifled the creative expression of ideas and principles. 
The post-modern spiritual person has been denied the freedom within which to pose 
thoughtful questions, to question others meaningfully, and to have one's meaning heard 
and responded. 
We need to recover the questions and and critically reassess humanity (Heschel, 
1955). God needs humankind but humankind must first recover its knowledge of God 
as the Eternal Thou in order to make meaningful relationships with others' Thomess. 
A very good place to start is with Buber and the I and Thou. 
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APPENDIX A: EPILOGUE 
The most difficult aspect of writing this dissertation did not face me squarely until 
the document was composed, typed, formatted, printed, collated, punched, and bound 
and I was free to consider the meaning of what brought me to study radical evil; to 
decipher the mysteries of radical goodness; and to leave a piece of myself within the 
pages of The Voice of the Cricket. What emerged from this study was my coming to 
know my motive for studying the Holocaust as history, that is, trying to give meaning 
to the apparently meaningless. 
My decade of youth and freedom from worry in the 1950s denied the Holocaust's 
existence and its victims and survivors lay in solitary anguish with no voice for 
themselves or the eleven million who were murdered on European soil. The wrenching 
of children from their mothers' arms and the overwhelming anguish represented in 
Sophie's Choice were forced into silence as well as denial. The radicalism of the 1960s 
gave a voice to the immense spirit that previously welled unspoken within the hearts and 
minds of those who experienced the Shoah's unreality and inhuman ethics. As I joined 
the parade of critics of political policy that centered primarily on U.S. involvement in 
Southeast Asia, another spirit struggled for a place in my vocal rebellion against 
authority. 
That voice with which I struggled was a religious spirit that took two additional 
decades to emerge. For twenty years I suppressed my religious thoughts and converted 
them into Religious Ritual as I celebrated meaningless correctly within an organized and 
predetermined structure. When I believed in the 1980s that I faced my own radical evil, 
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I freed myself to investigate the philosophical, social, and cultural dimensions of evil. 
Because my professional life took place within the educational setting, it seems proper 
that my formal studies sprang and flowered within an educational institution and course 
of study. I believe it was more than serendipity that ushered me to that point where 
Religion gave way to religiousness and religiosity overtook Ritual. "Find yourself a 
teacher and you will have found yourself a friend," the Pirke Avot stresses. Going back 
to the ancient texts, whether Hebrew, Greek, German, English, or American, does help 
translate modernity into an understandable mixture if the reader and her teacher(s) read, 
talk, think, re-read, discuss, and respect both one another and the classic sources of 
knowledge. 
To understand the Holocaust, I chose to investigate the role of European rescuers 
of Jews in Nazi Europe. Reading text after text and testimonial after narrative, I became 
frustrated and shouted in rage, "Reading these books makes you believe that no Jews 
were killed! Are they trying to convince me that the German people were goodV The 
choice of topic and texts had been mine, I was promptly informed. What drove me to 
look in this disheartening direction? 
The completion of my dissertation helped provide me with some answers to this 
seemingly inexplicable dilemma. I needed to know that there were good people within 
Nazi Europe. I wanted to learn the stories of rescuers to convince myself that people 
were not genetically or biologically evil. I insisted that humankind did care about one 
another in spite of the reality of the Holocaust and I demanded that this hope and prayer 
be affirmed. I came to Martin Buber's writings not because of his pessimism that the 
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moments of sacred communion were fleeting; rather, I sought his works because I 
cherished his optimism that each human being was eternally redeemable not matter what. 
No matter what. 
Struggling through Buber, Aristotle, Plato, and Kant set the table for the feast of 
diversity that challenged my contention regarding the redeemability of the human spirit 
when faced with the tragic Holocaust of the twentieth century. Arguing against Greek 
tripartite society and reservation of Eternal Truth for the fortunate few men who could 
afford to pursue it became a weekly joust between my ever-patient professor and me. 
Yet understanding Greek idealism is fundamental to knowing why our society has 
developed into one that enabled the Holocaust and one in which the murderous seeds of 
European xenophobia have again been planted and taken root. 
The positivists invaded ethics and thinking as I watched the philosophizing world 
of my reading spin away from God and the human spirit and seek comfort within the 
orderly, static, and controlled template of science. I sat horrified in front of my 
computer as I read and took notes on the development of the "Cartesian gameboard" and 
typed page after page of biological determinism and ethics of the many overtaking the 
ethical existence of the few or of the socially and economically disenfranchised. Finally, 
the absurdity offered by Nietzsche and Sartre became reality and the Holocaust fit nicely 
into place within a society corrupted fundamentally by power, hatred, and inability to 
care. 
But I had chosen and cherished this time to find real answers and I struggled to 
find another answer, another direction in which the Nazi terror could be understood and 
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humankind affirmed. I could not and would not sit silent as the six million of my 
readings again marched in neat columns into the gas chambers and slave camps. I 
wanted another explanation and a new approach. I insisted that humanity's fundamental 
nature could not be evil. But I did not know if I could read anything or bring to a 
discourse any facts, theories, or justifications that would make my inner core accept the 
proposition that, given the reality of the Holocaust, people were basically good. 
Perhaps Schopenhauer had been right. Perhaps death was the only release from absurdity 
for the Shoah's victims. 
Finally, I came to Martin Buber. Buber taught me that if I could reach another, 
even for a moment, then at least one other person must be capable of being a Thou to 
my /. If one person could be such a Thou to my /, perhaps there could be another. If 
there were two, could there be more? As if I were Abraham bargaining with God, I 
wondered if there could be ten? Twenty? How many would it take? The possibility 
began to resemble a hall of mirrors that stretched into psychic infinity. I just needed the 
voice. The still small voice within me that spoke the basic question. "1m ayn ah-ni li, 
mi li?" If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am only for myself, what am 
I? And if not now, when? 
Buber's voice became mine while I tried to answer these questions. There were 
rescuers during the Nazi terror because the dimensions of time were merely constructs 
of our minds and in their own time, rescuers faced the basic Thou of the others and met 
them squarely and head on. However small their numbers, there were always rescuers 
of others in all times and all political ages because if not now, then when? To feed the 
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hungry, to lift up the fallen...words that did have meaning even if the chanters of these 
prayers were merely mouthing words in Hebrew they could not and did not care to 
translate. There would always be stories of rescuers throughout history because the 1 
was real and the Thou was real and space between them was sacred. 
I balanced precariously upon the narrow ridge of the choice between despair and 
hope and I finally understood Buber's quandary. Would I emerge from study eternally 
discouraged that more Is did not meet Thous in the lived concrete or would I come to 
cherish those who faced the other squarely in the person's basic need and met the other 
with one's true self? My balance on the rocky ridge was threatened by my readings and 
discussions as well as by my everyday interactions with my students. Victims of 
American racism and institutional discrimination, these young people challenged my 
resolve to choose either hope or despair. 
The Holocaust and American racism were the two dominant challenges in my 
coming to write this dissertation. For every German Nazi there was an oppressor of 
American black young people and the immensity of their numbers tilted me toward the 
gulf of despair. Yet as the doomed Jews chanted, "I believe with perfect faith that the 
Messiah will come...," my students told me of their roots, the murder of their young 
men in the streets and in the prisons, and their need to meet their challenges head on in 
the lived concrete of everyday life. I searched in the classics and in the modern texts for 
hope and I found it in the attics where Jews were hidden and in the university classrooms 
at the other end of Market Street in Greensboro, North Carolina. 
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I found both hope and despair in The Voice of the Cricket and in Rabbi Joan's 
commentary on it. Although the complexity of the Holocaust cannot be metaphorized 
into the simplicity of creative writing, I cannot disregard the power of the individual to 
shape one's own world. Hope intertwines with despair and I have come to know that 
radical evil as well as radical goodness, whatever they are, emerge from time to time 
from the power of the human soul. 
Spirit in its human manifestation is a response of man to his Thou. Man 
speaks with many tongues, tongues of language, of art, of action; but the 
spirit is one, the response to the Thou which appears and addresses him 
out of the mystery. Spirit is the word. And just as talk in a language 
may well first take the form of words in the brain of the man, and then 
sound in his throat, and yet both are merely refractions of the true event, 
for in actuality speech does not abide in man, but man takes his stand in 
speech and talks from there; so with every word and every spirit. Spirit 
is not in the /, but between I and Thou. It is not like the blood that 
circulates in you, but like the air in which you breathe. Man lives in the 
spirit, if he is able to respond to his Thou. He is able to, if he enters into 
relation with his whole being. Only in virtue of his power to enter into 
relation is he able to live in the spirit (Buber, 1958, p. 39). 
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APPENDIX B: THE VOICE OF THE CRICKET 
Yossi, the tailor, a good, simple and devout resident in a small shtetl of Polonia 
in which also dwelled the Ba'al Shem Tov, one day asked Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer, the 
renowned Ba'al Shem Tov, about how he, a mere tailor, could contemplate the greatness 
of Creation and the power and glory of the Creator. In his daily trips to the House of 
Prayer, Yossi often experienced joy, fervor, as well as glimpses of the light of heaven, 
but he never felt complete or as one as he stood alone bathed in that perfect light. Its 
brightness frightened him, and he withdrew from it and his private space with God at the 
very point at which he felt afraid such a meeting would consume, rather than elevate him 
toward holy unity. Whenever this happened, Yossi felt incompetent and useless. He 
yearned for the missing strength that would complete his journey between worlds and 
elevate him from being a simple, uneducated, and poor tailor to his becoming touched 
by the spirit which had surely bathed the zaddik he was now addressing. 
"How," cried Yossi as the Ba'al Shem Tov nodded in sympathy with his plight, 
"can I look at the light of Heaven and not be afraid?" Yossi knew from the rabbi's 
stories of the great and timeless journeys between the world below and the realm of the 
heavens that the rabbi had taken. He marvelled at the stories of the perfect light and the 
cascades of heavenly angels that greeted the Ba'al Shem Tov and the zaddikim with song 
on their flights. He prayed fervently each day in the House of Prayer at the end of the 
dirt road leading from the center of town east toward the great mountains, and he felt the 
fervor, and he had glimpses of the transformation. But he had yet to receive the joy. 
The Ba'al Shem Tov shook his head slowly from side to side. 
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"Oy, Yossi," he commiserated, "the light of God's face cannot be seen by 
man. Not even a zaddik may look at God's face. We can only know the light of union." 
The Ba'al Shem Tov sighed, threw his hands up into the air, yet looked Yossi straight 
in his eyes, as if to the spark that was his soul. The flame of the gaze burned brightly 
and for a moment, both Yossi and the Ba'al Shem Tov sat together as one. 
But Yossi was not satisfied simply with this moment of communion with the great 
Ba'al Shem Tov. His heart burned and ached for the light of glory to touch his poor 
soul, too, as it must have singed the soul of the Ba'al Shem Tov, his zaddikim, and all 
those before him who traversed the heavens and stood face to face with God's holy light, 
returning from their ascent with whitened beards and burning eyes, forever influenced 
by their mysterious encounters. Now, at this moment alone with the Ba'al Shem Tov, 
Yossi reached into himself, gathered his innermost words and he continued with a 
passion that grew in his heart and was evidenced in the rising crescendo of each word. 
"No! No! I want to stand before God and see the light and I want to be 
unafraid! Can you help me? Can you or any of the zaddikim of Polonia assist my soul 
in flight through the heavens to stand with God's light and not be afraid? I can never 
rise up the ladder and fulfill my task in this world if I cannot loosen the spark within my 
soul to rejoin, even for a moment, with its heavenly origin. And I cannot do this alone!" 
The Ba'al Shem Tov stroked his long white beard and stared with deep black eyes 
directly into the depths of Yossi's heart. The silence of his heart bore witness to the 
tailor's plea with a full heart and very mixed emotions. Was not the zaddik's task on 
earth to serve his disciples? And was not Yossi an honest, sincere, and devout disciple 
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striving to experience a moment of redemption that would serve to guide him on his 
ultimate, divine path? The cooing of the pigeons sang a song of faithfulness into the 
zaddik's heart. The rustle of the autumn leaves on the nearby trees carried an aroma that 
the old zaddik's eyes could visualize. It could be done. But should it be done? The 
Ba'al Shem Tov sat for a long while as the sounds of the forest grew louder in his heart 
as the late-day sun began its daily turning. 
The Ba'al Shem Tov's eyes were fastened on the simple tailor who sat before him 
in Polonia but his vision soared upward to the lights of the distant past. Directly into the 
heart of the Ba'al Shem Tov, Rabbi Elimelekh, great disciple of Rabbi Dov Baer the 
Great Maggid, re-told of his restoration of the sanctuary of Jerusalem on this earth, 
which corresponded to the altar in the sanctuary of heavenly Jerusalem. But in his own 
vision, Rabbi Elimelekh saw that every one of his disciples helped him in his special way 
with this holy task. On that one Day of Rejoicing in the Law, Rabbi Elimelekh noticed 
that two of his disciples were absent. Instantly he knew that the followers could build 
and build, but the restoration would be incomplete without all the disciples building 
together as one. The Ba'al Shem Tov sat in deep contemplation. Honoring Yossi's 
request to glimpse the light of heaven could be the completion of the great restoration 
and he would need the assistance of the souls of all the great zaddikim, past and present, 
to stand with Yossi and help him glimpse the light unafraid. He spoke with great 
compassion to Yossi as he considered the weight of his choice. 
"Come back on Rosh Chodesh," he counseled, "and we will open our hearts to 
soar with yours toward the edges of the great light. But hear now: although we will be 
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with you, you will be alone. Alone is the condition in which we encounter the Divine 
light, but together we will lend you the essence of ourselves that will support you in your 
intention to traverse the final six steps. Only Yossi the tailor can walk the final six steps 
and see the light that is creation. Come back in thirty days and my disciples and I will 
gather to assist you on your heavenly search. Go home now, Yossi, and pray like you 
have never prayed before because in thirty days, the souls of the zaddikim will enable 
the light of heaven to touch your soul." 
Yossi stared in both disbelief and delight at the Ba'al Shem Tov's words. First 
he wondered just who was he, this simple, poor, and uneducated tailor, that the great and 
wise Ba'al Shem Tov should gather his disciples to assist such an insignificant man on 
such a search? Yossi drew in a quick breath and remonstrated himself for belittling his 
holy intention. "For my soul the world was created!" he thought. When he looked up, 
the Ba'al Shem Tov smiled with his eyes that bore directly into Yossi's being, as if 
Yossi's inner recognition of man's importance as the culmination of God's work in the 
universe was shared with the Ba'al Shem Tov, even just for a brief moment. 
"But we are all ashes," the Ba'al Shem admonished. Yossi was silent. 
As he turned to leave and took one last, lingering glance at the face of the master, 
the image he encountered struck him behind his eyes, in the depths of his mind. The 
long, drawn face of the master stared upward toward the heavens and was bathed in a 
wondrous white glow of holy light. Yossi left the Ba'al Shem in his rapture, and neither 
saw nor heard the unvoiced chirp of the cricket silenced for eternity beneath his boot as 
he marched determinedly home. 
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The town was abuzz that month with arrivals and rumors of arrivals of the holy 
masters from all over Polonia. Every day, it seemed, another rabbi approached the Ba'al 
Shem Tov's door and was ushered in immediately by the cook or her serving girl. No 
one emerged from the house, save for the cook and her kitchen maid who traipsed almost 
daily to the market for vegetables, flour, tea, sugar, and fruit. And every erev Shabbat, 
without fail, for chickens. Every week her order grew larger and the two women 
struggled beneath their holy food purchases. The butcher kashered only his finest 
chickens for her. The greengrocer sifted and lifted produce to find only the best for the 
Ba'al Shem's holy gathering. The tight-lipped cook spoke only her order; she did not 
divulge the group's purpose in gathering, a lack of information that served only to fuel 
the fires of rumor and gossip of the community within the tiny town. Her unvoiced 
message was powerful: the holy men worked in secret on their mysterious mission. 
And the stories of that mission flew wildly from shopper to shopkeeper, from 
carpenter to milkman, enlarging as they were related from sister to sister, and mother 
to shvige. Who were these holy men, and why were they in town right now? What 
great event would cause such men to undertake such travel? And some of them, mind 
you, were not in the best of health or were advanced in years. Was the Ba'al Shem Tov 
ill? Was his son to be married? Was his son ill? Were they offering prayers of 
recovery? Did they seek to intervene with the Divine? Had they learned the date of 
redemption? Had the Ba'al Shem Tov received the Word from Elijah on his mystical 
wanderings? Titterings and chatterings fueled every conversation in the street and in the 
markets. Even Heschel, the rabbi's son, began wondering out loud why so many holy 
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men would hide out together in this small and pitiful little hovel of the town of the Ba'al 
Shem Tov. Eventually talk of the coming of the Messiah grew in the minds, but was not 
allowed on the lips, of the townspeople. Certain things, after all, were not for just 
anyone, perhaps they were just for the great one, to understand. But why were these 
great ones here? And why would these special souls group here now, if the Messiah 
truly was not coming? What other reason could there be for such a gathering? The 
titterings grew bolder, the rumors more imagined and almost hysterical. Finally, Heschel 
voiced the secret question feared yet exalted among the gossipers when he spoke of the 
Messiah to the dairymen with the simple words: "If not now, Yankel, when?" 
As if the gates of Eden were again opened, the gossipers and rumor-mongers 
rushed in. Yes, indeed, they asked, why not now? This is a good time what with the 
pogrom in L'vov last month, certainly as good as any. And why not here? After all, 
this small village, not known for much besides being the home of the Ba'al Shem Tov, 
is where the holiest of the holies had chosen to gather themselves and probably pray in 
the mightiest earnestness, sincerity, and fervor. Boys in cheder buzzed beneath their 
teacher's beard about the strange happenings and portents for the coming of the Messiah. 
Basha, the carpenter's wife, began polishing her one treasured silver kiddush cup in 
honor of the Messiah's impending arrival. Yudel, the stout greengrocer, unlocked the 
bridal chest of his late wife, Gisha, to air his finest and long packed-away tallis, his 
marriage tallis, and Feder, the weaver, was besieged with requests for white cloth for 
dresses for the women, and new black cloth for fine suits for the men. 
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Yossi, the simple devout tailor, had spent the thirty days alone behind drawn 
curtains in his one room shack, studying, praying, fasting, reading psalms, and 
strengthening himself mentally and physically for what he knew would become his 
longest and most arduous journey, a trip that would take him only steps from his home, 
but into a world as far removed from Polonia as could be imagined. Six steps alone, the 
Ba'al Shem had declared, were what Yossi had to walk himself. He would fly to the 
heavens on the wings of the disciples with the strength of the holy men to approach the 
light of God, but he spent the month readying himself for his six final, triumphant steps. 
From within his isolation and concentration, Yossi was jerked forcibly into the here and 
now by a loud rapping on his door. 
"Yossi! Yossi!" a voice called into his reverie, "open the door and measure me 
for a new suit!" Yossi climbed up from his corner on the floor and walked in a daze to 
the knocking that disturbed him. "Yossi, are you in there?" 
"Yankel? Yankel, YOU need a new suit? Why? Is your daughter getting 
married?" he asked as he steadied himself from his deep contemplation. 
"Married? My daughter? No, Yossi, the Messiah is coming and I need a new 
suit," Yankel declared in a matter-of-fact manner. "Come, hurry, we have so little 
time." 
Yossi straightened himself as he gazed into the fervid eyes of the dairyman who 
stood at his door. Messiah? In Polonia? Had he heard correctly? As if it had a mind 
of its own, the tailor's mouth fell open. It was all he could do to simply stare at the 
raving man. And it was all Yankel could do to keep from striking Yossi around his ears 
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that apparently could not hear Yankel's clearly elevated voice. Yankel continued 
berating the tailor for his tardiness and his stupidity. 
"He comes. He is coming. We~all of us in this town—all know. Why don't you 
know? Where have you been? Come now, you will measure me for a fine suit to greet 
the Chosen One. He could be here by Shabbat. Now wouldn't Shabbat be a perfect time 
for the arrival of the Messiah here in our fine town?" 
Yossi drew in a sharp, deep breath and saw beyond the dairyman's shoulder that 
the townspeople were gathered in the street, talking and chattering animatedly among 
themselves, gesturing hands flying every which way, people chirping and scurrying about 
like crickets. He searched his mind for answers to the questions that came in deluges, 
but Yossi, the simple tailor, found none. 
On the dirt floor, Yossi had kept a calendar of sorts during his time of seclusion 
and preparation. Quickly counting twenty-nine strokes, he immediately became aware 
that tomorrow, erev Shabbat and Rosh Chodesh, was the day of his appointment with the 
Ba'al Shem Tov and the disciples. Were the disciples here already? Why had Yossi not 
gone out to greet them? Where had the time gone? It had seemed that only an instant 
passed since his request of the Ba'al Shem Tov was made and the zaddik's promise was 
given. He pushed Yankel aside. 
"No, not now! Now is my final moment. I must prepare myself. No new suits 
today, not even for you, my old friend." The dairyman stared in utter surprise at the 
quick, decisive and dismissive motions of the heretofore reticent tailor. The fire in the 
tailor's eyes burned deeply into what seemed to be the essence of the dairyman's heart. 
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This was a man to be left alone to own path, he thought. This is a possessed man, a 
man who has seen a vision. He backed away from the gesticulating tailor and hurried 
home to pass the news of the tailor's eccentricities along to the men in town. 
Meanwhile, Yossi surveyed his tiny home to choose luggage for his journey to 
the light of heaven. What did one take on such a journey, he asked himself. A tallis? 
A kiddush cup? A prayer book? All seemed so inconsequential when meeting the 
Almighty. What should he take, he wondered, and sat down in his corner on the floor 
till evening fell. As the third star appeared, Yossi said the prayer in his heart to greet 
this special evening. He sat in this corner until he noticed the morning and recited 
morning prayers when the sun rose. First he washed himself, then with one quick look 
at the room that was his home since before his parents died, he opened the door, stepped 
through, touched the mezzuzah, closed the door firmly behind him, and walked directly 
to the small home belonging to the Ba'al Shem Tov, carrying nothing in either hand, yet 
with a zeal and passion in his fiery eyes that consumed and quenched his fear. Stopping 
at the front door of the Ba'al Shem's home, Yossi knocked once and waited. 
Although it was early in the morning and before many should have been out of 
bed, Yossi's trip to the Ba'al Shem's home did not go unnoticed by the men in town. 
Many of the townspeople had not slept all that night and had been discussing, arguing, 
laughing, jeering, and shouting about the Messiah's impending arrival. For thirty days, 
not one in town had dared disturb the Ba'al Shem or his holy disciples lest they disrupt 
their quest for the Messiah's arrival. Except Yossi. Here now on a fine morning just 
right for the arrival of God's chosen one, the meager tailor stood empty-handed and 
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audaciously rapped at the door behind which only who-knows-what was going on. Such 
nerve! Such gall! Just who did Yossi the tailor think he was? The men gathered 
slowly, then in greater numbers, across the tiny street from the Ba'al Shem's modest 
dwelling. They strained and pushed to witness the impending spectacle when the Ba'al 
Shem Tov would undoubtedly throw the poor tailor out on his ear. With utter 
amazement, they witnessed their first miracle: the Ba'al Shem personally answered the 
door, smiled at the tailor, and ushered him into his house. The gossipers and rumor-
spreaders went quickly to work and by noon all in the town had decided that Yossi the 
tailor may just very well be God's Chosen One, selected to usher in the redemption of 
the world. Knowing nothing else to do, the women of town gathered in Yossi's one-
room and began cleaning, cooking, and readying the bungalow for the coming of the 
ever-lasting Shabbat. The men, also searching for activity, posted one guard to alert 
them to Yossi's exit, and also besieged his house and repaired the fence, straightened the 
posts, and nailed down loose boards on the street side. The guard did not disturb their 
labor for Yossi did not emerge, not that day nor the next. The people waited anxiously 
for word of the Messiah and no one in town slept well or for any length of time that 
night. 
In the Ba'al Shem Tov's home, no sleep for Yossi, the disciples, or the Ba'al 
Shem Tov himself was in order either. Without so much as introductions, the Ba'al 
Shem asked Yossi simply, "Are you ready?" and with the tailor's nod, led him to the 
center of the circle of disciples. Yossi stood timidly and awkwardly, unaware of what 
he was supposed to do or what was expected of him, and after what seemed like an 
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eternity, reached down within himself and began praying pure thoughts toward God, 
knowing that by doing so, God would look at Yossi as if God were a human being. 
Yossi prayed as if he were in Eden, and allowed no envy, lust, or pride to distract him. 
He concentrated on the sound of the lone cricket near his feet, a voice he heard as clearly 
as the sound of the shofar. This one mitzvah of prayer Yossi struggled to perform 
ultimately and to the core. He stood alone among many in the darkness and travelled his 
own true Exodus, stopping at Sinai to receive personally the Law from God, and 
carefully traversed the blade of life, knowing that emptiness was the life of the man who 
fell from the narrow ridge. On his journey to his private space within the multitudes for 
his moment with God's light, Yossi prayed for the wicked, too. His love of God became 
nothing if he could not love man. He felt the spark of knowledge almost extinguished 
by the angel at his birth come alive and burn within his soul. He felt simple, yet holy, 
owing to the presence of the prayers of these holy men, and he experienced the humility 
of Moses as he accepted God's verdict against him. On this, the ninth rung of pride and 
humility, Yossi reached out with his heart for the souls of the righteous men in his midst. 
He felt alone yet in communion with the others in and out of this tiny room and at that 
moment he did not fear that he might fail when he stood face-to-face with God's light. 
He longed for the moment, if even a moment, and in his fervor took his first step alone. 
The angels in heaven ceased their talking and joined him on his path. The warmth that 
greeted him refreshed his soul and he stepped again, a second step, toward the light. 
Songs of praise emerged from the unmoving mouths of the heavenly chorus and filled 
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his ears with joyful sounds of praise. His mind joined the chorus and his heart pounded 
him along to his next step. 
He could feel the light now. He took a third step and he witnessed the teaching 
of Law to Moses on Sinai. He glimpsed the back of God's head and saw Moses' hair 
turn white. Renewed, he took a fourth step as the heavenly chorus washed away his 
trembling and his foot reached out once more. 
He saw all the zaddikim, present, past, and future, praying fervent prayers for 
themselves, their disciples, and their communities. He saw the blind leading the lame, 
the rich feeding the poor, and ignorant learning from the masters. Recognizing the 
chariot of the Messiah, Yossi's heart greeted the world to come! He perceived the light, 
not with seeing eyes, but with a full heart of gladness for Olam ha-Ba. Yossi's steps 
continued forward. The fifth step brought him to full knowledge. 
Yossi's unseeing eyes witnessed the Messiah's message that Zion shall be 
redeemed with justice. He heard in his soul the cries of the downtrodden lifted 
effortlessly by their fellow-men, and the cacophony of peace that inhabited the earth. 
He felt the swells of the winds of the wings of the zaddikim urging and assisting him on 
this journey toward his moment in God's holy light. He lifted his hands beseechingly 
toward the light and ventured his sixth and last step. 
In mid-stride, an unknown face of such evil as he had never imagined possible 
interposed itself between Yossi and the light and abruptly the light of the heaven was cut 
off and vanished. The angels' chorus ceased. The downtrodden cried again, the blind 
and lame struggled individually and without gain on separate paths. Moses again 
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questioned God and was pained at His denial of Moses' entry into the Promised Land. 
He felt the flame of the spark of knowledge fade, and the cacophony of peace was 
replaced by the shrieking and anguished cries of women and children, men, grandparents, 
zaddikim, teachers, rabbis, tailors, and shopkeepers joining together in a horrible chorus 
of pain. All prayers ceased and the voices of the angels were silent and their eyes 
closed. The wind of the wings of the zaddikim present in the Ba'al Shem's home 
fluttered to silence and as he fell backward, Yossi witnessed another and horribly 
different light, a light of a dizzying and abrupt sunset of Shabbat in his tiny town in 
Polonia. He knew that his journey was ended but he could not imagine the reasons. He 
saw the image of the light, and then the light vanished. Complete, total and utter sadness 
overcame him as he tried desperately to pull himself back together to the world of the 
here and now and focus his unseeing eyes on the outlines of the forms of the zaddikim 
in a circle around him. He heard the stunned silence that filled the room. 
No journey of the disciples had ever ended in such a mad and evil way. The 
zaddikim were confused and alarmed and as they turned to their master they saw that the 
Ba'al Shem Tov's face was streaked with tears and they heard his lamenting and 
unintelligible cries that filled the tiny room. 
As if in despondent echo, the thunder of the heavens rocked and crashed above 
the tiny Polish village, demonically ending the community's joyful ritual of the 
celebration of Queen Shabbat's coming and sent the townspeople scurrying for covered 
shelter and safety. Huddled with his family in his tiny home, the dairyman hugged his 
frightened wife and their children as the crashes of fierce lightning and the menacing 
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sounds of booming thunder pierced the otherwise peaceful sky. The greengrocer, having 
covered his carts laden with his wares for the Shabbat rest, shrieked in impotence and 
dismay as his carts and bundles were ravaged by the unrelenting fury of the freakish 
weather. And Heschel, the rabbi's son, cowering in the corner of the House of Prayer, 
muttered silently, his lips mouthing the words, "I believe with perfect faith that the 
Messiah will come..." And Yossi reeled, fell, and finally lay spent and silent on the dirt 
floor amid the holy men and their master, the now-shattered Ba'al Shem Tov. 
It seemed as though time stood still as Yossi lay inert and the Ba'al Shem cried 
silent tears. The heavens reigned fury against the tiny town and, as the animals fled the 
surrounding forest, not a noise was heard, not even the chirp of the cricket. The birds 
vacated their roosts as the deer ran wildly through the clearings now twisted and littered 
with branches and tree limbs. Animals broke free from their pens and sought escape 
from the wrath visited upon them from the heavens. All was wrong in this tiny shtetl 
town and its inhabitants cowered with the kind of fear that has no rational explanation 
or purpose. All trembled and all were silent. 
This day became the Shabbat that never was for this tiny town and hundreds and 
thousands of other tiny towns in Polonia and across Eastern Europe. For the eternity that 
became that Shabbat, no prayers were offered in the synagogues, no Shabbat meals were 
celebrated, no sharing, communicating, teaching, or learning between rabbi and student 
happened. No one left his tiny house or refuge unless the fury of the unleashed lightning 
struck and burned it to the ground. Some escaped to the safety of neighbors, and others 
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perished horribly in the ensuing flames. The Ba'al Shem Tov's tears fell as did the rain, 
and Yossi remained unconscious to the elements in a stupor on the floor. 
At last, the Ba'al Shem spoke. 
"Friends, we cannot flee the darkness. Stay! Hide! The heavens are in 
confusion and for this day, God's holy sparks are gone! We remain alone and 
abandoned. We are without direction and without hope! The glory of the light has 
vanished. Pray, pray! Pray for the return of the light! Pray as if your very survival 
depends on it!11 
And with this dire pronouncement, the holiest of the zaddikim of Polonia fell 
silent, and the Ba'al Shem Tov cried. 
For twenty-four hours, the reign of darkness continued. Animals abandoned their 
forest homes, frightened men, women, and children hid in tiny shelters until the fierce 
lightning struck and burned yet another to the ground. The rabbis and their sons 
evacuated the Houses of Prayer, and the Chevrah Kadishah could not tend to the bodies 
of the dead. The earth stood still in mad fury that one Shabbat in Polonia and the 
ceaseless thunder drowned out the cries of men, the anguished shrieking of their wives 
and children, and silenced the chirping of the crickets. 
As abruptly as it had started, the heavens suddenly ceased their rampant 
destruction. Yet no one moved, fearing as much for his own life as well as fearing for 
the lives of the townspeople. But most of all, fear was in everyone's hearts for the Ba'al 
3 
Shem Tov and his holy disciples. No one remembered Yossi's entering the tiny house 
on the outskirts of town, yet all recalled the mysterious goings-on that the zaddikim had 
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practiced. Dazed and only semi-aware of their calamitous situation, one by one, what 
was left of the community emerged from their half-destroyed refuges and took stock of 
themselves, their loved ones, families, friends, businesses, and village. Fear was quickly 
replaced by intense anger as the remaining men of the town surveyed the total destruction 
wreaked on their tiny village and the loss of their friends, families, and livelihoods. In 
despair and utter frustration, the few gathered at the door of the Ba'al Shem's house for 
want of any other place to ask questions that had no answers and waited for his expected 
explanation. Waiting turned into anger fueled by frustration and the tiny group agreed 
to batter down his door than allow the inhabitants to escape their retribution for what 
must have been caused by the disciples' evil actions. With this fury of desperation, the 
small group forced open the wooden door and came face-to-face with the circle of dark, 
vacant faces of the holy disciples, the inert and prone Yossi, and the crying Ba'al Shem 
Tov. 
Ephraim the butcher spoke for the small group. "Ba'al Shem," he began in a 
small voice that grew in volume as his anger rose, "what have you wrought upon us? 
What evil have you conjured up that so angered the Holy One so, that He would destroy 
such a peaceful village as ours?" Staring at the body on the floor, he added, "And what 
of Yossi? What have you done to Yossi?" 
The Ba'al Shem, sill kneeling over Yossi and crying, yet gazing up toward the 
heavens, only repeated his unintelligible words, muttered incoherently, and cried 
unceasing tears. The disciples stared in shock, and Ephraim and what was left of his 
shattered community silently turned and exited, knowing that no answer would be theirs 
333 
today. The disciples filed out behind them, emerging into the sunlight, throwing back 
glances toward the image of Yossi lying silently beneath the kneeling, praying, and 
crying Ba'al Shem Tov. The world had been turned upside down, the lights had been 
extinguished, and what remained was not to be understood by the onlookers, not today, 
if ever. Only Yossi and the Ba'al Shem Tov knew what they had seen. And neither one 
could explain their vision to the men of the small, destroyed village. 
What they had seen simply had no explanation. For in that instant between 
Yossi's fifth and sixth steps, both he and the Ba'al Shem, who had been the most fervent 
in his lifting and carrying Yossi toward the perfect light, were free from the structures 
and constraints of time. They gazed into the past and toward the future and that gaze 
served to unlock a vision of the horrors that were to befall the descendants and 
generations of Polonia. They heard the death, they smelled the crematoria, they shared 
the pain of torture, and they were rent and twisted by the forced separation of mother 
from child, father from parent, zaddik from disciple, and people from their God. In that 
moment between steps, both Yossi and the Ba'al Shem Tov were present within the 
catastrophe and powerless to prevent it. The enormity of what they witnessed paralyzed 
Yossi and reduced the Ba'al Shem to tears for the six million who had not voice to cry 
for themselves. And in that instant, the sparks of heaven were forcibly darkened by the 
hand of man. And in His horror over what He had unloosed, God hid His face. The 
cries of fear from the angels unleashed immense thunder; the darkening of the holy 
sparks unleashed Satan's evil lightning. People of Polonia could only experience the 
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cataclysmic effects of the catastrophe that was their future. When they sought 
explanation from the most wise among them, he had no answers to give them. 
Polonia's tiny villages never returned to the normal state that was their existence 
prior to the unleashing of the fury. The Ba'al Shem Tov, it was ordained, was never to 
visit the holy land for his vision inflicted a permanent scarring upon his soul and a 
questioning of the Almighty plan, a humbling he shared with the great prophet Moses. 
Not having enough remaining willing citizens to reform or rebuild their town, the people 
of the Ba'al Shem Tov's village were dispersed, and sought comfort and company with 
those who had also survived the continental celestial storm. They left their homes and 
belongings, never looked back, and journeyed across mountains, rivers, and oceans to 
new lands and new avenues of seeking livelihood and God. 
Yossi remained in the small town, labelled as a madman, and was tended to by 
the Ba'al Shem Tov and his disciples for his remaining years. Yossi only muttered 
questions over and over again, and it did not matter if he had a listener, only questions. 
The Ba'al Shem always tried to respond and to answer his often-rambling questions, 
always with a seriousness and earnestness his disciples could not understand. 
"Where did the sixth step lead?" Yossi asked one day. 
"To darkness," patiently answered the Ba'al Shem once again. 
"Where were the lights?" Yossi asked again. 
"Gone," the Ba'al Shem replied, "gone away. Extinguished. God witnessed man 
destroy truth and God hid His face." 
"Where did God go?" Yossi implored, tears filling his eyes. 
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"He went with the voice of the crickets," the Ba'al Shem Tov responded gently. 
"To a place where silence reigns and evil echoes in the hills and mountains, through the 
valley of death and despair, to a land where questions have no answers." 
During one particular ominous evening when the forces of nature appeared at the 
ready to be unleashed on the small town as a thunderstorm, the distant crack of lightning 
elicited a series of questions from Yossi, the mad man. "Where was God?" he wondered 
as the Ba'al Shem Tov stroked his long white beard. 
"When we love more and more," the Ba'al Shem Tov sang gently to the troubled 
soul before him, "we invite God in. And when He is fully inside us, we can never 
completely let Him go. But just where was God that night so long ago, my friend? 
When the heart of man is so hard that God's light is shut out of his creation, He laments 
for having created man and the heavens witness the fury that would be the world's 
destiny if there were no Almighty as our comfort and partner in creation." 
"But how do we rekindle the light of God?" Yossi implored. 
And the Ba'al Shem Tov opened his hand to show the poor tailor the cricket that 
had been chirping quietly within his loosened fist. "Listen, my poor soul, listen. Listen 
to the voice of the simplest of the forest and hear his thoughts. When man has no 
answer, listen with your heart, your eyes, your arms, legs, and feet to the simplest sound 
you can find. Only within the simple are the great and difficult questions both asked and 
answered. When the question is almighty, the answer is not from any man. The voice 
of the cricket is the only answer for such a question." 
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APPENDIX C: COMMENTARY 
The Voice of the Cricket, by Susan Lecin Polinsky, presents an interpretation 
of the Holocaust and radical evil through the guise of the Hasidic tale. By closely 
emulating Martin Buber's style, this modern Hasidic tale enables the reader to 
imagine how the Baal Shem Tov would have responded to the horror and destruction 
of the Holocaust, for it truly was the darkest period of Jewish history. 
From my view as a rabbi and an educator, the power of The Voice of the 
Cricket is in the imagery which is used. The cricket is one small creature which can 
be eliminated by one step. Yet its pure and simple voice carries in the darkness of 
the night. The recurring image of the cricket, from the moment Yossi unconsciously 
steps on one to the cricket as the source of the answer, reiterates the significance of 
the small things in life. For the Baal Shem Tov, the simple and small creations of 
God were equally important to and as awe-inspiring as animals and human beings, 
because God was the source of all. Thus, the cricket represents the good, simple, 
and the innocence in the world. 
In contrast, the image of the boot at the beginning of the story denotes power. 
This power belongs to humanity and is thus in conflict with Divine power. The boot 
is not rooted in creation but made by a human being. The sense of destruction 
caused by the boot corresponds to the total destruction brought about by the radical 
evil of the Holocaust. 
These dichotomies of God-made versus man-made and power versus weakness 
reflect my attitude toward the Holocaust. In order to understand the radical evil, my 
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God-concept reflects the sense that humanity is influenced by Divine inspiration but 
each individual chooses how to use or not to use the inspiration. Thus the 
omnipotent God of the Baal Shem Tov withdrew into darkness because humanity 
chose not to let Divine inspiration influence their actions, rather than God 
relinquishing the power. 
The Voice of the Cricket places the realm of radical evil within humanity. I 
firmly believe that if segments of humanity had continued to hear the voice of 
simplicity, of purity, of creation, then the darkness of radical evil would not have 
enveloped the world we know. The voice of the cricket would have continued to be 
heard. 
Through imagery and replication of the style of Martin Buber, The Voice of 
the Cricket allows the reader a sense of how the Baal Shem Tov might have 
responded to the Holocaust and radical evil. It enables the reader to accept that 
God did not withdraw but that humanity withdrew from God. God remains with 
those who continue to search within themselves for the answers. 
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